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ABSTRACT
This thesis argues that the legal subject is unable to exercise control over their sexual 
and gender identity in law. In other words, I suggest that identity is controlled not by 
the individual, but by law. My focus is female gender and sexual identity with 
particular reference to lesbian sexual identity. I suggest that the legal ‘meaning’ given 
by law to the ‘categories’ of ‘woman’, ‘mother’ and ‘lesbian’ and so forth, are of 
central importance to law in its determination of ‘identity’. I argue that this is a 
continuing process and takes place not only within the context of hetero-centric 
values, assumptions and norms, but also by the operational nature of ‘distinct’ 
epistemological fields within law. As a result, identity, is created by legal discourse, 
not the individual. I focus upon the ways in which female identity is represented 
within the contexts of ‘the family and marriage’; child custody disputes; familial 
property disputes; visual rhetoric and biological determinism. I argue that lesbian 
identity within law continues to be rendered ‘the other’ and ‘the invisible’ due to the 
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“Every person participates in a multitude of social 
relations, some of them consciously, some of 
them not. Once we begin to question our place in 
society, we are led to ask how, where, and in what 
ways we participate in it”. (Tong, 1989:125).
During the course of this thesis, I will explore the posit that 
identity is formulated by, and through, legal discourse, and not by 
the legal subject herself. I will argue that there is a complex and 
highly structured hierarchy of legal identities, resulting in a 
‘spectrum’ of identities, ranging from those identities which are 
excluded, rendered ‘the other’, to those which are ‘favoured’ or 
‘promoted’.
I argue that law ‘creates’ and ‘reproduces’ the identity of 
‘family’ and as a consequence, the identities of the individuals 
within that family. Attempting to ‘map’ some of these ‘creative’ 
and ‘reproductive’ processes will, I argue, allow for the
discrepancies between law’s ‘promise’ and its ‘performance’ to 
be exposed.
I cannot speak for all subjects of law and I would not be so 
presumptuous as to claim that I speak for the experience of all 
women, I can only tell a very small part of the story. However, I 
would argue that every legal subject’s identity is affected in some 
measure by legal discourse. Although the vast majority of 
individuals do not encounter ‘law’ in quite the same way as the 
respondents and applicants who appear in reported cases, the 
‘effects’ filter down law’s ‘capillaries’ and permeate into a wider 
sphere of law and society.
I have sought therefore, to try and counter-act (if only in a small 
way), and argue against, socio-legal processes which construct 
certain identities as invisible, illegitimate and ‘the other’. I have 
further sought to explore the possibility that not only do these 
‘socio-legal’ processes exclude and discriminate against certain 
constructions of identity, but do so whilst purporting to be doing 
the opposite. In other words, law speaks of inclusion, but 
excludes, law talks of ‘legitimacy’, but practices ‘illegitimacy.
Whilst the concept of ‘motherhood’ is generally endorsed and 
approved of by law, this endorsement only occurs when expected
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‘norms’ are conformed to. A lesbian identity is one which is 
immediately obvious as not conforming to heterocentric values 
and assumptions. The ‘juncture’ between lesbian identity and 
law provides the main focus of this thesis. Are lesbian mothers 
perceived of as ‘mothers’ or ‘lesbians’? Are these two concepts 
regarded as legal oxymorons? Why does a ‘lesbian’ identity 
receive a legal scrutiny that female heterosexual identity does 
not? Why is it that despite the popular concept of ‘glorious 
motherhood’, a lesbian identity is often perceived as being in 
direct opposition to the ideal of motherhood?
During the course of this first chapter, I want to explore some of 
the ways in which issues such as power, recognition, typification, 
conspiracy and cultural values continue to be preserved by law’s 
self-determined parameters, and its often ‘invisible’ practice of 
categorising legal ‘relevance’.
“I am an academic lawyer. Whilst researching and 
writing this book I often wished that I were also an 
historian and a sociologist”. (Doggett 1992:1).
In writing my own thesis, I have often expressed similar wishes.
I do not think it is possible to ‘talk’ about ‘law’ without 
acknowledging that law is as much a ‘product’ of, and a
‘producer’, of these ‘other’ ‘disciplines’. Law is not created in a 
vacuum, nor is its function to maintain or produce a vacuum. 
While I too, am taking ‘law’ as my primary ‘object’ of study, I 
readily acknowledge that discourse from other ‘disciplines’ 
interacts with law in many different ways and on many different 
levels. In a similar way, ‘law’, its effects and its power, are 
experienced by its ‘subjects’ everyday. Despite the operation of 
power and its effects upon those ‘subjects’ of law, to what extent 
does individual experience impact upon, law?
As a ‘subject’ of law myself, it has become clear to me that 
families and sexuality are not the ‘set in stone’ fundamentals that 
I had always been led to believe. Instead, they appear to be free 
floating concepts, at the mercy of any interpretations, 
constructions and meanings associated with, or imposed upon 
them. This kind of formulation might imply that they carry no 
limits. However, these ‘free floating’ concepts are interpreted by 
law using the workings of discourse, knowledge and power. 
This led me to ask how ‘the culture of law’ was able to 
selectively admit, refuse to recognise, or render silent other 
voices, interpretations and constructions.
I also began to realise that the Taws’ governing how such 
concepts are encountered, interpreted and applied, were
themselves subjective, capricious and restrictive. They were not 
value free or neutral. The pursuit of, and the claim to, ‘truth’ 
within legal discourse is inherently ideological, hierarchical and 
selective. It appeared to me that in practice, Taw’ seemed to 
have little in common with it’s inherent, implied ‘promises’ of 
justice, fairness, equality and so forth through which it seeks to 
legitimate itself. Again, not what I had previously been led to 
believe, not only by the law tutors during my undergraduate days, 
but also by the reading of hundreds of law reports in the 
‘traditional subject areas’ (tort, contract, trusts etc.1). These cases 
were always ‘legitimated’ by reference to the underpinning of 
‘egalitarian’ ideas - ‘equal treatment’ ‘equal rights’ ‘impartiality’, 
for example.
Butler cites this phenomenon as ‘performative’ power. She 
argues that the judge, in giving ‘his’ judgement, undertakes a 
performative act. It is the very ‘act’ of handing down a 
judgement and the ‘power’ conferred and implied within that 
‘act’ which gives the judge power, not any previous citing of 
cases or statutes, nor reliance on precedent. In this respect, if the 
power of discourse is linked with performativity, then the 
performative domain is one which this form of power acts as
1 My undergraduate studies were overwhelmingly ‘black letter, an approach to 
law which has been called a ‘bastardisation o f legal positivism’ (McCoubrey
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discourse (Butler 1993: 225). In other words, it is the 
performance of the citation of the past which grants the judge 
‘his’ authority and not the citation per se. However, the judge’s 
judgement, is not a singular act; instead the judgement repeats or 
mimes the discursive gestures of power:
“Hence, the judge who authorises and installs the 
situation he names invariably cites the law he 
applies, and it is the power of this citation that 
gives the performative its binding or conferring 
power. And although it may appear that the
binding power of his words is derived from the
force of his will or from a prior authority, the 
opposite is more true: it is through the citation of 
the law that the figure of the judge’s “will” is 
produced and the “priority” of textual authority is 
established.” (Butler 1993: 225).
Thus according to Butler, the position of ‘authority’ which the 
judge speaks from, is derived not from the judge, nor from the
actual judgement given. Instead, the performative power is
invoked through conventional citational legacy. It is through this 
‘legacy’ that a judgement appears to be part of a ‘continuous
and White 1993:187).
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chain’ of judgements, giving both the judge and the judgement 
their ‘legitimacy’. My subjectively lived experience as a law 
student, engaged in three years ‘hard labour’ reading many law 
reports, led to a conclusion that the underlying purpose was not 
necessarily to explore concepts of ‘fairness’, ‘equality’, ‘justice’ 
and so forth, but rather to learn ‘how to cite the law’. In other 
words, my ‘purpose’ as a law student, was to ‘imitate’ the judges’ 
citation.
It appears to me that on a rhetorical level, much of what law was 
supposed to ‘do’, was incompatible with my perception of 
myself as an (actual or possible) ‘subject’ of law. For example, 
my perception of myself as a ‘woman’ did not seem to match the 
image presented to me by law - and the image I had of myself as 
a lesbian most definitely did not match. On an experiential level,
I realised that my ‘self-perception’ and my self-identity, causes a 
‘categorisation’ problem for legal culture. However, it was also a 
recognition that law both requires, and necessarily operates 
through, categories of ‘legal relevance’. The more Taw’ I was 
exposed to, the more I began to realise that legally and socially 
speaking, ‘families’ and ‘lesbians’ were ‘categories’ not deemed 
to be ‘compatible’ (in the eyes of the law), either with each other, 
or the dominant legal culture. In other words, they are mutually 
exclusive polar opposites. I have sought to counter-act (even if
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only in a small way), and argue against a process by which I had 
been constructed as invisible, illegitimate and ‘the other’ by a 
system which itself repeatedly purports to be doing the opposite. 
I wanted to explore the law’s selective refusal to recognise 
identity in some cases and the promotion of identity in others.
During this first chapter, I explore some of the methodological 
approaches I have taken advantage of in trying to explore these 
issues. I have drawn on some of Foucault’s work in order to 
explore some of the limits of the meaning associated with and 
constructed by the language that law uses. I do however, stop 
short of a complete adoption of Foucault’s ideas regarding the 
‘non-existence’ of ‘the subject’, preferring instead to regard the 
subject as ‘something which exists’ within law, but whose 
experientially defined subjectivity is ignored or negated.
I start my substantial examination of these issues in my second 
chapter, by exploring the manner in which ‘family’ has been 
defined, categorised and imposed by dominant ideological 
discourse, a dominance which is often ‘hidden’ within ‘layers’ of 
‘legitimacy’ and ‘truth’ from critical examination. Whilst there 
are, obviously, other familial arrangements which exist without 
the blood tie, (e.g. adoptive families), the ‘blood tie’ and 
biological determinism/constructionism continue to play a central
defining role in socio-legal familial construction. For example, 
adoptive families ‘lack’ the a blood tie, yet the law still seeks to 
construct a blood tie. In other words, the law forces the adoptive 
family to mimic the biological one. I seek to challenge some of 
the notions surrounding families as being ‘natural’ i.e. 
biologically constructed and determined. The appeal of ‘the 
natural’ to legal discourse, allows for the operation of power law 
to present the ‘natural’ as ‘established truth, whilst 
simultaneously enabling this process to remain largely disguised.
For example, in the following extract, the judge makes the appeal 
to the ‘natural’ as if he were basing his judgement on facts; any 
‘difference’ therefore, is presented as being based on fact, not 
cultural meanings and understandings:
“No matter how you may dispute and argue, you 
cannot alter the fact that women are quite different 
from men. The principal task in the life of 
women is to bear and raise children:...He is 
physically the stronger and she the weaker. He is 
temperamentally the more aggressive and she the 
more submissive. It is he who takes the initiative 
and she who responds. These diversities of 
function and temperament lead to differences of
outlook which cannot be ignored.” (Denning 
1980:194).
Grosz, for example argues that this approach limits women’s 
social and psychological capacities according to biologically 
established limits. This approach therefore, ‘asserts that women 
are weaker in physical strength than men, that women are, in 
their biological natures, more emotional than men. (Grosz, 1995: 
48).
This ‘desire’ to keep separate, make categories, set apart and so 
forth, is not only utilised to ensure for example, that ‘male’ 
identity is kept separate from ‘female’ identity, but also to 
exclude in other ways; ‘heterosexuality’ from ‘homosexuality’, or 
‘mother’ from ‘lesbian’.
In chapter three, I examine some of the case law in ‘marital’ 
property dispute cases in an attempt to uncover a similar pattern 
of separation. Only this time it is not the divide between what is 
‘natural’ and what is not, but a divide over ‘distinct’ areas of 
legal practice. With this in mind, in addition to problematising 
that relationship between law, identity and ownership, it is also 
my concern to problematise the ‘ownership’ of language by, and 
within, law. This latter analysis will explore the artificial and
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thin divisions created by law in respect to its own internal 
workings. I hope to show that the continuation of the artificial 
divide between ‘property’ law and ‘family’ law, is not due to a 
necessity to prevent one ‘discipline’ overlapping another, (a 
common cry amongst some lawyers), but is part of a larger 
pattern of exclusion and ostracism (Bottomley 1993).
The ‘injustice’ that often results from this pattern of exclusion is 
arguably the most ‘blatant’ example of an open 
acknowledgement of law’s divisive operational nature. Yet even 
here, there is a pervasive unwillingness to re-evaluate categories 
and concepts.
What happens then, when the acknowledgement that such 
divisive and exclusionary methods are missing?
In chapter four, I attempt to answer this question by suggesting 
that the exclusionary strategies used, become a little more 
‘subtle’. However, whilst the strategies may become more 
subtle, the effects on ‘the subject’ are not. In order to explore the 
operation and effect of these strategies, I concentrate upon the 
importance of the symbolic and iconic aspects of law’s 
exclusionary operational nature and continued reinforcement of 
its own ‘legitimacy’. I argue that law’s dependence upon
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legitimacy is achieved mainly through the re-enforcement of 
Tines of succession’ in the context of ‘the family’. This is 
achieved through written discourse, but also through what I have 
termed ‘visual’ rhetoric; i.e., law’s symbols and icons. The 
symbolic nature of law’s visual symbols and icons has been the 
subject of critical examination in other contexts, for example, 
the symbolic nature of the court room.2 However, the operation 
of power through more ‘accessible’ or ‘common’ visual symbols 
has not been addressed to a similar extent.
Constant bombardment of a particular visual representation of the 
family operates upon the subject to re-inforce the dominant 
ideology of an inherently heterosexual and gendered family. For 
example, the ‘nuclear’ family, is visually portrayed in a manner 
consistent with its a written image. Part of the ‘problem’ of 
hying to uncover dominant ideological constructions, has been 
the ‘invisibility’ of alternative discourses.
Even within the ‘academy’ itself, the problem of invisibility 
continues. At the level of undergraduate studies, whilst the 
students may be encouraged to think critically about law, the 
main ‘tools’ used for this are, of course, text books. These 
immediately present the student and lecturer with images of the
2 See for example, Jackson: 1985., Goodrich: 1991., Kelveson: 1989.
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family which are prescriptive in nature and operation. The visual 
images I have chosen are found on the front covers of 
‘commonly used’ family law text books to explore whether 
‘power’ operates by the symbolic repetition of citation, and how 
that which is symbolic becomes invested with power.
Against this backdrop of the often uncritiqued, unacknowledged 
operation of ‘power’ and ‘truth’ within socio-legal discourse, 
how does the legal subject ‘experience’ Taw’; in what ways does 
this manifest itself? In chapter five, the legal subject under 
consideration is the lesbian mother. It is the wielding of power 
within law towards the excluded lesbian mother that I argue 
illustrates an incongruous operation of law’s nature. The terms 
upon which a lesbian mother is ‘allowed’ to be recognised as a 
legal subject in her own right, are extremely restrictive.
I will argue that not only does this operate to the detriment of the 
particular lesbian mother concerned, but also to the detriment of 
law itself. The negative ‘recognition’ given to a lesbian mother is 
based on the repetitive sameness and homogeneity of 
heterosexuality. I argue that it is this ‘sameness’ and 
homogeneity which can lead to legal stagnation. In other words, 
diversity and difference are ‘recognised’ by law only in negative 
terms. ‘Difference’ is therefore constituted as deviance and
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weakness. ‘Conformity’ to the ‘ideal’ as strength. In this respect, 
sameness and difference are placed in a hierarchy of privilege in 
relation to their opposites. For example, the legal category of 
‘woman’ is placed on a hierarchical scale in relation to its binary 
oppositional category, that of ‘male’. In other words, law 
concerns itself with the creation of categories, hierarchy and 
privilege - and ‘power’ is an integral part of that process. Thus, 
it is not necessarily the identification of difference(s) per se, that 
is of prime interest to me, but rather the operation and nature of 
those difference(s), and the meaning and importance law ascribes 
to them.
Would a Foucauldian analysis of the operation of
power/knowledge allow us to theorise that the power/knowledge 
dichotomy was also inherently linked with the issue of control, 
ownership and possession of identity? Does law claim exclusive 
access to ‘knowledge’ and the ‘truth’ about identity; its 
construction and expression?
In chapter six, I attempt to answer these questions by exploring 
the operation of power/knowledge within the construction of 
sexual and gender identity and the resulting control over the 
possession and expression of that individual identity. ‘Power’ is
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part and parcel of our everyday lives - we live it rather than have 
it:
“Foucault...constitutes a radical break with all 
previous conceptions of power...To begin with, 
power is not a possession, won by one class that 
strives to retain it against its acquisition by 
another. Power is not the prerogative of the 
‘bourgeoisie’; the ‘working class’ has no historical 
mission in acquiring it. Power, as such, does not 
exist, but in challenging existing notions of how 
societies operate, one is forced, in the first 
instance, to employ the same word. Power is an 
effect of the operation of social relationships, 
between groups and between individuals. It is not 
unitary: it has no essence.” (Sheridan, 1980: 218).
Within this context, I will examine how power operates upon the 
legal subject’s ability to self-determine sexual and gender 
identity within the context of legal discourse. I will argue that 
the legal subject is disempowered from ‘having’ their own, self- 
defined identity, and instead is expected to adopt the identity 
constructed for them. In this respect, I concentrate upon the 
concepts of ‘ownership’ within ‘the family’ and explore the
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extent to which sexuality and gender are viewed by law as 
‘property’. In other words, does law view ‘identity’ as the 
‘property of law?
As with chapter five, I have chosen to concentrate primarily upon 
the operation of law on lesbian mothers. Through a random 
selection of some of the case law I will ask whether sexuality and 
its attendant expressions, is perceived by law as something to be 
controlled and categorised. Are there ‘gaps’ between the 
constructions, expressions and representations of a lesbian 
mother’s self-identity, and those that are imposed upon her by 
law? If there are, it may be these ‘gaps’ allow us to ‘map’ the 
apparent continuing difficulty that women (especially lesbians), 
as legal subjects, have in authenticating their identity and 
exercising control over it.
My seventh and final chapter will draw together the substantive 
issues I have examined throughout the course of my thesis. At 
that juncture, the discussion will point towards possible modes of 
resistance to impositions of power and the possibility of moving 
towards a ‘new’ jurisprudentially/judicial approach to ‘the 
family’ and ‘intimacy’. Within this context, I will try to examine 
why Taw’ appears incapable of viewing the ‘family’ without the 
‘crutches’ of gender, sexuality, femininity, masculinity and so
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forth as they are presently defined. To use a politically 
fashionable phrase, ‘do we need to think the unthinkable?’ In my 
opinion, ‘thinking the unthinkable’, is not necessarily re-thinking 
familial structures themselves, but re-thinking the strategies and 
methodologies used to create and sanction those structures.
Having introduced some of the substantive issues to be explored 
within this thesis, I now turn to discuss the various 
methodological techniques and approaches I have utilised.
Qualitative/quantitative?
I have decided that it would be inappropriate to use a quantitative 
methodological approach for a variety of reasons. A quantitative 
approach would necessitate identifying (and thereby defining), 
the object of the study. Even if it were possible or desirable to 
produce ‘categories’ that are suitable for quantitative research, 
defining in operational terms, the ‘object’ of the study, in my 
own case Taw’, ‘family’, and ‘sexuality’ and so forth, would lead 
to that type of essentialist inclusion/exclusion approach, which I 
am anxious to avoid. In other words, external definitions have the 
propensity to suggest, and even stipulate, the ‘answers’ from the 
top-down. Classifying and categorising sexual and gender 
identity has largely proved to be a controversial issue for
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quantitative approaches by forcing the field of experience
onto/into pre-conceived operational categories and therefore
allowing these to pass unchallenged. For example, in the 
‘research area’ of lesbian sexuality, many such quantitative 
studies have been criticised for ‘inaccurate labelling’;
“This collection of invalidatory labels has the 
effect of severely reducing the number of ‘real’ 
lesbians in existence. By defining large numbers
of women as outside the category of lesbianism,
social scientists are then left with a relatively 
narrow, limited and homogeneous group of ‘real’ 
lesbians from whom accounts can be elicited.” 
(Kitzinger 1987: 68).
In other words, the question of what it means to be a ‘lesbian’ is 
defined not by the subject herself, but by the social scientist. To 
be a ‘real’ lesbian, she must conform to the parameters and 
definitions imposed by the researcher, at the expense of, and 
regardless to, how she herself defines her identity with respect to 
her life experiences.
Furthermore, once amassed, quantitative data can be mistakenly 
treated as ‘knowledge’ about the subject. Under these
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circumstances, the ‘knowledge’ gained by the researcher as a 
result of such quantitative study, is limited to the experiences of 
lesbians who ‘fit’ the social scientists definition of ‘lesbian’ - 
women who have been defined as ‘real’ lesbians. Such studies 
do not allow for the act of ‘self-definition’. In other words, there 
remains the possibility that such studies do not fully take into 
account the experiences of lesbians who have defined their 
identity for themselves:
“Arriving at a working definition of ‘lesbian’ is 
fraught with difficulty and contradiction, there is 
no consensus about what defines or even what 
characterises a lesbian. The word is variously 
understood and positioned within a multiplicity of 
paradigms: the moral, the mystical/religious, the 
juridical, the scientific, the medical, the political 
and the social. ... Among lesbians ourselves there 
is a profound dissensus about lesbian identity, 
with essentialist and constructionist theories of 
varying kinds and degrees giving rise to 
contradictory and often competing performances 
of ‘lesbian’, as well as political and theoretical 
positions.” (Wilton 1995: 29).
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In this respect, I am not seeking to find the ‘truth’ about ‘lesbian’ 
identity (if there is such a thing), nor how it should be defined 
within the operation of law (which I would argue is impossible). 
That kind of ‘knowledge’ does not have the capacity to put under 
sufficient scrutiny, the operation of law and power upon the 
construction of identity. In this respect, I would argue that a 
quantitative approach relies heavily, either implicitly or 
expressly, upon essentialist connotations, treating the object of 
research as given, not as constructed, as something already 
produced, not as a process of on-going social construction 
mediated by ad hoc selective interpretations.
For example, in The Lesbian Heresy, Jeffreys makes a distinction 
between different kinds of lesbianism. ‘Lesbian feminism’ she 
argues, is the construction of lesbian identity through feminism; 
‘Lesbians who are feminists experience their lesbianism and their 
feminism separately (Jeffreys 1994: xi). Whelehan notes that in 
this respect, “Jeffreys’ implicit aim to attribute a certain purity to 
a ‘proper’ lesbian perspective is becoming increasingly 
unpopular in academic and wider circles” (Whelehan 1995).
I would argue that essentialism is a methodological tool to be 
approached with caution. My caution stems from essentialists’ 
argument that every individual, every system, everything that is
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‘known’, has one objectively given ‘essence’, i.e., that it is 
possessed by a common ‘nature’ or ‘property’ which is intrinsic 
to it. As a theory, essentialism provides definitions of a ‘thing’, 
revealing its ‘essence’; the perfect ideal form. In other words, it 
reifies a process that is presented as a factually given state of 
affairs. The legal subject is attributed with an ‘essence’. The 
subject who ‘complies’ with an essentialist definition is 
considered to be indisputable, true, exact, precise and 
incontrovertible. The subject who does not comply, is untrue, 
false, inadequate, imprecise and disputable:
“Essentialism entails that those characteristics 
defined as women’s essence are shared in common 
by all women at all times: it implies a limit on the 
variations and possibilities of change”. (Grosz, 
1990: 334).
Essentialism is thus able to define ‘woman’, ‘man’, ‘sexuality’ 
and so forth, as being ‘natural’ and ‘real’, each possessing 
inherent qualities. However, ‘essentialism’ is not limited to one 
single system of thought. There appear to be three main types of 
thinking in relation to essentialism, each of them resting on 
different sorts of argument about how biological difference is 
transformed into subjective difference - ‘biological essentialism,
21
philosophical essentialism and historical reification’ (Marshall 
1994:104). In respect of the ‘subject’, it thus makes use of 
universal categories which are constructed as ‘natural’ and/or 
‘absolute’, and are presented as rooted in biology. The work of 
Mary Daly, Adrienne Rich and Shulamith Firestone is usually 
associated with biological essentialism. In The Dialectic of Sex, 
Firestone maintained that women’s ties to childbirth and 
childrearing caused a basic imbalance of power between men 
and women that predated all other power imbalances.
Probably one of the best known examples of philosophical 
essentialism came from the work done by Simone De Beauvoir. 
Beauvoir saw certain physiological differences between men and 
women, most notably in men’s freedom from reproductive 
activity and the potential for men to first define themselves as 
subject. Thus for De Beauvoir, biology becomes elaborated into 
gender as woman becomes the ‘other’ to man within a 
hierarchical relationship. In a general sense, these writers wrote 
from a position whereby the sense of self is located in the 
specifities and peculiarities of the female body. Historical 
reification appears most clearly in socialist feminist theory, 
where consciousness and subjectivity tend to be located in 
human activity as it is organised under capitalism, not in a 
biological or philosophical essence (Marshall 1994: 107).
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However, at the same time, resisting essentialism is not so much 
about merely deconstructing the category. Resisting essentialism 
is perhaps more to do with uncovering some of the processes 
through which identity is produced.
A qualitative approach necessitates a different focus. Rather than 
focusing upon the world as already categorised and the 
experience associated with that existence qua category, a 
qualitative approach by contrast, helps to understand how the 
meanings and constructions ascribed to those categories are 
constituted as such. In addition, such an approach can allow for 
attention to be paid to the ‘tools’ of construction; e.g. the 
ideologies which create and sustain the meanings, purpose and 
value of the categories ‘woman’, ‘mother’, ‘lesbian’.
Although the ‘empirically recorded’ lived experience of lesbians 
and families is of great importance and provides one of the main 
focuses of this thesis, the purpose of including such a focus is 
not to engage in what would ultimately amount to a prescriptive 
and definitional exercise with regard to identity. Rather, the 
focus of my critical attention is the operation of power through 
law in the construction of identity. I feel that a quantitative 
approach to such ‘data’ would not advance the project by 
allowing for the adequate explorations of the issues under
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consideration. Because in so doing, I have drawn upon aspects of 
feminist legal studies, and sociological perspectives in order to 
illustrate the exclusionary nature of law itself within families and 
the attendant sexualities. As much of the emphasis in this thesis 
is concentrated upon the constructed lesbian within family law, 
Feminist theory has much to offer as a methodological tool, and 
whilst I am a ‘self-defined feminist’ myself, I do have 
methodological reservations with certain aspects or critical 
focuses of certain feminist concerns.
The lack of attention paid by (especially early) feminist discourse 
to lesbian subjective experience3, (largely driven by the myth that 
one oppressed group cannot in turn oppress another), meant that 
early feminism centred its discourse on the patriarchal nature of 
male-female relationships, at the expense of critical examination 
of the heterosexual imperative. Because early feminism operated 
on the basis of essentialist meanings of male and female, the 
only ‘path’ of resistance was to reverse the present day 
assumptions, i.e., making women ‘superior’ to men. Feminism in 
the early 1970’s paid scant attention to the assumptions and 
constructions upon which the compulsory nature of 
heterosexuality rests:
3 See Wilton 1995 where the author criticises the majority o f  feminist scholars 
for not acknowledging their heterosexual position in their writing.
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“By this lack of attention, they risked accepting 
that being heterosexual was an essential part of 
their being, and in this way were demonstrably 
less willing to consider the possibility that sexual 
orientation is itself a social construct, rendered 
meaningless if social and ideological punishments 
and rewards associated with illicit and licit forms 
of sexual expression were removed.” (Whelehan 
1995: 92).
In other words, the omission to critically address the construction 
of a compulsory form of heterosexuality, resulted in a failure to 
examine and expose the ideological and hierarchical construction 
of a sexuality constructed as normatively and exclusively, 
heterosexual. It is only recently, that ‘second wave’ feminism 
has left biological determinism behind4 and turned instead to 
social constructionism, extending this to the sexual domain. 
Even so, there still appears to be a continuing lack of attention 
paid to the importance of the heterosexual imperative. For 
example, Tong only discusses lesbian feminism as a separate 
wing of radical feminist thought (Tong 1989). In contrast, Rich
4 I.e., the characterisation o f female sexuality as radically distinct from a 
phallic organisation o f sexuality.
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has demonstrated the social construction and enforcement of 
compulsory heterosexuality (Rich 1980). Rich observes that the 
institution of heterosexuality holds sway over all women 
regardless of their sexual choices - which in fact, have little to do 
with ‘choice’ as such. Because of the assumption of a 
‘normality’ deemed to be inherent in heterosexual existence, the 
social and political control over women and ‘outgroups’, 
continues to prevail (Rich 1980). In this respect her aim is to:
“encourage heterosexual feminists to examine 
heterosexuality as a political institution which 
disempowers women - and to change it.” (Rich 
1980).
Notwithstanding certain methodological reservations regarding 
this lack of attention to the heterosexual imperative, on a more 
general level, feminist theory allows for examination of the 
workings of power and on gender (Butler, 1990). The 
importance of a feminist approach to gender discourse, lies in 
‘unravelling’ the importance of gender considerations in law; 
what it means in law to be constructed as ‘masculine’; 
‘feminine’; ‘woman’, or ‘man’. Feminist discourse has thus 
made large inroads into exposing the hidden workings of power, 
and the revealing of the processes of construction and that which
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is constructed. Examining the workings of power upon lesbian 
identity, allows not only for the exposing of gender as a 
construct, and of heterosexuality as a construct, but also as to 
how these two constructs are projected onto the body of the 
lesbian mother. The ensuing ‘conflict’ between that which is 
constructed and that which is lived and experienced is thus 
hopefully exposed to critical examination.
This experiential methodological approach will help to uncover 
discrepancies between law’s claims and its operational practices. 
This kind of critical examination necessitates exploring how 
lesbian self-experience which, by its very existence challenges 
traditional notions of power and authority, is treated by the 
heterosexual imperative. In this respect, I am concerned with 
exposing often unchallenged familial structures, within the 
context of how ‘important’ (or otherwise), lived experiences are 
to law.
Although it is of interest to ask ‘what does the operation of law 
tell us about intimacy?’, this approach operates within a 
framework already established and controlled by law itself; it 
posits intimacy itself as the object of study over and above that 
which is the legal definition. Instead, I prefer to ask ‘what does 
the operation of law tell us about law’? This question posits law
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itself as the object of study and critique. It is by this process that 
I hope to uncover that which is being taken for granted, together 
with the consequent implications for the legal subject of these 
assumptions in lived experience. In other words, I hope to 
expose how the operation of law in concealing these 
discrepancies, certainties, doubts and ambiguities, reinforce and 
perpetuate the widely propagated image of law as objective, fair 
and universal.
I began to ask how these dominant ideologies of law managed to 
affect so dramatically, and integrate so successfully into lived 
experience. In exploring these issues, a Foucauldian approach 
allows for the workings of power and knowledge to be examined 
at the experiential level of the individual. Foucault argues that it 
is power that is primarily constitutive of individual identity, not 
governments, legal systems and institutions. In other words, 
power exists not only at institutional levels, but also within the 
individual’s daily life.5 One logical conclusion of this, is that if 
power is not located in the individual, they also do not have 
‘identity’.
5 An example o f this is ‘the personal is political’, a phrase used in the early 
days o f feminism.
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Within this methodological context, I have adopted an approach 
based on a post-structuralist version of qualitative socio-legal 
research for varying reasons. A post-structuralist approach 
acknowledges the importance of the experiential subject as 
specifically distinct from the external third person approach 
found in the signs and signifiers of an exclusively quantitative 
approach. It allows a view of the operation of law and power 
upon the family by examining constructed meanings of 
knowledge, discourse and categories of legal relevance, which 
claim as their foundation, such things as essentialism, naturalism, 
absolutism, objectivity and truth. This latter approach, involving 
the construction and imposition of labels, categories and 
therefore identity, is a process of ‘normalisation’, an activity I 
endeavour to avoid. A post-structuralist (type) approach has been 
adopted, largely as the result of experiencing the law firstly, as a 
woman, and secondly as a lesbian. The apparent contradiction 
here is obvious; post-structuralism does not acknowledge the pre­
constructed and coercivley imposed labels. In short, post­
structuralism6 (of which Foucault, Lacan and Derrida are ‘front 
runners’), maintain that there is no ‘essential’ core to the 
individual as such, any ‘essential’ core that might exist is 
constructed from language and discourse:
6 Sometimes otherwise known as post-humanist or post-essentialist.
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“The self-contained, authentic subject conceived 
by humanism to be discoverable below a veneer of 
cultural and ideological overlay is in reality a 
construct of that very humanistic discourse. The 
subject is not a locus of authorial intentions or 
natural attributes or even a privileged, separate 
consciousness. Lacan uses psychoanalysis, 
Derrida uses grammar, and Foucault uses the 
history of discourses to attack and deconstruct our 
concept of the subject as having an essential 
identity and an authentic core that has been 
repressed by society. There is no essential core 
‘natural’ to us, and so there is no repression in the 
humanist sense.” (Alcoff 1997: 337).
In other words, the individual’s essence is to have no essence. In 
this respect, a rigorous post-structuralist analysis leads to 
complete denial of not only the subject, but also of subjection, 
oppression and selectively lived experience. The subject is 
denied any ability to affect or challenge social discourse or 
indeed to any acknowledgement of the effects of dominant 
ideological discourse. There is therefore, no repression of the 
subject’s right to exercise self-determination over what and who 
they are. The result is that a non existent subject cannot be 
repressed. There are additional problems of resisting the
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impositions of power and dominant discourse upon subjective 
identity. If identity is formed through ‘socialisation’, then the 
subjective identity is formed largely through its oppression. In 
addition, the T  and the ‘self of lived experience are also denied. 
Following this line of thinking, any ‘idea’ or ‘opinion’ would be 
a ‘negative’ - ‘deconstructing everything and refusing to 
construct anything’ (Alcoff 1997: 338). Within this context then, 
how can I self-identify with, and adopt, the labels of ‘female’ 
and ‘lesbian’ and still claim that post-structuralist thinking has 
value to my thesis?
Whilst facilitating deconstruction, post-structuralism denies the 
subject the ability to affect or change social discourse. However, 
this is not to say that a post-structuralist approach denies possible 
sites of resistance. Butler for example argues that ‘categories’ of 
‘woman’ do not become useless through deconstruction - they 
can be used as a site of resistance whilst simultaneously opening 
up discourse and challenging the exclusionary operations and 
power relations that construct and limit ‘women’ (Butler 1993: 
29).
Although Foucault would also probably have gone out of his way 
to avoid being labelled as a post-structuralist, I would suggest 
that a Foucauldian approach incorporates post-structuralism. It
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can allow us to conceive of, and analyse the operation of power 
and power relations. What was of interest to Foucault, was the 
relationship between modes of organisation of thought, and the 
relations of power and knowledge through which human beings 
are transformed into certain types of ‘subjects’. In his early 
work, for example, The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault 
emphasised ‘power’ as being something which was stable and 
concentrated. However, he shifted away from this position in his 
later work which tended to emphasise the fractured and unstable 
nature of power which he maintained was both productive and 
accessible.
For example, in Discipline and Punish (1977), Foucault argued 
that power is not repressive or oppressive, rather, power was 
something both positive and productive. His concern was ‘to 
create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, 
human beings are made subjects’ (Foucault 1982: 216-217). It 
was Foucault’s main contention that the subject; the ‘self was an 
historical product created by, and through discourse:
“One has to dispense with the constituent subject, 
to get rid of the subject itself, that’s to say to arrive 
at an analysis which can account for the 
constitution of the subject within a historical
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framework. And this is what I would call 
genealogy, that is, a form of history which can 
account for the constitution of knowledges, 
discourses, domains of objects, etc., without 
having to make reference to a subject which is 
either transcendental in relation to the field of 
events or runs in its empty sameness throughout 
the course of history”. (Foucault 1980: 117).
In this respect, using a Foucault and post-structuralist approach 
enables an analysis as to how and why women are constructed as 
subjects in both discourse and power relationships. In addition, it 
allows the ‘gaps’ or ‘spaces’ hidden by power and discourse to be 
exposed, freeing us from some of the ‘inevitability’ of regarding 
‘essentialist truths’.
In a variety of ways, women who are lesbians have been socially 
constructed as ‘outsiders’ to the law and society, they are 
constructed and defined in many different incarnations, but 
always it seems, as ‘the other’, and almost without exception, 
negatively (Kitzinger 1987). In other words, the subject is 
recognised only as that which is non-recognisable. Is this ‘non­
recognition’ the result of law exercising power and control
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through a process of oppression and suppression? Foucault poses 
the following questions:
“Do the workings of power, and in particular those 
mechanisms that are brought into play in societies 
such as ours, really belong primarily to the 
category of repression? Are prohibition, 
censorship, and denial truly the forms through 
which power is exercised in a general way, if not 
in every society, most certainly in our own?” 
(Foucault 1990: 10).
In other words, Foucault questions whether exclusion is the 
means through which power operates. Although it is important to 
identify that which is being censored and excluded, this 
‘identification’ is not necessarily the prime focus of my concerns. 
The ‘identification’ of that which is censored will emerge as a 
result of focusing upon how that process of prohibition, 
censorship and denial operates; the mechanisms used and the 
instruments employed:
“to discover who does the speaking, the positions 
and viewpoints from which they speak, the 
institutions which prompt people to speak about it
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and which store and distribute the things that are 
said.” (Foucault 1990:11).
Foucault’s theory of Power
Within this context, what is Foucault’s understanding of 
‘power’? In History of Sexuality, Foucault identifies power as a 
strategy, operating on, and upon, a multitude of ‘sites’. Power is 
not entered on specific institutional sites. It is not the 
‘possession’ of governments, sovereigns or class, nor is it 
something that people have and wield over others, on the basis of 
their roles and positions in hierarchies. Power is not imposed 
from the apex of a social hierarchy, nor derived from a 
foundational binary opposition between a ruling class, rather it 
operates in a capillary fashion from below; it is all encompassing 
(Smart 1985). Even ‘resistance’ to power is no ‘resistance’ at all; 
it is merely yet another expression of power. ‘Power’, thus 
allows for the production and limitation of identity, and cuts off 
the possibility of an absolute and final essentialist ideal.
In Foucauldian terms, power is not what some people possess 
whilst others do not, but a tactical and resourceful narrative. It is 
thus relational, something that is exercised from a variety of 
points on the social body, rather than something that is ‘held’ or
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‘owned’ by the subject. Power is established in and through its 
effects, and the effects, consequently felt, are the workings of 
power itself (Butler 1993: 251). In other words:
“There is no “power”, taken as a substantive, that 
has dissimulation as one of its attributes or 
modes. This dissimulation operates though the 
constitution and formation of an epistemic field 
and set of “knowers”; when this field and these 
subjects are taken for granted as prediscoursive 
givens, the dissimulating effect of power has 
succeeded.” (Foucault 1990:).
On the subject of discursive power, he goes on to state that it is:
“[Pjroduced from one moment to the next, at every point, or 
rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is 
everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it 
embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. 
And “Power”, insofar as it is permanent, repetitious, inert, and 
self-reproducing, is simply the overall effect that emerges from 
all these mobilities, the concatenation that rests upon each of 
them and seeks in turn to arrest their movement.” (Foucault 1990: 
93).
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He goes onto point out that this, in turn, has ramifications for 
methods and modes o f ‘resistance’ to power:
“Just as the network of power relations ends by 
forming a dense web that passes through 
apparatuses and institutions, without being exactly 
localised in them, so to the swarm of points of 
resistance’s traverses social stratifications and 
individual untities.” (Foucault 1990: 96).
For Foucault then, there is the possibility of resistance to the 
operation of power through discourse. However, resistance to the 
operation of power should concentrate critical attention on the 
varying complex processes through which the subject is 
constituted, not on the traditionally perceived ‘institutions’ of 
power, such as law. In this respect, any analysis of power should 
not:
“look for the headquarters that presides over its 
rationality; neither the caste which governs, nor 
the groups which control the state apparatus, nor 
those who make the most important economic 
decisions direct the entire network of power that
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functions in a society (and makes it function).” 
(Foucault 1990: 95).
Foucault’s theory of power allows us to expose the complex 
interactions of power within law to scrutinise what law does, why 
it does it and how it may be changed. It allows us to do away 
with more ‘conventional’ theories of power which relied almost 
exclusively upon a dichotomised world of domination and 
subordination. In this respect, it disrupts the notion that those 
who ‘dominate’ do not ‘possess’ power; indeed, there are no 
‘dominators’ or ‘repressors’, no dominated and repressed.
As Foucault points out, the ‘truth’ about the human condition is 
constantly sought. With the continuing advances of science, it 
seemed possible to uncover an ‘essential truth’ of human nature. 
Although this possibility has now been recognised as over 
ambitious, it has managed to integrate itself into the legal psyche. 
One of these ‘essential truths’, is the classification and 
categorisation of ‘populations’. Through statistical forms of 
representation, the phenomenon of population was shown to 
have its own regularities, for example birth and death rates, 
characteristic ailments, age profiles, social groupings and so 
forth. Such representations established population as a higher 
order phenomenon of which the family constituted one aspect.
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The family thus became a privileged instrument for the regulation 
or management of the population. Once governments began to 
conceptualise the people as being ‘populations’, they became a 
‘controllable’ commodity; a public/state concern. As 
‘populations’ cannot exist without ‘sex’, all things sexual became 
a ‘public interest’ issue:
“One of the great innovations in the techniques of 
power in the eighteenth century was the 
emergence of ‘population’ as an economic and 
political problem” (Foucault 1990: 25).
Many of the results of this occurrence, were that certain 
discourses on sex were silenced, while others were privileged. 
Foucault identifies that it was the sex of children and adolescents 
that was particularly subject to a process of silencing in the 
Eighteenth century. However, the same methodology can be 
applied to the constructions of lesbians. The establishment of a 
so called ‘mainstream’ discourse on sex and population, led to 
other discourses being marginalised, silenced or excluded.
However, at the same time, the silencing, also gave rise to 
discourses on sex which have been numerous, far reaching and 
wide ranging:
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“What is peculiar to modem societies, in fact, is 
not that they consigned sex to a shadow existence, 
but that they dedicated themselves to speaking of 
it ad infinitum, while exploiting it as the secret.” 
(Foucault 1990: 35).
In conjunction with a ‘mainstream’ discourse on sex, this ‘ad 
infinitum’ speaking of it, led to its control - discourse produces 
power. Foucault suggests that the object of this, was to constitute 
a sexuality that is economically useful and politically 
conservative (Foucault 1990: 37). As he points out, just because 
there is a continuing, vociferous discourse on sex, does not mean 
that the discourse has value, says anything useful, or indeed, has 
any meaning.
Further, it was precisely the ‘repressive hypothesis’ which 
produced sexualities which were constructed as ‘unnatural’ 
‘illegitimate’ and so forth. Rather than repressing such 
‘sexualities’, they had the opposite effect - such ‘alternative 
sexualities’ multiplied. If this was true of the Eighteenth century, 
then it can also be true of this century. Whilst there does appear 
to have been a diversification of sex discourse7, the mainstream 
ideology continues to resist and marginalise other sex discourse.
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For example, Queer culture, is struggling to maintain a discourse 
on ‘gay marriage’ which is free from heterocentric values. It 
does appear that the so called ‘recent’ discourses on sex, for 
example homosexuality, find themselves ‘attached’ to the 
dominant, mainstream discourse in which they struggle to 
disassociate themselves from re-defining heterosexual ‘ideas’ or 
‘re-inventing the heterosexual wheel’.
However, as Foucault points out, despite the discourse on sex 
being multiplied instead of rarefied, the dominant discourse 
endeavoured to conceal sex:
“By speaking about it so much, by discovering it 
multiplied, partitioned off, and specified precisely 
where one had placed it, what one was speaking 
essentially was simply to conceal sex: a screen- 
discourse, a dispersion-avoidance.” (Foucault 
1990: 53).
One ramification for ‘minority’ sexualities, was a ‘spot light’ 
type reaction. Because the new sciences were unable/unwilling 
to direct their gaze inwards and to conduct discourse upon 
themselves, attention turned to minority sexualities. The focus of 
that attention can tell us much about the dominant mainstream
7 For example, pornography, childhood sexuality, Queer culture and so forth.
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sex discourse. The nature of what is defined as ‘conventional’ is 
set in relief and promlematised via its anti-pode or ‘other’. The 
emergence of science allowed for the creation of ‘new’ 
categories of human sexual behaviour, especially that of 
‘homosexual’, a term ‘invented’ in 1869 and not used in England 
until the 1890’s (Weeks 1977). As a result, homosexuality was 
classified as ‘deviant’. At this stage it is possible to see that we 
have all the necessary ingredients for contemporary repression 
and control. We have a ‘population’ that needs controlling; we 
have the ‘scientific ability’ to classify human sexuality; and a 
result, we have the sexual categories essential to the maintenance 
of hierarchy and privilege.
How does ‘power’, in this instance, relate to hierarchy and 
privilege? According to Foucault, power places sex in a binary 
system; licit and illicit; permitted and forbidden (Foucault 1990: 
83). Given what I have outlined above, this must mean that only 
the minority part of the binary equation (the illicit and the 
forbidden), is thrust under the microscope as something to be 
explained. The majority part of the equation (licit and 
permitted), is presented as ‘normal’ and non-problematic. The 
underlying assumptions of ‘normality’ are re-entrenched as 
somehow ‘obvious’, ‘self-evident’, ‘natural’ and so forth.
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Limitations of Foucault’s Theory of Power?
Although a Foucauldian methodology enables us to begin
addressing the question of how power operates within law, its 
monolithic characterisation does not allow for the exposing of 
varying ‘levels’ or subtleties of power. Such a methodological 
approach does not fully explain how power can become
concentrated in certain institutions and how this concentration is 
controlled in favour of some social groups, and to the
disadvantage of others. The experience of ‘family’ (of one kind 
or another), is common to all individuals, as is the experience of 
‘sexuality’. However, the existence of so called ‘deviant’ 
sexuality with the family is not common to all individuals. 
Certainly, as Foucault argues, all individuals posses and
experience power/knowledge, but he fails to acknowledge that at 
the experiential level of the subject, power operates at different 
levels.
Within Foucault’s work there is a persuasive view (influenced 
largely by Nietzsche), of all forms of thought and knowledge 
being expressions of a ‘will to power’; which designates both the 
productive and multiple possibilities of the law. This, 
effectively exposes the notion of ‘the Law’ in its singularity as a 
fictive and repressive notion (Butler 1990: 156). The ability to
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wield power differs from individual to individual, and is 
experienced in a variety of ways; threat, opportunity, necessary 
evil, desire, and so forth. To be excluded from discourse; 
rendered as ‘the other’ and to have one’s self-defined identity 
negated, is in my opinion, the result of a ‘power-less’ individual; 
not as Foucault would argue, a result of power not being 
exercised in the service of repression and domination. Up until 
this point, I find a Foucauldian analysis valuable.
However, I do have some reservations with a complete adoption 
of his methodological analysis. Firstly, according to Foucault, 
(especially in his earlier work), there is literally nothing to 
liberate, no ‘essence’ of natural sexuality to ‘free’. In other 
words, there is no ‘subject’ to emancipate from power. In this 
respect, Foucault himself was reacting very much against the 
repressive theses of Marcuse, Norman Brown and Willeim Reich, 
who posited the idea of an ‘inner essence’ of sexuality, which 
society repressed allowing only a distorted expression and 
therefore requiring a ‘liberation’ from this repression by way of 
politics and theory. Some feminist theory accords with this 
standpoint (Smart 1990: 194), while other feminists argue that 
due to the distinct lack of attention to the constructed gendered 
subject, the visible, acceptable subject remains constructed as
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male, and thus exempted from any radical criticism (McNay
1992).
However, this can produce a tension. If, according to Foucault, 
there is no ‘subject’ i.e. that the ‘subject’ can only exist within 
discourse and is a product of the technologies of power, then 
there can be no oppression and nothing to liberate. This total 
rejection of any value in essentialism as a method of possible 
resistance, has caused problems for those feminist thinkers who 
posit that feminist discourse is based on the notion of the female 
subject:
“The notions of women’s oppression and 
women’s liberation assume that there is an 
identifiable, bounded subject, woman, who is 
oppressed and who is fighting for liberation from 
this oppression.” (McNay 1992).
Denying the subject, necessarily means denying any discourse on 
oppression, liberty, freedom and so forth. I am not willing to 
argue that there is no oppression, or exclusion, largely because I 
experience it first hand. If Foucault is correct in his approach 
that power is created through discourse, and that consequently, 
all individuals experience power, he must rest this argument on
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the assumption that all individuals are ‘part and parcel’ of the 
discourse.
However, if all individuals were indeed part of the discourse, 
there would not be some individuals pointing out that they are 
powerless. Does this mean that however large or wide ranging 
the discourse, there still remains that which is not covered by the 
discourse? i.e. that, which as a consequence of discourse, is 
rendered invisible?
My second reservation with a complete adoption of a 
Foucauldian analysis, is that to posit that a conceptual term (e.g. 
‘female’ or ‘lesbian’ and so forth), has no ‘essential’ meaning, is 
not to say that those terms are rendered ineffective in exposing 
unfairness and capriciousness within legal discourse. Post­
structuralism is useful in thinking about the material injuries 
suffered by women’s bodies (Butler and Scott 1993). Indeed, a 
Foucauldian/post structuralist approach enables the ‘process’ of 
construction and normalisation to be exposed to scrutiny and 
critical examination, it does not negate the usefulness of the term:
“...the category of women does not become 
useless through deconstruction, but becomes one 
whose uses are no longer reified as “referents”,
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and which stand a chance of being opened up, 
indeed, of coming to signify in ways that none of 
us can predict in advance. Surely, it must be 
possible both to use the term, to use it tactfully 
even as one is, as it were, used and positioned by 
it, and also to subject the term to a critique which 
interrogates the exclusionary operations and 
differential power-relations that construct and 
delimit feminist invocations of “women”.” 
(Butler 1993: 29).
To undertake a critique of the processes of construction and 
normalisation is not the same thing as ‘getting rid of it’. Instead, 
the process of critique and deconstruction free the term from ‘its 
metaphysical lodgings’ (Butler 1993: 30). Although this may 
lead to a certain loss of ‘epistemological certainty’, this need not 
be the same thing as ‘political nihilism’. On the contrary:
“Such a loss may well indicate a significant and 
promising shift in political thinking. This 
unsettling of “matter” can be understood as 
initiating new possibilities, new ways for bodies to 
matter.” (Butler 1993: 30).
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Indeed, once the ‘label’ has been imposed, it enables sites of 
resistance to appear. It enables individuals to make use of their 
subjectively lived experience, in resisting the imposition of 
essentialist meanings and labels. In this sense, in order to 
successfully resist such impositions, any marginalised group is 
obliged to establish at least a rudimentary sense of group identity 
(Whilton 1995). Foucault himself acknowledges that discourse 
‘can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a 
hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting 
point for an opposing strategy’ (Foucault 1990: 101). Further, if 
as Foucault argues, it is the oppression which creates the subject, 
then for immanent critique to be successful, it is to a large extent, 
necessary to formulate resistance to oppression along the lines of 
the oppressed subject herself.
A further criticism I have of a Foucauldian analysis, is that as a 
Foucauldian analysis of power embues all individual’s with 
living power rather than having it, there is the implication that the 
‘illegitimate’ subject is responsible to a greater or lesser extent, 
for her own oppression. This is, perhaps, one of the ‘subtleties’ 
of power which Foucault omits to pay attention to. Implying 
that the discursive subject is responsible for producing her own 
oppression diverts critical attention away from the operation of 
power by the dominant discourse, and absolves that dominant
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discourse from any responsibility for it’s oppression. The idea of 
holding judges, lawyers and so forth ‘accountable’ for their 
actions as ‘responsible subjects’ is an anathema to this particular 
line of thinking.
In addition to this, there is much within Foucault’s work which is 
neglected and systematically excluded (Bristow 1997: 188), In 
particular, his lack of attention to categories of gender and sex. 
Bartky has criticised the lack of attention given by Foucault in 
Discipline and Punish to the differing experiences of female and 
male bodies:
“Foucault treats the body throughout as if it were 
one, as if the bodily experiences of men and 
women did not differ and as if men and women 
bore the same relationship to the characteristic 
institutions of modem life...Women, like men, are 
subject to many of the same disciplinary practices 
Foucault describes. But he is blind to those 
disciplines that produce a modality of 
embodiment that is particularly feminine. To 
overlook the forms of subjection that engender the 
feminine body is to perpetuate the silence and
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powerlessness of those upon whom the disciplines 
have been imposed.” (Bartky 1988: 63-4).
As a methodological tool, a Foucauldian approach is not without 
its drawbacks. It is, in my opinion, of limited use in exploring 
subjective experience - the experience of ‘having’ a body, of 
occupying a body, of occupying a space in the world via a 
physical body - the ‘lived’ body. This is somewhat ironic given 
that ‘the body’, as a locus of power, is central to much of his 
work.
Parameters?
I have placed a self-imposed limit upon my thesis. The limitation 
in question is that of the interplay between race/ethnicity and 
power, and the impact that might have on my discourse. This is 
not because I feel that race is unimportant, quite the reverse. The 
reasons for this are three-fold. Firstly, because my thesis is 
experientially based, my own position situated as it is in ‘white’ 
culture, will not allow me to write from an another experiential 
position, or indeed hope to ‘include’ issue that are unique to 
Black women. Given that not all women experience gender in 
the same way, (i.e. black women will experience the effects of 
gender construction in different ways to white women (Roberts
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1993), I will obviously experience constructions of gender in 
different ways to women of different ethnic/racial origins to 
myself
In this respect, I am aware of the criticisms levelled against 
‘western feminism’ in its early failure to acknowledge the impact 
of race and ethnicity upon lived experience:
“It became apparent that western women’s 
liberation movements had been based on a very 
specific identity, that of white, middle class, 
young, highly educated and often heterosexual 
women, and that the demands and goals of such 
movements had been in their interests rather than 
in the interests of all women.” (Charles and 
Huges-Freeland 1996).
The second rationale, is closely linked with the first. It’s not so 
much the question of how law interacts with race, but rather how 
legal discourse constructs the racial identity. In this respect, a 
Foucauldian8 approach would suggest that knowledge is produced 
within the discourses that in turn, ‘re-iterates’ or ‘produces’ the
8 At least, the later works o f Foucault would hold to this view, especially for 
example, Histoiy o f  Sexuality.
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‘knowing’ subject (Charles 1996: 8). In this context then, 
‘knowledge’ of how law interacts with race, is produced within 
race discourse itself - the racial subject is only ‘defined’ by the 
rhetoric. The implication of this are that in terms of race 
discourse, it is difficult to experience a discourse which does not 
imbue me with the constructions of ‘the racial other’. Although 
being defined as white means that I experience the effects of 
power as part of the ‘dominant’ culture, I do not experience the 
effects of power and the imposition of dominant ideological 
racial discourse in the same way as if I were part of a racial 
minority culture.
Thirdly, the discourse on issues of race and womanhood is vast 
(Kennedy 1992); (Smart 1989), and there are more authoritative 
works dedicated to the issues of race, sexuality and gender, and I 
feel that it is not my place to comment upon the subjectively 
lived experience of race and ethnicity within my thesis. Rather, I 
feel that the question of whether my thesis has any value for 
issues surrounding race and ethnicity, would be best answered by 
someone who could speak from the ‘authoritative’ position of 
subjectively lived experience. It would not occur to me to claim 
that I speak for the experience of all women, I can only tell a 
small part of what I would suggest is a much larger story.
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Conclusion to Chapter One
Given the considerations I have outlined above, my 
methodological approach is not a question of seeking absolute 
truth as to the ‘right’ perspective on identity, but rather an 
unfolding or exposing of what I perceive to be previously 
silenced, non-recognised and marginalised areas of the interplay 
between ‘law’, ‘the family’ and ‘sexuality’. Indeed, it the very 
usage of these words that will form the first part of my critique. I 
will be attempting to demonstrate that these concepts are 
restrictive of critical thought. A good example of this, is the 
furore surrounding the passing of the Family Law Act 1996.
During the latter stages of the Act’s passing, the Parliamentary 
debates spent a significant amount of time discussing whether 
married couples should be able to divorce after one year or 
eighteen months. Whilst this issue is important to couples who 
are spouses, it is by no means relevant to all couples. In other 
words, in this particular instance, the discourse is very limited in 
its application. My point being that in many instances, ‘law’ 
only applies to a limited number of ‘privileged’ individuals. The 
rest are excluded one way or another. If the purpose of law is to 
have relevance and significance to the individuals under its 
influence and power, it cannot do that by continuing to restricting 
itself to narrow thinking, whilst ‘promising’ to do the opposite.
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In this context, I would argue that it is important to engage in a 
mode of analytical discourse which attempts to uncover and 
expose to critical examination, the restrictions imposed by such 
narrow thinking; it is we who should be thinking of law in a 
wider context.
In the light of the above, I would suggest that Foucault’s theory 
of power is right, perhaps it is a question of power. However, it 
seems to be more than just ‘a’ question of power, for there are 
many questions to be asked in terms of the operation of power. 
To what extent, for example, can the individual resist the 
unwanted intrusion of power, and exercise the power they ‘live’ 
in order to self-determine and express identity? It is not 
necessarily a question of ‘to what extent can individuals exert 
power to change other people, the course of events?’, but more a 
question of individuals resisting the intrusions of ‘power 
normalisation’ from outside sources. It is about having the 
‘power’ to ‘self-defme’ identity; to name oneself, and, to 
determine the conditions under which that name is used. 
However, as Butler points out in Bodies That Matter, although it 
is necessary to assert political demands through recourse to 
identity categories, it is impossible to sustain the kind of control 
over how these categories are treated and constructed in the 
future. This is not to argue that identity categories should never
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be used, but along with the struggle to self-define, there must go 
with it, the awareness that an identity category will not remain 
static:
“The expectation of self-determination that self- 
naming arouses is paradoxically contested by the 
historicity of the name itself: by the history of the 
useage’s that now emblematizes autonomy; by the 
future efforts to deploy the term against the grain 
of the current ones, and that will exceed the 
control of those who seek to set the course of the 
terms in the present”. (Butler, 1993: 228).
Butler examines the effects of discursive power on the pejorative 
use of the word ‘queer’. She argues that the term ‘queer’ is the 
site for a convergence of ‘historical reflections and futural 
imaginings’. As such, it can never be fully owned, and can only 
be ‘redeployed’ and ‘twisted’; that self-naming is not ‘free will’ 
and does not involve ‘choice’. Rather, that identity, is as a result 
of complex and constitutive history of discourse and power. In 
this respect, ‘queer’ cannot fully describe those it purports to 
represent. Notwithstanding this, Butler argues that it remains 
politically necessary to lay claim to “women”, “queer”, “gay”,
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and “lesbian”, precisely because of the way these terms lay their 
claim on us prior to our full knowing:
“The political deconstruction of “queer” ought not 
to paralyse the use of such terms, but, ideally, to 
extend its range, to make us consider at what 
expense and or what purposes the terms are used, 
and through what relations of power such 
categories have been wrought.” (Butler 1993: 
229).
I have applied a similar approach to the subject constituted as 
“mother” and “lesbian”. Although the definitional category of 
the subject may change, they are still subject to the operation of 
power and its normalising effects.
Because families are constituted by individual subjects, similar 
questions apply. For this reason, ‘the family’, both in social and 
legal thought, can be said to be in similar state of flux. Debates, 
for example, on the public versus private nature of the family, 
can be read as family resisting the power intrusions of the State 
and Law. Such debates illustrate a struggle for ‘self-definition’, 
or self determination. The rising divorce rates, the fall in the 
number of marriages, children being bom to older parents, and so
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forth, can also be read in this way, as possible sites of resistance 
to the constructed ‘traditional’ family. Previously glorified and 
revered as the ‘foundation of society’, the props which held it 
there; the discourse of knowledge and the machinations of power, 
fail to stand up to scrutiny and critique. Yet in terms of an 
ideological concept, ‘the family in family law’ still proves to be 
remarkably resistant to such intrusions of critique.
Whelehan suggests that one of the main reasons for this, is the 
rise of the ‘New Right’ in the mid 1980’s (Whelehan 1995). In 
Modem Feminist Though; From the Second Wave to 'Post- 
F e m in ism Whelehan argues that ideology of the New Right 
posits the family as ‘natural’ and ‘morally desirable’, and 
therefore any feminist critiques of current familial arrangements, 
are characterised as antipathetic to the desires of ‘human nature’ 
(Whelehan 1995: 240). Whelehan argues that the New Right 
undermines feminist ideology indirectly by the adoption of more 
subtle and complex strategies to maintain patriarchal relations. 
And that this has been achieved by a reclamation of ‘the natural’:
“The New Right has done much to reaffirm 
contemporary gendered assumptions about 
women’s place in society...It is not a new tactic to 
make reference to the natural to substantiate a
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preferred form of social order, but the New Right 
has worked hard to give the category of the 
natural a more urgent contemporary meaning.” 
(Whelehan, 1995: 240).
Whelehan identifies the issue as being one of redefining the 
category of natural to give it a meaning which is acceptable to the 
ideology of the New Right. In other words the category of 
natural is constantly open to (re)interpretation. In this instance, 
the New Right has given different meaning to the natural, and it 
has been achieved through discourse. It is therefore, a claim to 
meaning. During this process, they have claimed human nature 
as ‘their own’ to define, and through definition comes inclusion 
and exclusion. Claiming the meaning of human being is, I would 
suggest, achieved through the operation of power. This is not to 
suggest that there is a centralisation of power in the New Right, 
but, rather that any discourse is an operation of power in itself. If 
discourse can equate with power, then does the meaning given to 
the natural in legal discourse, allow for the operation of power to 
present the natural as the basis for ‘truth’ and thus Law? If 
identity is produced through legal discourse, to what extent then, 
is the identity of family and the identity of the legal subject 
produced on the basis of what is ‘natural’? These questions lead 
into the issues addressed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
Identity by Marriage, Blood, Symbolism and Rights
Introduction
“Where does family law come from? The classic 
answer is to refer the reader to general sources of 
law such as custom, history, common law, 
legislation and cases. But this answer may hide as 
much as it reveals.” (O’Donovan, 1993: 10).
O’Donovan’s reference to the ‘classic answer’ as being capable of 
hiding much more than it may reveal, has much resonance. The 
manner and method by which Taw’ and ‘family’ are ‘traditionally’ 
constituted, means that mere reference to a particular ‘legal’ 
source per se, can ‘hide’ possible answers. Could it be that it is 
not just the legal citation which needs critical examination, but the 
context in which the citation is delivered? Perhaps then, it is in the 
manner in which a particular source is engaged, that answers may 
be found, rather than ‘mere’ reference(s) to citation. During the 
course of this chapter, I will address the question of whether that 
which is hidden can be revealed though looking at family and 
family law through three main areas; blood; symbolism and rights.
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The ‘blood’ tie, and its importance in familial definition, finds its 
roots in the influence of biological determinism/constructionism - 
the appeal to the ‘natural’. As I hope to demonstrate, the appeal 
to what is ‘natural’, holds great attraction, it requires no further 
justification, and thus it has been successful in ‘hiding’ answers.
How then, does an examination of ‘blood’, ‘symbolism’ and 
‘rights’ help to unravel the control law exercises over the 
formation of identity? Firstly, many of these underlying 
assumptions have a bearing on the ‘practical’ chances of a mother 
gaining custody of her children or securing her ‘share’ in the 
house. Judicial pronouncements and legal culture still make 
decisions largely based on what is ‘natural’, what is ‘normal’ - 
these concepts are, I argue, directly influenced by biological 
determinism. ‘Rights’ can, I would argue, be seen as an extension 
of ‘biology’. The ‘right’ to inherit a parents’ property (for 
example), can only be a ‘right’ if one is the (legally defined) child 
of that parent (or parents). Whilst the child’s right to inherit is not 
absolute, the testator can, for example, disinherit the child, there 
still remains a legal presumption that a child will inherit from the 
parent. Secondly, an examination of the techniques, language and 
methods underlying law’s discourse on ‘blood’, ‘symbolism’ and 
‘rights’, can expose the influence this has on the ‘bigger picture’. 
These influences on judicial thinking and pronouncements send 
out a message to society about what is approved of (legitimate, 
visible, suitable etc.) and what is not approved of (illegitimate,
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unsuitable, the ‘other’ etc.). Perhaps more importantly, they are 
often ‘hidden’ within the judicial rhetoric.
On a general level, socio-legal culture presents an image of a 
particular familial arrangement. The West, toward the end of the 
20th Century, is well used to being presented with the image of a 
nuclear family. It is also used to hearing calls for a ‘return to the 
golden age’ of the family. I suspect however, that these kinds of 
calls have always been made by each generation. As not only each 
generation will experience ‘family’ in different ways, but each 
individual as well, historical accounts of ‘family’ cannot in 
themselves per se, convey an ‘accurate’ or ‘objective’ description 
of ‘family’.
Foucault’s approach to historical analysis led him to rejected the 
idea that historical analysis is a matter of uncovering that which 
has been forgotten and overlooked in order to provide a ‘total’ 
history. For Foucault, history is not about the unfolding of a 
continuous narrative, neither did he believe that this process could 
provide a complete and comprehensive view of the past. Instead 
he argued that what should be examined was:
“... the traditional devices for constructing a 
comprehensive view of history and for retracing the 
past as a patient and continuous development must 
be systematically dismantled.” (Foucault 1977:153).
In other words, Foucault was interested in the complex relations 
between discourses, the interaction between them; the dissonance
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and difference between discourses. If, as Foucault argues, 
historical analysis is identifying discourses, it becomes possible to 
explore history avoiding preconceptions. What is studied instead 
is preconceptions as discourse.
An historical examination of collected accounts and experiences is 
riddled with potential difficulties. I am aware of the potential 
dangers in subconsciously imposing modem conceptions on 
historical forms of ‘family’ in a manner in which they were never 
intended to be. For example, it appears to be a ‘modem’ day 
assumption that the nuclear family is a recent phenomenon, 
superseding the ‘extended’ family. However some commentators 
have argued that:
“...the large, joint or extended family seems never 
to have existed as a common form of the domestic 
group at any point in time covered by known 
numerical records.” (Laslett, 1972:126).
To try to understand the term ‘family’ in any historical context 
produces difficulties of interpretation. Constructing an image of 
the family at any given moment in time, would necessitate the 
artificial constmction of a history in which ‘modem’ assumptions 
(e.g. the ‘roles’ each family member is expected to occupy), are 
not made. Any definition of family, and this may include 
discussion on such things as norms, household membership, forms 
of domestic organisation and cultural symbols, can never be
62
superimposed upon one another to produce a picture of what the 
family was like at any given time. In other words, what is 
assumed and what is consciously, or perhaps subconsciously 
accepted as ‘norms’ or ‘truisms’ for families today may not have 
even been hypothesised or even practised in times prior to the 
present day.
In the light of this, I would argue that it is in fact impossible to 
conceive of historical times or events in the manner in which they 
were viewed at the time. Views of history must remain as just 
views - they are relative to the underlying presumptions of fact, 
culture and interpretation. For example, the contemporary 
perspective of the First World War was that it was a ‘war to end all 
wars’. It only later came to be perceived as the First World War 
after subsequent events; i.e. the Second World War, which altered 
the interpretation of history. Thus any historical examination of 
the family must be ‘tainted’ with our modem day views. The idea 
of understanding the history of the family in terms of the past itself 
is affected by how we in the present selectively interpret the 
significance of that history, and it is these selective interpretations 
which are problematic.
For example, some writers start their examination of family law 
with a purely contemporary analysis of definitions vis a vis 
marriage, since to many, marriage is the logical starting point for a 
family.1
1 See for example, Bromley and Lowe, 1992.
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This is a particularly good example of modem day interpretations 
and perspectives imposing themselves upon history. Marriage was 
not always seen as the natural starting point for the formation of a 
family. As pointed out in by Nietzche:
“Being married in the era of the ancien regime is 
not sufficient to qualify a unit of cohabitation as a 
family.” (Nietzche 1969: 58).
In the time of the ancien regime, the term ‘family’ referred to an 
inter-generational entity, an estate. The Encyclopedic of 1765 
defines family as:
“... those citizens who, clearly distinguished from 
the dregs of the populace, perpetuate themselves in 
an estate, and transmit their line from father to son 
in honourable occupations ... in well matched 
alliances, a proper upbringing and agreeable ... 
manners.”2
However, Donzelot traces the advent of the modem family to an 
array of Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century discourses 
surrounding children. Such issues included swaddling, corseting
2 Encyclopedic o f 1765. Cited in Flandarin, pp 6-7.
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and unhygienic infant care, wet nursing and babyfarming, 
infanticide, child abandonemement, the evils of servants rearing 
children, the moral dangers of lodgers and communal sleeping 
arrangements. The concentration on children illustrates the 
importance with which they were viewed. In this respect, the 
presence of children appeared to be a pre-requisite for the 
formulation of a family.3
Any study of the historical understanding of family, necessitates a 
starting point. Piecemeal reforms litter the historical textbooks 
and statutes. It is difficult to find a starting point and say with 
certainty, 'that was the origin of the modem day ‘family’. 
Nevertheless, a starting point of some sort must be found, even 
whilst at the same time recognising that there can be no analysis of 
assumptions that derive from an historically definitive perspective. 
Recognising the difficulties of tracing a linear history poses, it 
makes more sense to chose a starting point which is not linear. In 
this context, it might be logical to examine the institution of 
marriage itself. However, as mentioned above, care must be taken 
here for marriage was not always seen as an essential pre-requisite 
to the existence of a family, (indeed a marriage ceremony was 
often the last on the list of priorities). Many modem family law 
definitions necessitate some form of marriage ceremony, civil 
and/or religious before it can be accepted that a (legally
3 Indeed Dewar has suggested that in the Twentieth Century, marriage should 
be viewed as superseded by parenthood as the control determinant o f  the legal 
rights and responsibilities o f family members (Dewar, 1992).
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recognisable) family indeed exists.4 Again, are we imposing our 
contemporary understanding on history? Even when talking about 
‘modem marriages’, care must be taken to understand precisely the 
context in which the word ‘marriage’ is being discussed. For 
example, it is used to describe the procedural ceremony that two 
people go through: ‘the marriage of John and Mary happened 
yesterday’; it is also used to describe their ongoing union; ‘John 
and Mary have a good marriage’. The differing contextual usages 
of the word 'marriage' illustrate the word’s ambiguity.
In the light of this, my concern is to try to unravel some of the 
assumptions made surrounding the questions of how a family is 
defined or constituted. I want to questions the presumptions 
regarding whether ‘marriage’ is to be accepted as a pre-requisite of 
family? Why is it that ‘socially acceptable’, and legally 
recognised families only achieve this ‘status’ by virtue of a 
ceremony of marriage? How and why then, did ‘family’ and 
‘marriage’ became synonymous?
Whether families are defined through blood, marriage, rights and 
so forth, one commonality between these definitions, is that 
‘family’, has been and still is, implicitly identified with 
procreation. Thus, procreativity created families are generally 
identified as ‘biological’ families. It is these families which are 
favoured in the legal hierarchy and illustrates the importance of 
biology and blood to socio-legal discourse.
4 1 deliberately omit to mention such statutes as Housing law statutes where one 
parent families and unmarried (heterosexual) couples may be treated as a family 
for the purposes o f the particular legislation.
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The Family As Defined By Patriarchal Blood
The insistence, by law, of the existence of a ‘blood tie’ in order to 
‘define’ family could be argued to be largely historical. The word 
‘family:
“Often related to a set of kinfolk who do not live 
together, while it is also designated as assemblage 
of co-residents who were not necessarily linked by 
ties of blood or marriage.” (cited in Genealogies of 
Morals 1969183).
Indeed, it was only in the Eighteenth Century that the concept of 
the family began to be restricted to those members of the 
household who were related by blood.
The appeal to the ‘blood’ can also be read as an appeal to the 
‘natural’, and ‘natural’ can be read as ‘biology’ and thus ‘science’. 
For example,
“... that by the Laws of Nature a Man has Right to inherit the 
Property of another, because he is of Kin to him, and is known to 
be of his Blood”. (Locke, ed. Laslett, P 1960).
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The reference here to the ‘laws’ of ‘nature’ is used to justify the 
conclusion that the right to hold property was a right of nature, 
not a mere privilege from positive law (Freeman, 1994:98). In 
other words, Locke maintained the right of private property was 
implied by natural law, and that the justification of private 
ownership lay in labour, and was therefore ‘natural’.
Although Locke is not talking directly in terms of the family, it 
can be clearly seen that he bases the laws of inheritance upon the 
blood relationship. According to Locke, this happens because the 
Laws of Nature dictate that this will be the case. ‘Nature’ and 
‘blood’ are almost effortlessly and inextricably linked.
Thus from prior to the Enlightenment, there is an appeal to the 
‘natural’, an appeal which served to justify a particular case, 
decision or statute. This reliance on ‘nature’ to justify all manner 
of things found its way into the ‘scientific’ research done by the 
‘sexologists’ in the late Nineteenth Century.5 Sexology involves 
cataloguing and interpreting all forms of sexual practice which are 
then hierarchised as more or less ‘deviant’ (Whelehan 1995: 150).
This criteria of ‘natural’, found expression in Studies in the 
Psychologies o f Sex by the ‘sexologist’, Havelock Ellis. He 
based his analysis of sexual relations between women and men on 
animal courtship. His basic theory was that in animal courtship, 
the male pursues and conquers the female. Because this
5 See also Weeks (1985: Ch.4), which contains an comprehensive analysis o f  
the work and influence o f the sexology tradition.
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‘biological fact’ happened in the animal kingdom, it was therefore 
‘natural’. This line of argument led him to the conclusion that 
because it was ‘natural’ for women to be sexually submissive, 
they therefore enjoyed rape, beatings, and physical and sexual 
humiliation, regardless of any contrary protestations by the woman 
herself. By presenting his arguments as being based on ‘nature’, 
there is the assumption that the origins of human sexuality is a 
‘natural’ response, ‘inverted’ by cultural or biological means. By 
presenting itself as a ‘science’, sexology is thus able to impose 
notions of what ‘normal’ sexuality should be, in addition, ‘it 
arguably possesses a hidden agenda that is rooted in a biologistic 
model of sexuality’ (Whelehan 1995: 151).
The ‘attractiveness’ of ‘nature’; that which is ‘natural’, has been 
the basis of much socio-legal discourse. Naturalism in this sense, 
is closely linked to biological determinism and necessarily, 
essentialism. In this line of argument, essentialism adheres to the 
theory that a woman’s characteristics are shared in common with 
all other women, running through all time and across all cultures. 
It locates the major source of sex and gender differences in nature, 
and that these differences are largely innate. This necessarily 
means that there are limits (possibly an absolute limit) on the ways 
in which a woman can act contrary to her ‘natural’ manner. This 
conveniently ties women to ‘biological’ and thus to the role of 
reproduction and child rearing:
“Biologism is a particular form of essentialism in
which women’s essence is defined in terms of
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biological capabilities. Biologism is usually based 
on some form of reductionism: social and cultural 
factors are the effects of biological 
causes...Biologism is thus an attempt to limit 
women’s social and psychological capacities 
according to biologically established limits. It 
asserts, for example, that women are weaker in 
physical strength than men; that women are, in their 
biological natures, more emotional than men.
Insofar as biology is assumed to constitute an 
unalterable bedrock of identity, the attribution of 
biologistic characteristics amounts to a permanent 
form of social containment for women.” (Grosz,
1995: 48).
Legal discourse positions itself as merely ‘reflecting’ that a 
woman’s ‘role’ within society is defined by her ‘essential nature’. 
Her role is portrayed as ‘inevitable’ and pre-ordained by nature. In 
this respect, the legal discourse determines the limits of identity by 
reference to roles which are incapable of alteration or critique, and 
without further justification. This approach conveniently ignores 
other discourses on sex and gender difference, by treating ‘man’ as 
the standard, and women as ‘the other’.
When the previous Conservative Government working paper on 
the reform of the adoption laws was launched in late 1992, a letter
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to The Times newspaper stated that the industrialisation of the 
family was “a departure from nature” as it denied “the child’s right 
to a mother as prime carer.”6
One can only wonder at the writer's understanding of the word 
“nature”, but it would appear to illustrate the widespread feeling 
that ‘nature’ and what is ‘natural’, is the criteria for definition of 
the family. But exactly what is meant by these terms; in what 
ways are they to be understood?
Within legal discourse, the appeal to nature is almost universal, 
and whilst some areas of legal discourse have acknowledged the 
limiting effects of this approach, they are heavily outweighed. For 
example, The Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences 
and Prostitution, criticised usage of the terms ‘natural’ and 
‘unnatural’ on the grounds that:
“they depend for their force upon certain explicit 
theological or philosophical interpretations and 
without these interpretations their use imports an 
approving or condemnatory note into a discussion 
where dispassionate thought and statement should 
not be hindered by adherence to a particular 
preconceptions.”7
/Vhe Times. 20th October 1992. )
Cmnd. 247, para.35. p. 17.
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Unfortunately, this approach is highly unusual, the appeal of 
nature has a strong rhetorical effect and is used frequently to give 
credence to. some blatant prejudice. For example, during the 
course of Parliamentary debates surrounding homosexual marriage 
and the Corbett case, one MP suggested that legal recognition of a 
homosexual relationship:
“would be contrary to any understanding of the 
Churches about what is the nature of marriage. It 
would certainly counter what I regard as the proper 
basis of English marriage.” 8 (emphasis added)
Again, it is ‘nature’ that dictates criteria for legitimacy; what is 
‘natural’ is again the predetermined reference point. Naturalism 
allows for the determination of legitimacy; the inside/outside 
division.
A similar approach can be found in legislation. In the Human 
Embryology and Fertilisation Act 1990, where an unmarried 
woman is provided with treatment services, regard is to be had to 
not only the welfare of the child, but also the need of the child to 
have a father are criteria for eligibility to receive the services 
Within this context, what does the term ‘father’ mean? It could 
refer either to the man who provided the sperm, or the man who is 
involved to a greater or lesser extent in the child’s upbringing.
8 Alexander Lyon MP., Hansard, n .l l .  1829. Regarding the Corbett v Corbett 
case.
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This requirement for “the need of that child for a father” is 
meaningless as every child has a ‘genetic’ father, regardless of 
whether the father is present during the child’s development or 
not, and regardless of how the child was conceived.
Thus what is being talked about here is ‘the need of that child for 
a father figure. Whether intentional or not, the underlying effects 
of this legislation is to discourage the provision of treatment 
services for those people who live outside what is regarded as the 
‘traditional nuclear family’, which, is of course defined primarily 
in terms of blood (a wife and husband become ‘one flesh’). By 
and large such people will be single women and/or lesbians. 
Again, we see that the family is not ‘really a family’ unless there is 
a man or father figure presence.
Chodorow suggests that exclusive female parenting leads to the 
suppression of important personality traits in both girls and boys. 
Thus, according to Chodorow, the healthy development of 
children requires the active participation of both parents. 
However, she also suggests that women’s heterosexual 
relationships lack emotional richness, and that women ‘have 
learned to deny the limitations of masculine lovers for both 
psychological and practical reasons’ (Chodorow 1978: 200).
This raises the matter of compulsory heterosexuality. The 
biological fact is that it takes one sperm and one egg to produce a 
child. This is inescapable. Yet, once this has happened, we are in 
a position to choose whether to attach any social significance to 
this biological happenstance. Attaching social significance
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involves insisting that it takes one man and one woman to raise 
the child. If we choose to attach social significance, this is then 
stating that the sex of the child raiser(s) is important. If we choose 
not to attach social significance to the fact that it takes sperm and 
an egg to produce a child, then the sex of the child raiser(s) ceases 
to be relevant. Yet we have seen that legislative activity places 
paramount importance on heterosexual sex. Indeed, this means 
that attaching social significance to the conception of a child is to 
reinforce compulsory heterosexuality. Attaching no social 
significance would mean that ‘parents’ can consist of one or more 
persons, in any combination, regardless of sex.
Thus the extensive use of what is ‘natural’ within the context of 
familial relationships is frequent, and is used in order to legitimate 
and give credibility to what are socially constructed, preconceived 
ideas of how the family should or should not be defined. Further, 
the word ‘nature’, and its derivatives, for example, ‘natural’, have 
been and still are inextricably linked with consanguinity. Familial 
forms and relationships have been based on the saying that ‘blood 
is thicker than water’. In the context of a court room, this 
approach is re-inforced be the exclusion of the ‘social’ father.
A good illustration of this is Re J 9, concerned a property transfer 
application by a woman who wanted the court to transfer the 
interest of a property which was held in the joint names of both her 
and the man with whom she'd been living with for the past ten 
years. The parties had not undergone a ceremony of marriage and
9 Re J  (Unreported) The Times, 12 November 1992.
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he was not the natural father of her child. The court admitted that 
he had undoubtedly been a ‘social’ father to the child and that the 
three individuals concerned had lived together and considered 
themselves to a family. Nevertheless, the property transfer was 
denied for two reasons; firstly, he was not married to the mother 
and secondly, there was no consanguine link between him and the 
child. Are these two reasons sufficient to exclude the man from 
the understanding or definition of a family?
The familial image presented by the judgement is an extremely 
limited one. Limiting definitions of the family to the construct 
outlined above is a backward step. In this particular instance the 
man should have been considered to have been ‘a member of the 
family’. The lack of a valid marriage certificate and of a 
consanguine link to the child should not be a bar to the recognition 
of a familial relationship. Ironically enough, a legal familial link 
to the child could have been made by an application for a 
residence order.
In this instance, the only two methods of ‘integrating’ himself into 
the judicial concept of family was either to marry the woman or 
apply for a residence order. Whilst there may not be anything 
intrinsically wrong with these two particular methods, the method 
and criteria for their application leave something to be desired. 
The so called ‘failure’ of this man to undergo these procedures 
should not be an automatic bar to considering him a member of 
that particular family.
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However, it is not just blood which determines a family, it is 
patriarchal blood. That the family is a patriarchal invention is by 
no means a new concept. But if we examine the family through 
the defining metaphorical criteria of blood, flesh, nature, it 
becomes harder to unravel.
In Western ideological culture, a person’s wealth consists of 
property (both real and personal), titles, (sur)names and money. It 
is these things which are considered to be part of the individual’s 
and the community’s heritage. To ensure that the son inherited his 
father's wealth, it was essential for the father to be assured that his 
son was indeed, his son; that there be a ‘blood’ link between them:
“In a patriarchal society where power is in the 
hands of the fathers, a society where blood ties and 
property are privileged, it is important that fathers 
be sure of their paternity before they pass their 
names and property onto their sons.” (Spensky 
1992:65).
This was not necessary to the same extent for women since (in the 
absence of modem scientific tests), maternity is more easily 
established than paternity. In addition to this, women had no 
wealth of their own to pass on in any case. The easiest way 
achieve this with a reasonable amount of certainty is to establish 
the presumption that the child a married woman gives birth to is
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the child of her husband.10 Thus, all that was important in the 
world was passed directly from father to son, by-passing the 
woman altogether. Apart from ensuring the ‘safe’ transition of 
property and wealth, this arrangement also had the additional 
‘benefit’ of rendering the woman invisible.
Thus, the perception of a marriage between a man and a woman in 
order to produce legitimate children (especially boys who could 
inherit landed wealth and private property) produced the basis of a 
concept much used today. Children were not considered 
‘legitimate unless they were bom within ‘wedlock’. Could it be 
the case that this legitimation was based upon conformity to 
perceived notions of ‘nature’? Was this approach largely 
responsible for the notions of ‘nature’ or ‘naturalness’ of a union 
which determined paternity/parenthood?
The Family As Defined By Marriage
The above examinations of family do not have as their starting 
point a ceremony of marriage, and thus texts such as Bromley’s 
Family Law take their own starting points when formulating an 
examination of family, and are perhaps therefore culpable of over 
simplifying the whole issue.
10 See Banbury Peerage Case. (1811) 1 Sim & St 153.
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Historical and present day assumptions on concepts of the validity 
(or otherwise) of a union of two people are still wrapped up in a 




/  “1. But from the beginning of the creation God
f \
I made them male and female. !
i ;
I 2. For this cause shall a man leave his father and
i
j mother, and cleave to his wife.
\ 3. And they twain shall be one flesh; so then they
\
\  are no more twain, but one flesh”.11
Thus one of the oldest definitions therefore merely required sexual 
consummation for a valid marriage to come into existence. 
Perhaps more accurately, sexual intercourse of a particular and 
specified kind. As Collier has pointed out, sexual intercourse 
within a marriage is of a pre-determined kind, and means 
penetrative heterosexual sexual intercourse (Collier, 1995: 148).
A ‘ceremony’ of any kind is not mentioned. Consent to marriage 
was not necessary until the advent of the influence of Roman law. 
By the time the Norman conquest occurred, casual polygamy was 
very common and there were many differing methods and reasons 
for entering into a marriage. Marriage was seen as a means of 
uniting those people of property: Kingdoms and Dynasties. A
11 Gospel according to St. Mark Chapter 10.
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church ceremony was not considered relevant or necessary. By 
Tudor times, it was generally accepted that a marriage was a pre­
requisite for the formulation of a family. However, things were 
still far from simple, as Stone points out:
“Marriage was an engagement which could be 
undertaken in a variety of ways and the mere 
definition of it is fraught with difficulties.”12
Lord Hardwicke’s Marriage Act 1753 dictated that informal and 
often clandestine marriages should no longer be considered valid. 
Prior to this Act, all that had been necessary for a valid marriage 
was sexual consummation and consent. From this date onwards, it 
became necessary for a church ceremony to be undertaken for the 
recognition of the marriage. Civil marriages were not recognised 
in England again until the Marriage Act of 1836. However, only 
the power of jurisdiction changed, the criterion for validity 
established by the Church survived.
It was only really the question of property division upon death 
which necessitated Hardwicke’s Act. Wealthy and propertied 
families needed to have legal certainty in order to know who 
would inherit and what would be inherited, and in this context, 
marriages had far reaching and important financial consequences. 
In so far as children could marry without parental consent, if the 
minor was a girl with a large fortune the old common law rule that
12 Stone, O., (1977) Family Law. 1st. Ed.
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a wife’s property became vested in her husband on marriage made 
her a particularly attractive match. Hardwicke’s Act thus invoked 
considerable parental control over their offspring’s marriage.
/  The first line of Bromley's Family Law, states that:
/
“The word ‘family’ is one which is difficult, if not
/
\  impossible to define.” y /
However, this is not necessarily the case, especially if there is a 
specific goal to be achieved through the definition. For example, 
in relation to (public) housing law:
“A person is a member of a another’s family....if 
(a) he is the spouse of that person, or he and that 
person live together as husband and wife, or 
\ (b) he is that person’s parent, grandparent, child,
grandchild, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew or
/
niece.” 13
In other words, for the purposes of this statute, a family is 
heterosexual. Two women who live together in a ‘committed, 
monogamous, homosexual relationship’ are not ‘members of the 
tenant’s family’ within the meaning of s.l 13(1).14
13 Housing Act 1985, s.l 13(1).
14 See for example Harrogate Borough Council v Simpson [1986] 2 FLR 91
This is in contrast to the definition of ‘dependants’ contained 
within the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependant’s) Act 
1975. Here, the relationship to the deceased is defined in terms of 
financial dependence and thus extends to those people who may 
otherwise be regarded as being outside traditionally constructed 
familial norms.
What can be difficult and perhaps impossible is providing a 
definition which is suitable for every occasion. It is little surprise 
therefore that there is much difficulty in providing a definition of 
universal applicability. On the other hand, it is surprising that he 
does not provide an understanding of the term family, since the 
apparently ‘normal’ family is commonly understood to be nuclear 
and heterosexual (Boyd 1992).
However, it is not merely the marriage ceremony which is under 
consideration here; it is the marriage contract itself. The 
‘traditional’ marriage vows are prescribed by the State and 
religion. Because these vows are prescribed, no negotiation is 
allowed with respect to the terms of the marriage contract 
(Pateman 1988).
The Family as a Symbol
The codification of family is not just restricted to the codification 
of individuals within that particular family, to imagine that family 
regulation and family law was restricted to this would be to vastly 
over-simplify. The family is much more than this. The institution
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of the family exerts influence over society, as in turn, does society 
exert influence over and through the family:
“The concepts of ‘marriage’ and ‘family’ describe 
complex social institutions in Western Society in 
which individuals seek to satisfy a variety of 
individual...and social interests. As social
institutions ‘marriage’ and ‘family’ are flexible,
versatile concepts accommodating a wide range of /
/
divergent patterns of behaviour and attitude^ 
(Dewar, 1992:33).
Perhaps the confusion arises because of confusion over the context 
of the word ‘family’. Is it a ‘mere’ word capable of precise and 
concise definition in the way in which a lawyer would understand 
it? Or is it perhaps a concept, or a symbol with a plurality of 
possible and actual connotations? Maybe even an ideology - a 
way of life? Some people appear to have used the word almost as 
a way of giving a structure to a particular way of life. The use by 
political parties of all types of ‘family values’ in legislation, is a 
good example of this. The ‘return to family values’ is more than 
just a phrase, it is a call for a return to a past age that never was. 
The fact that the phrase is used by politicians of all persuasions 
demonstrates its ‘flexibility’ to assume any given social or 
political meaning.
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Stone presents a slightly different view of family, who argues that:
/
/ “A family is a more varied complex of different NI !I relationships, and exists in fact in so far as those
| individuals who form it consider themselves to be /
\ continuously related to each other biologically or /
\  . /  
socially or (more usually) both.” (Stone 1977:78). j
Thus ‘family’ is here defined in terms of the individual and 
subjective opinion of its members - i.e., those who ‘consider 
themselves’ to belong to the family. As valid as this may be, it 
would appear that purely subjective definitions are not acceptable 
either socially or legally. It would follow then, that many of the 
definitions have been based upon the need to address a particular 
and individual problem or issue (such as preventing too many 
immigrants), rather than to provide a de facto definition. It would 
seem that the law will not allow individual members to define 
themselves as family, unless of course they have performed certain 
pre-defined actions/rituals, such as a recognised ceremony of 
marriage. It seems almost preposterous that the law would give 
individuals a ‘free’ hand to define themselves and their 
relationships with others. It would not be legally valid for a group 
of individuals to state publicly ‘we are a family’. Why should this 
be so?
One logical inference is that legal culture requires and demands 
certainty if it is to regulate the institution of the family. And it 
does need to regulate it. As with any other complex social
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institution, the family is required to submit to regulation. John 
Dewar suggests that ‘family law’ is an immense subject covering 
education, housing, health services, the fiscal system and the 
labour markets (Dewar, 1992). This appears to be an accurate 
picture, but what he quite rightly goes on to say is that ‘family’ 
focuses primarily on the traditional question of ‘status’:
“and is primarily concerned with the means by 
which status is conferred, such as marriage 
parenthood and cohabitation, and on the means by 
which status may alter, such as divorced, or state 
action to remove children.” (Dewar 1992: 43).
Indeed, it is not just the family which places focus on ‘status’, but 
the whole system of family law itself ‘traditionally family law has 
been concerned with questions of status: child, wife, parent, 
husband, legitimacy, father, cohabitant, and how these are created, 
altered and terminated’. (O’Donovan 1993: 11).
To leave such considerations to the individual members of the 
family group would not provide legal culture with the certainty 
which it strives for.
Both the previous Conservative and the incoming Labour 
Government have emphasised the importance of ‘the family’ both 
to society generally, and to their policies. However, it would 
appear that despite many years of emphasis on ‘family values’,
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little has been achieved in terms of arresting the increasing divorce 
rate. It is doubtful therefore whether the law can be deployed as an 
effective instrument of social engineering.
By the Eighteenth Century a valid family was seen as a group of 
people united by blood ties headed by the male. Women and wives 
were seen as part of this property division. Interestingly, this 
perception was only cultivated in the Nineteenth Century with the 
onset of industrialisation. People moved from the rural areas 
where there had been a division of labour, with men and women 
seen as being equal but different, into crowded industrialised 
areas, where only a limited amount of paid work was available. As 
this work was physically demanding, and women were (obviously) 
the child bearers, the men got the jobs and thus the economic 
wealth. Women, as economic ‘burdens’ on their husbands, were 
then perceived as property. The Victorian family was headed by 
the man who possessed all the rights enjoyed by a legal person. 
Thus conforming to the religious belief discussed earlier that a 
man and a woman are ‘one flesh’.
There are two points to be made here. Firstly, it is the man who 
represents this ‘one flesh’. Secondly, and this brings me back to 
my earlier topic, that the (emotive) use of a particular word, in this 
immediate instance, the word ‘flesh’, is again representative of the 
‘body’ and the ‘biological’, and thus what is ‘natural’. Is this 
constant magnetic pull back to the reference points of blood and 
nature inevitable? Are these really the only reference points 
available to us in our constant drive the define the family, and if so 
why?
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Women were not defined as legal persons in their own right - all 
their actions were deemed to be the responsibility of the husband. 
This is put quite clearly by Glendon:
“organised around a hierarchical model, with a clear 
division between the sexes, traditional family law 
placed primary responsibility for support of the 
family on the male partner and vested authority in 
him to determine the place and mode of family life 
and to deal with all the family property, including 
that of the wife.” (Glendon, 1977: 55).
Indeed it has been suggested that the industrialisation process is in 
itself a cause of the breakdown or weakening of the family 
(Goode, 1980: 34). As it calls for individuals within that family 
unit to go out from the family to work for individually earned 
wages, and therefore derive less benefit from their communal, 
shared contributions to the household unit. Since this 
industrialisation process:
“[C]ommentators and social philosophers have been 
prophesising the disintegration of the family, or 
arguing that it has lost its functions, and have 
pointed to continually increasing divorce rates, 
rising rates of illegitimacy, the breakdown of 
parental control, sexual perversions, communes,
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cohabitation without marriage and even the 
Women’s Liberation Movement as proof of that 
dissolution.” (Goode, 1980:35).
As graphically stated by Blackstone:
“...the very being or legal existence of the woman is 
suspended during the marriage, or at least is 
incorporated and consolidated into that of the 
husband, under whose wing, protection and cover 
she performs everything.” (Blackstone 1857:468).
This is quite clearly a definition of family which does not just stop 
at “the suspension of the legal existence”, but which is intrinsically 
based on the issue of “rights”, i.e. ‘who owns what rights and 
against whom’. What is perhaps more significant, is that it clearly 
illustrates the very visible and positive rights of the husband in 
sharp contrast to the non-existent rights of the wife. It would 
appear then, that ‘rights’ can play a large part in the construction 
of families, but to what extent?
The Family as Defined by ‘Rights’?
“The husband hath, by law, power and dominion 
over his wife, and may keep her by force within the
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bounds of duty, and may beat her, but not in a 
violent or cruel manner: for, in such case, or if he 
but threaten to beat her outrageously, or use her 
barbarously, she may bind him to the peace by 
suing a writ of supplicavit out of chancery.”15
The notion that individuals may hold rights within the context of a 
familial relationship is not new. However, the enforcement of one 
family member’s rights against another family member, can lead 
to the family unit being defined by rights. The ‘right’ of a parent 
to consent/refuse medical treatment for their child; the ‘right’ of 
spouses to expect sexual intercourse, and so forth, have been used 
to provide an understanding or a method of examining what 
constitutes a family. Is there anything ‘wrong’ or limiting in 
defining the family in terms of rights, or is a rights discourse a 
valid methodology for defining, grouping or excluding those 
individuals in a family unit?
Until recently, defining the family in terms of rights appears to 
have been acceptable to those who had ownership of those rights. 
Smart argues that whilst a rights discourse may have been entirely 
appropriate during the nineteenth century when women faced a 
very different set of circumstances; ‘the law was quite overt in its 
distribution of privileges and power to men’ (Smart 1989: 139). 
However, she strongly disapproves of using a similar rights
15 Bacon’s New Abridgement o f  the Law, published in 1736. Quoted in 
Doggett 1992: 10.
discourse today ,‘the continuation of the same demand for legal 
rights is now problematic...the rhetoric of rights has become 
exhausted, and may even be detrimental’ (Smart 1989: 139). She 
argues that this is especially so where women are demanding 
rights which are not intended to create equal rights with men, but 
where the demand is for a ‘special’ right (e.g. women’s ‘right’ to 
choose) (Smart 1989). Whilst I am in general agreement with 
Smart regarding the argument that rights discourse may be 
detrimental, my concerns centre around the underlying rights 
notions that ‘rights’ equal ‘property’.
To talk in terms of rights, can be to adopt the phraseology of 
property law and concepts of ownership, as if rights can be owned, 
inherited, sold, given away and enforced against third parties. In 
other words, the owner of a piece of property or a tangible object 
usually has and always sought to have control over its use and 
disposition. This suggests that an ‘essential’ feature of rights is to 
give the right holder some sort of actual or normative control over 
that to which s/he has a right. If this is so, then the issue of 
‘rights’ being used to define the family could be a dangerous one. 
Within any given family, one person can exercise actual or 
normative control over another, for example, a parent exercising 
‘lawful chastisement’ over a child, or a husband exercising his 
‘conjugal rights’16. Merely granting the child the ‘right’ not to be 
chastised by her parent, or granting the wife the right not to be
16 The marital rape exemption was removed by the House o f Lord’s in R v R 
[1991] 4 All ER481.
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raped by her husband, does not necessarily mean that the power 
imbalance has been removed - it merely gives that impression.
Is it acceptable that a person can own rights to, or over another? I 
suggest that rights of some form or another have to exist in order 
to protect the unit of the family, and/or the individuals within it. 
At the very least, an individual must surely have rights to 
themselves. The issue of rights being ‘owned’ by a person, is 
tackled by both Locke and Nozick, in their common assertion that 
every individual, by virtue of the fact that she is a human being, 
has sole right to the ‘ownership’ of her body. This means that she 
has the right to control her body without the coercive influence of 
others, as long of course as s/he does not infringe other people’s 
ownership of their bodies.17
However, in Blackstone’s definition above, it is clear that a 
woman’s rights within marriage were ‘suspended’, the family 
being headed (legally) by one person, the husband. Blackstone’s 
definition of marriage represented a thinly disguised arrangement 
which totally subsumed the woman’s identity into that of her 
husband. This view would appear to be supported by Foucault 
who called the family a system of alliances, in which the family is 
implicated in a system of legal, political and economic exchange; 
once exchanged in marriage, the woman was hence part of her 
husband’s estate, and therefore legally, her husband’s property.
17 See Phillips, D (1992)., Equality Justice and Rectification; An Exploration 
in Normative Sociology.
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Again, this is somewhat at odds with Locke’s view. He writes of 
the ‘person’ that:
“...the Labour of his body, and the Work of his 
hands, we may say, are properly his.”18
In other words, a person has property in her person because her 
person (including any action which proceeds from it), is properly 
hers, and is so because she has an exclusive right to it. Thus, 
while it may be inescapable that an individual has rights, to what 
extent those individuals have exercisable rights over others within 
the family group is a difficult question.
Until well into the Seventeenth Century, there were several steps 
to go through before parties could consider themselves married. 
Stone listed them as follows:
“For persons of property, it involved a series of 
distinct steps. The first was a written legal contract 
between the parents concerning the financial 
arrangements. The second was the spousals (also 
called a contract), the formal exchange, usually 
before witnesses, of oral promises. The third step 
was the proclamation of banns in Church, three 
times, the purpose of which was to allow claims of
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pre-contract to be heard (by the Seventeenth 
Century, nearly all the well to do evaded this step 
by obtaining a license). The fourth step was the 
wedding in Church, in which mutual consent was 
publicly verified, and the union received the formal 
blessing of the Church. The fifth and final step was 
the sexual consummation.”19
This may be put side by side with the present day definition, that is 
contained within the Marriage Act 1949, as amended by the 
Marriage Act 1983, and the by now familiar definition (at least to 
lawyers) contained within Hyde v Hyde:
“the voluntary union for life of one man to one 
woman to the exclusion of all others.”20
What appears to have remained constant is the heavy dependence 
upon monogamy, and the fact that the parties must be male and 
female respectively (or man and woman dependent on what source 
is being used). Other fundamental aspects of the definition are not 
addressed. The conflict(s) between the state and the established 
church then, would appear to be concerned more with who is 
empowered to bestow validity than what a marriage should or
18 Locke, J., Two Treatises o f  Government, ed. Peter Laslett. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960.
19 Stone, O., (1977) Family Law. 1st Ed.
20 1866. L.R.I.P & D. 130, per Penzance LJ at page 133.
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shouldn’t be. The fundamental concepts of a valid marriage have 
remained relatively constant. Respective bodies have therefore 
addressed and consequently adopted the issue of validity as it 
applies to and affects them, and not as it applies/affects to the 
individuals who participate in a marriage (ceremony). Adapting 
the validity rules of marriage (to suit particular needs) is an 
activity which seems to be enjoyed by more people than just the 
State and the established Church.
The issue of monogamy has at least been acknowledged with the 
recognition that a polygamous marriage is:
“Now recognised in this country unless there is
some strong reason to the contrary.”21
The policy behind the recognition of polygamous marriages is 
that, if parties settle in the UK having entered into a marital union 
outside it, that union should be protected by English law. Usually 
this protection takes the form of the exercise of the adjustive 
jurisdiction on divorce.
Further, while various interested and learned bodies may have 
argued over the extent and degree of a valid marriage within 
prohibited degrees, the fact that they considered the matter worthy 
of discussion, is an improvement on the position vis a vis ‘male’ 
and ‘female’.
21 Per Lord Parker. Mohammed v Knott (1969). 1 QB 13-14
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These assumptions as to sexuality were (and indeed still are) so 
entrenched that the issue is never even raised let alone challenged. 
Indeed Cretney and Masson state that changes in the law:
“Have rendered the traditional definition of 
marriage in English law....inaccurate: Marriage is 
indeed still a voluntary union but it is no longer 
indissoluble save by death.” (Cretney and Masson 
1987: 4).
The implication contained within this statement is that originally, 
death was chosen as the means by which a marriage was 
terminated or dissolved. Do we see here the inescapable 
conclusion that ‘marriage is for life’, and therefore that marriage 
will only come to a ‘natural’ end by the operation of ‘nature’ i.e. 
the death of the parties? This brings full circle the argument that 
‘nature’ (with all its symbolic and semantic connotations) is 
supposed to provide a legal basis for determining the validity for 
both marriage and family.
Conclusion to chapter two
In this chapter I have explored how law constructed and 
maintained the appeal of ‘the natural’ in order to provide a basis 
for defining ‘family’, and how ‘family’ in turn, was constructed by 
reference to ‘the natural’. My concerns revolved around exposing
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law’s construction and control over identity formulation and 
expression through the judicial appeal to the ‘blood tie’ ‘rights’ 
and symbolism. The connection between these concepts and 
judicial notions of the ‘family’, had (and still continues to have), 
the effect of restricting non-judicially constructed/approved 
familial forms.
If ‘the family’ as a unit, is ‘defined’ in this way, what implications 
does this have for the formation of the individual identity of a 
family member? If law’s divisive operational nature vis-a-vis ‘the 
family’, is something that is ‘hidden’ behind blood, rights and 
symbolism, how might its divisive nature affect (effect?) identity 
formulation when that process is not so well ‘hidden’?
Identity is not just restrained by the meaning associated with the 
terms blood, rights and symbolism, it is additionally constrained 
by the creation of categories and hierarchies and the operation of 
‘distinct’ areas of legal practice.
To what extent may there be similar restraints placed on identity 
because of, or due to, the separation of ‘distinct’ epistemological 
areas of legal practice? Is there a further process of hierarchical 
categorisation within ‘distinctive’ areas of legal practice? To 
what extent is individual identity constructed by, and within the
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‘domain of authorised legal knowledge’ - the epistemological field 
of ‘property law’?
In the following chapter, I will examine those elements of case 
law applicable to property disputes between co-habitees. I hope to 
show that law’s failure to recognise the claims from women who 
are either married or living in heterosexual co-habitation for legal 
and/or beneficial interests in property disputes, is due to two, 
interlinking, main factors.
Firstly, the maintenance of the rigid distinctions between two 
epistemological fields of ‘knowledge’; property law and family 
law. There appears to be firm judicial resistance to a relaxing of 
these boundaries. Why is there such a reluctance to recognise the 
concept of property being owned other than by the person who 
paid for it? The nexus of the problem as I see it, is the fear that 
such an approach would ‘weaken’ the institution of marriage. 
Allowing ‘family law’ concepts into considerations regarding 
property ownership would upset the ‘traditions’ of property law. 
There is, an additional problem here. I would argue that there is 
no such thing as ‘family law’; whilst we may have text books that 
say ‘family law’ on the front of them, or even a ‘Family’ Division 
in the Court of Appeal, we don’t have a ‘tradition’ of family law 
in the sense that we have a ‘tradition’ of property law. What we
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have instead, is the application of ‘imported parts’ of other 
‘areas’ of law, (immigration, housing, social security, trusts and 
so forth), which combine to produce the epistemological field of 
‘family law’.
The second reason for law’s failure to recognise women’s claims 
for legal and/or beneficial interests, is due to the little, if non­
existent recognition of the diversity of identity; a diversity which 
does not fit neatly into the simple binary classification of sexual 
and gender identity pre-supposed by law. Instead, the sexual 
stereotyping, formulation and expression of the woman’s identity 
is determined by law’s adherence to notions of ‘appropriate’ 
identity expression within a marriage or heterosexual co­
habitation.
Within this context, how has the ‘family’ has been defined and 
categorised by dominant ideological discourse? Is it possible to 
expose a dominance which is often ‘hidden’ within ‘layers’ of 
‘legitimacy’ and ‘truth’? As I have shown above, ‘rights’; ‘blood 
ties’ and biological determinism/constructionism continue to play 
a central defining role in socio-legal familial construction. The 
‘truth’ about families (sic), is that they are biologically constructed 
and determined; they are ‘natural’. The appeal of ‘the natural’ to
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legal discourse, allows for the operation of power inherent within 
these layers of ‘established truth’ to be largely disguised.
Grosz, for example, argues that this approach limits women’s 
social and psychological capacities according to biologically 
established limits. Thus, ‘it asserts that women are weaker in 
physical strength than men, that women are, in their biological 
natures, more emotional than men.’ (Grosz, 1995: 48).
This ‘desire’ to keep separate, make categories, set apart and so 
forth, is not only utilised to ensure for example, that ‘male’ 
identity is kept separate from ‘female’ identity, but also to exclude 
in other ways; ‘heterosexuality’ from ‘homosexuality’, or ‘mother’ 
from ‘lesbian’.
What follows is an exploration of the extent to which law 
excludes and defines identity in other ways. Only this time it is 
not the divide between what is ‘natural’ and what is not, but a 
divide over ‘distinct’ areas of legal practice. With this in mind, in 
addition to problematising that relationship between law, identity 
and ownership, it is also my concern to problematise the 
‘ownership’ of language by, and within, law. This latter analysis 
will explore the artificial and thin divisions created by law in 
respect to its own internal workings. I hope to explore the
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question of whether the continuation of the artificial divide 
between ‘property’ law and ‘family’ law, is not due to a perceived 
necessity to prevent one ‘discipline’ overlapping another, (a 
common cry amongst some lawyers), but is rather, part of a larger 
pattern of exclusion and ostricision (Bottomley 1993).
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CHAPTER THREE
Identity Construction by Sexual Stereotypes and the Artificial 
Divisions Between Property and Family Law
“...We’re supposed to believe it’s natural to want to 
mince along on stilted shoes, face masked with 
stinking, lurid chemicals, nails bloody talons, 
dieted-jazzercized-depilated-plastic surgeries bodies 
encased in exposing dresses, voices unnaturally 
high, gestures ‘cute’ and aggressively flirtatious, 
and minds focused on pleasing men at all costs”.1
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I explored how law constructed and 
maintained the appeal of ‘the natural’ in order to define the 
‘family’, and how the ‘family’ in turn, was constructed by 
reference to ‘the natural’. My concerns revolved around exposing 
law’s construction and control over identity formulation and
1 Jo, bev, Strega, Linda and Ruston (1990) Dykes-Loving-Dykes. California: 
Battleaxe, quoted in “The Lesbian Heresy: A Feminist Perspective on the 
Lesbian Sexual Revolution, p. 77.
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expression through the judicial appeal to the ‘natural’, the ‘blood 
tie’ and biological determinism. The connection between these 
and judicial notions of the ‘family’, has the effect of restricting 
non-judicially constructed/approved familial forms.
If ‘the family’ as a unit, is ‘defined’ in this way, what implications 
does this have for the individual within that familial group? If 
law’s divisive operational nature vis-a-vis ‘the family’, is 
something that is ‘hidden’ behind biological determinism, how 
might its divisive nature affect (effect?) identity formulation when 
that process is not so ‘hidden’?
To what extent is identity constructed by, and within, the ‘domain 
of authorised legal knowledge’; i.e., the epistemological field of 
‘property law’? Is there a similar pattern of ostracision and 
separation? Is there a further process of separation that extends to 
‘distinctive’ areas of legal practice?
To try and address some of these concerns, I examine some of the 
case law concerning property disputes between co-habitees. I 
hope to show that law’s failure to recognise the claims from 
women who are either married or living in heterosexual co­
habitation for legal and/or beneficial interests in property disputes, 
is due to two, interlinking, main factors.
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Firstly, the maintenance of the rigid distinctions between two 
epistemological fields of ‘knowledge’; property law and family 
law. There appears to be firm judicial resistance to any relaxation 
of these boundaries. Why is there such a reluctance to recognise 
the concept of property being owned other than by the person who 
paid for it? The nexus of the problem as I see it, is the fear that 
such an approach would ‘weaken’ the institution of marriage. 
There is, an additional problem. Allowing ‘family law’ concepts 
into considerations regarding property ownership would disrupt 
and contradict the ‘traditions’ of property law. I would argue that 
there is no such thing as ‘family law’; whilst text books may exist 
which proclaim ‘family law’ on the front of them, and there also 
exits a ‘Family’ Division in the Court of Appeal, there is no 
similar sense of ‘tradition’ in family law as there is in property 
law. What exists instead, is the application of ‘imported parts’ of 
other ‘areas’ of law, (immigration, housing, social security, trusts 
and so forth), which combine to produce the epistemological field 
o f ‘family law’.
In addition, granting co-habitees the same property interests and 
rights as spouses may lead to a recognition (albeit implicit), that 
property is capable of being owned by the ‘family’, rather than by 
the individual - a recognition of ‘family property’. A recognition 
which is not forthcoming:
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“I would ... refuse to consider whether property 
belonging to either spouse ought to be regarded as 
family property, for that would be introducing a 
new conception into English law and not merely 
developing existing principles.”2
The second law’s reason for law’s failure to recognise women’s 
claims for legal and/or beneficial interests, is due to the little, if 
non-existent recognition of identity diversities. Diversities which 
do not fit neatly into the simple binary classification of sexual and 
gender identity pre-supposed by law, i.e. female/male, 
feminine/masculine. Instead, the sexual stereotyping, formulation 
and expression of the woman’s identity is determined by law’s 
adherence to notions of ‘appropriate’ identity expression within a 
marriage or heterosexual co-habitation.
Throughout this chapter, I will refer to the party seeking a 
declaration of beneficial ownership as a woman. This is not 
merely out of an acknowledgement that the vast majority of these 
applications do come from women, but also because I am 
primarily interested in exploring how female sexual identity is 
constructed through and by, property law.
2 Pettitt v Pettitt [1970] AC 777, per Reid LJ at page 795.
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Whilst there may be a socio-judicial perception that the property in 
question is the ‘family’ or ‘matrimonial’ home, this is a 
misleading perception. Under the ‘rules’ of property law, when 
‘property’ is bought, the legal title to that property remains with 
the purchaser.
Thus, the attitude of the courts has been that the property bought 
by the parties before entering into a marriage, stays their property, 
it doesn’t somehow materialise into the communal property of the 
whole family.
As between spouses, where there has been a divorce, it is now 
seldom necessary to decide the exact property rights of husband 
and wife, since they have been governed by statute for some 
considerable time. The courts have a wide discretion to make 
orders concerning property as between spouses following divorce 
under s.24 of the Matrimonial Homes Act 1973, as amended by 
the Family Law Act 1996.3 Where these statutory provisions do 
not apply, the general law of property does.4 I will therefore
3 In addition, s.2(l) o f the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1970, 
states that the statutory provisions relating to property disputes between 
spouses, will apply to parties who have broken o ff their engagement to marry. 
See also Mossop v Mossop [1989] Fam 77.
4 The Family Homes and Domestic Violence Bill 1995 made provision to 
extend the rights o f unmarried co-habitants in relation to property by amending 
s.17 o f the Married Women’s Property Act 1882 in order to allow unmarried 
couples to make application under it in order to resolve property disputes. This 
was a purely procedural amendment to make an application to the court easier. 
It would not have strengthened the property rights o f unmarried partners.
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concentrate upon how the courts have approached the question of 
division of property and property rights between cohabitees in 
order to illustrate the inconsistencies in applying sexual 
stereotypes.
Most of the ‘modem’ cases relating to family property concern 
unmarried, co-habiting couples. It is ironic that the mles 
developed under the law of property, now used for cohabitees, 
were originally used for married persons.
There appears to be, throughout these cases, either an express or 
implied regret that there may be no marriage between the parties; 
if a couple cohabit without any intention to marry, there should be 
little or no intervention by the court in the relationship, even if one 
of the parties should subsequently request it:
“There are many reasons why a man and a woman 
may decide to live together without marrying, and 
one of them is that each values his independence 
and does not wish to make the commitment of 
marriage; in such a case it will be misleading to 
make assumptions and to draw the same inferences 
from their behaviour as in the case of a married
Although the whole Bill itself was dropped due to significant opposition to this 
‘extension o f rights’, the original provision allowing for transfer o f tenancy 
(only in relation to tenancies and statutory security o f tenure), it was 
nevertheless retained in Part III o f the Family Law Act 1996.
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couple. The judge must look carefully at the nature 
of the relationship, and only if satisfied that it was 
intended to involve the same degree of commitment 
as marriage will it be legitimate to regard them as 
no different from a married couple.”5
In this context, the parties tend to be viewed as having voluntarily 
opted for a relationship unhindered by the social and legal 
regulation of a marriage. It may very well be more difficult for the 
court to infer an agreement because there is ‘less evidence’ of a 
long term joint commitment.
Yet the tendency in the modem application of family law takes the 
opposite approach. Increasingly, the so called ‘protective and 
support’ functions of the courts are being applied to ‘de facto’ 
families:
“The family is a social as well as legal unit and the 
need for protection and assistance in adjustments 
exists whatever the formal legality of the 
relationships.” (Eekelaar 1978: 34).
5 Bernard v Josephs [1982] 3 All ER 162, per Griffiths LJ at page 169.
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However, it would appear that the courts will only supply these 
‘protective and supportive’ functions where the de facto family 
conforms closely to the idealised familial nuclear family.
How, and why, does law set about maintaining these rigid 
distinctions between authorised epistemological domains of legal 
knowledge?
‘Property’ and ‘Family’.
“Much of land law - the field of law above all 
others claimed by English lawyers to be the epitome 
of rational achievement - occupies a prison of 
reason and as long as it does so, it cannot escape its 
prejudice against those who do not fit Reason’s 
stereotyped human being.” (Green 1995: 129).
The divisive nature of law is not necessarily something that is 
hidden and kept secret. The judicial approach appears to be to 
‘apply’ the law to the set of ‘facts’ before them. However, 
‘family law’ is a nebulous, undefinable area of law, there are no 
‘family law’ rules as such to apply. What is ‘applied’ is other 
‘areas’ of law - primarily, property law. The constant striving to 
keep separate, make categories, set apart and so forth, is not only
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utilised to ensure for example, that ‘male’ identity is kept separate 
from ‘female’ identity, but also to exclude on the basis of rigidly 
defined epistemologically distinct areas of law. The examination 
of case law in 'co-habitation property dispute situations, will, I 
hope, ‘uncover’ a similar pattern of exclusion, separation and 
categorisation, presented as a desirable and necessary divide over 
‘distinct’ areas of legal practice.
As mentioned above, property adjustment orders are not available 
to unmarried cohabitants; in general, disputes must be resolved by 
reference to the ordinary legal rules applicable to strangers.6 Co­
habitees must, therefore, base their claim upon the Law of 
Property Act 1925 which states that when land is transferred, that 
transfer must be in writing.7 The exception to this is if the trust 
arises by way of a resulting or constructive trust.8
6 The situation may be different if  there is a child involved.
7 S.53(l)(b) Law of Property Act 1925. Additionally, under s .2 (l) and (3) Law 
o f Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989, such an interest can only be 
created by a contract in writing incorporating all the terms which the parties 
have expressly agreed to and such a contract must be signed by or on behalf of 
each party. However, where a person cannot establish her interest in the 
conveyance, or by written and signed contract, she can still ask the court to 
declare her interest under a resulting, implied or constructive trust.
8 The first and easiest way to establish a trust, is if  there was an express 
declaration o f trust. Where the legal estate is vested in both parties, and the 
conveyance contains an express declaration o f the beneficial interests o f the 
parties, then that this proof of their interests and intentions, and the express 
declaration is given effect to, in the absence o f fraud, mistake, undue influence 
or evidence to the contrary.
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The ‘1925’ legislation was drafted to simplify the processes by 
which property was acquired and disposed of.9 It took no account 
of ‘familial’ situations. The judicial approach has seemingly been 
loathe to abandon epistemological boundaries of ‘property law’.
In Pettitt v Pettitt10 and Gissing v Gissing11, the House of Lords 
stated that the interests of husband and wife in property must be 
determined in accordance with the ordinary rules of property law. 
In Pettitt, it was very clearly stated that in dealing with property 
disputes between partners, the function of the court is to ascertain 
their rights and not to alter those rights:
“the court [cannot] disregard any existing property 
right, but merely confer a power to regulate 
possession or the execs of property rights, or, more 
narrowly, merely confer a power to exercise in 
proceedings ... any discretion with regard to the 
property in dispute which has already been 
conferred.”12
9 The body o f legislation referred to as the ‘1925’ legislation includes; The 
Settled Land Act; Trustee Act; Law o f Property Act; Land Registration Act; 
Administration of Estates Act and the Land Charges Act, all o f which were 
passed in 1925, becoming law on January 1st 1926.
10 Supra.
11 Gissing v Gissing [1970] 2 All ER 780.
12 Pettitt v Pettitt, Supra., Per Reid LJ at page 793. As a direct result o f Pettitt, 
s.37 o f the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970 was passed; “where 
a husband and wife contributes in money or money’s worth to the improvement 
o f real or personal property in which the proceeds o f sale o f which either or
109
In the words of Morris LJ in Pettitt, the question is ‘whose is 
this?’ and not, ‘to whom shall this be given?’13
“A spouse who contributes to the cost of acquiring 
or improving a home which is legally owned by the 
other, will be entitled to a beneficial interest, but the 
circumstances in which a trust (resulting, implied or 
constructive) will arise are notoriously difficult to 
predict.” (Hoggett and Pearl 1991:142).
In addition, it is clear from Gissing that if either party seeks to 
establish a beneficial interest in property, the legal title to which is 
vested in the other, s/he can do so only by establishing that the 
legal owner holds the property on trust for the claimant. This has 
to be done in the absence of any express agreement outlining how 
the property is to be held.
Denning attempted to do justice as he saw it to the ‘deserted 
wife’.14 His basic premise was that it may only have been a pure 
matter of convenience as to which partner paid the mortgage and
both o f them has or have a beneficial interest, the husband or wife so 
contributing shall, if  the contribution is o f a substantial nature and subject to 
any agreement between them to the contrary express or implied, be treated as 
having then acquired by virtue o f his or her contribution a share or an enlarged 
share, as the case may be, in that beneficial interest o f such an extent as may 
have been then agreed or, in default o f such an agreement, as may seem in all 
the circumstances just to any court before which the question o f the existence 
or extent o f the beneficial interest o f the husband or wife arises”.
13 Pettitt v Pettitt, Supra., Per Morris LJ at page 798.
14 See for example Eves v Eves, supra; Hussey v Palmer [1972] 3 All ER 744; 
Heseltine v Heseltine [1971] 1 All ER 952.
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which paid the bills. Additionally, most spouses would not have 
thought that such arrangements may mean that they would not be 
entitled to the property; any part of it, or any right to occupy it, 
upon the breakdown of that relationship. Denning used the 
devices of constructive and resulting trusts,15 almost 
interchangeably in order to achieve what he saw as justice. 
Denning was willing to find a beneficial share for the co-habitant 
who has contributed either to the improvements of the house or 
who had contributed in money’s worth to the household by being a 
housekeeper, mother and so forth.
Denning’s approach was strongly disapproved of by the House of 
Lord’s in the Pettitt and Gissing cases. They re-asserted the 
principle that if one party wished to establish a beneficial interest 
in property, they had to do so using the ordinary rules of land law 
by establishing the existence of a trust.
The way to do this was by re-iterating (as they saw it), that there 
must be a common intention demonstrated in a particular way, if a 
trust is to exist. However, it would appear that these two words 
‘common intention’, are the two words to which the judiciary 
clings to in this area. However, as we shall see later on in this 
chapter, ‘common intention’ is very difficult to define, and is more
15 sometimes known as ‘new model trusts’. See for example Eves v Eves, 
Supra.
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often than not interpreted by the judges as being a ‘financial 
intention’.
In the light of Lloyd’s Bank v Rosset16, it is now financial intention 
that the courts are most interested in ascertaining.
The first case reported after the House of Lords decision in Rosset 
was Hammond v Mitchell11. Here, the two parties lived together in 
a bungalow purchased by way of a mortgage, by the man and put 
into his sole name. The mortgage was eventually replaced by a 
series of bank loans which were also used to pay for several 
improvements and extensions to the property. The woman agreed 
to the bungalow being mortgaged by the man to fund various 
business ventures which she supported and took part in. The man 
also had a business and house in Spain in which they lived in for a 
short time. The relationship broke down and the man brought an 
injunction for possession of the bungalow. It was held that:
“their financial rights have to be worked out
according to their strict entitlements in equity”.18
16 [1991] 1 AC 107.
17 Hammond v Mitchell [1991] 1 WLR 1127. Interestingly, “not only is 
Hammond a case o f first instance, it is also a case not heard in Chancery but, 
extremely unusually given both the facts and the major element in the litigation, 
in the Family Division. Waite then is not a Chancery judge but a Family judge”. 
(Bottomley 1994: 87/89).
18 Supra, per Waite J at page 112.
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The court was asked to consider whether there had been any 
agreement or understanding reached by the parties expressly and 
relied upon in later conduct by the woman to her detriment. If 
there was not, then the court would consider whether or not an 
intention to share beneficial ownership could be imputed, and on 
what basis.
It was held that the support given by the woman to her partner’s 
business ventures, together with her agreement to subordinate any 
claim she might have to an interest in their home to that of the 
bank, sufficed to give her a beneficial interest. Open to question 
however, is how a finding that such ‘support’ can amount to 
conduct upon which detrimental reliance is based:
“Waite is actually trying to deal with the problem of 
matching abstract jurisprudence to a complex of 
facts; in other words, this is not a judgement 
designed to deal with a point of law but rather the 
reality of a very messy factual situation arising from 
a very messy break-up of (ex)cohabitees. Waite 
says of making a decision ‘this process is detailed, 
time consuming and laborious’19 and he is referring 
not so much to the jurisprudence as to dealing with 
the evidence of the jurisprudence demands that he 
looks for”. (Bottomley 1994: 88).
19 Per Waite J at page 112.
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In other words, the judge recognises that there is more to this case 
than the application of the rules of property law. However, whilst 
there is recognition in Hammond that relationship breakdown is a 
‘messy’ business, what appears to set it slightly apart from other 
cases, is the additional recognition that the relationship itself is 
legally relevant.
This additional recognition, is not, apparently forthcoming in the 
other leading cases.
“The question is what in fact the common intention 
was, and not what the court considers it might or 
ought to have been.”(Megarry 1993: 293).
Whilst this appears to be straightforward and relatively simple, 
however, that is exactly what the courts do. In other words, the 
court does consider what it thinks the common intention “might or 
ought to have been The main criticism of the orthodox line of 
reasoning, is that while this kind of requirement may be suitable 
for the commercial sector, it is not appropriate for claimants in the 
family context.
It is often the case that two people who set up home together and
enjoy a loving and what they believe will be a permanent
relationship, do not often think that it really matters whether their
home is owned by one or other of them, or by both jointly, since
they do not envisage the ending of their relationship. What
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appears to be missed by legal culture here, is that people do not 
embark upon an intimate relationship in the same way they would 
embark upon a business venture. It is rare for couples to draw up 
agreements, contracts, and so forth. Yet is seems that this is what 
the courts are implicitly looking for. Bottomley argues that 
Dennings’s judgement in Eves v Eves20 blurs three elements 
contained within the ‘orthodox’ approach to the law of trusts, the 
first of which she says is:
“[T]he need to focus on the acquisition of the 
property rather than a more general consideration of 
the way in which the couple ran their lives”. 
(Bottomley 1993:60).21
Even the ‘orthodox’ line of reasoning acknowledged this. In 
Pettitt, it was stated:
“The conception of a normal couple spending the 
long winter evenings hammering out agreements 
about their possessions appears grotesque, and I 
certainly cannot take the further step of working out
20 supra.
21 “The second is the traditional concern to find evidence o f an agreement about 
the ownership o f the property. The third element is the preference for monetary 
contributions, or contributions in kind, to the acquisition or (substantial) 
improvements o f the property.” (Bottomley 1993:60).
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what they would have agreed if they had thought 
about it”.22
In other words, what the orthodox reasoning expects the parties to 
do, is to make their rights dependent on their common intention 
about a matter they will rarely have thought it necessary to 
consider. There was a recognition in Hammond of this ‘problem’;
“The primary emphasis accorded by the law in 
cases of this kind to express discussions between 
the parties ... means that the tenderest exchanges of 
a common law courtship may assume an unforeseen 
significance many years later”.23
It is the rules of property law which demand that the parties 
consider these questions, and property law which imposes these 
considerations upon situations where they may not be considered 
necessary, nor desirable.
In Hammond, Waite J appeared to acknowledge this. One 
significant factor was that the original application included a claim 
for financial provision for the child under s. 12 of The Family Law 
Reform Act 1987. Bottomley argues that we can consider Waite’s 
judgement as the first attempt to fit the jurisprudence to the reality 
of litigation, and that Waite knows there is a hidden agenda - that
22 Pettitt v Pettitt, supra, per Hodson LJ at page 987.
23 Hammond v Mitchell, supra, per Waite J at page 40.
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of financial provision for herself and the child (Bottomley 1994: 
88).
Similarly, in Barclays Bank v O ’Brien24 it was stated that:
“Even today, many wives repose confidence and 
trust in their husbands in relation to their financial 
affairs”.25
Unfortunately, of course, most parties when they set up home 
together don’t draw up a legal document stating what the 
beneficial interests (if any) are. Thus in situations (such as these), 
where there is no express declaration of trust, the party must rely 
on the existence of an implied or constructive trust and prove 
common intention. And this is done by looking at the effect of the 
parties conduct and words. Anything which is said or done during 
the marriage or cohabitation can only ever be considered as 
evidence towards intention at the time of the marriage. It is at this 
juncture that we can see how the second of the rigid distinctions is 
maintained by law; the sexual stereotyping of female identity(ies). 
In the following section, I question the seemingly lack of 
recognition given to diversity of identity. Is a woman’s identity 
determined by law’s adherence to notions of ‘appropriate’ identity
24 Barclays Bank v O Brien [1994] 1 AC 180.
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expression? To what extent (if at all), does law reflect a diversity 
of identities which do not conform to the pre-supposed binary 
classification of sexual and gender identity?
“The duty of the judge is to undertake a survey of 
the whole course of dealing between the parties 
relevant to their ownership and occupation of the 
property and their sharing of its burdens and 
advantages. That scrutiny will not confine itself to 
the limited range of acts of direct contribution of 
the sort that are needed to found a beneficial interest 
in the first place. It will take into consideration all 
conduct which throws light on the question”.26
In order to acquire a beneficial interest, a woman has to;
1. produce a written declaration or agreement;
2. or establish direct contributions to the purchase price;
3. or in the absence of a direct contribution, she must establish a 
common intention to share, and, detrimental reliance upon it.
25 Barclays Bank v O Brien, supra per Browne-Wilkinson LJ at page 187.
26 Midland Bank p ic  v Cooke [1995] 4 All ER 562 per Waite LJ at page 574.
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It was clear from Gissing that financial contributions which are not 
referable to the costs of acquisition will not give rise to a share on 
the basis of presumed common intention. Such is the case where, 
for example, the payment of household expenses by one party 
enables the other to discharge the couple’s mortgage payments, or 
where one party contributes physical labour on the property or 
does unpaid work in the family business which enables the other to 
put the money saved towards the acquisition of property. In itself, 
this may sound like an unbiased test, (and within the strict 
doctrinal limits of property law it may be), but there are additional 
important underlying judicial biases and assumptions at play 
relating to perceived sex and gender roles in determining ‘common 
intention’.
For example, it is assumed that upon marriage breakdown;
“The husband will have to go out to work and must 
get some woman to look after the house - either a 
wife, if he remarries, or a housekeeper, if he does 
not. ... The wife will not usually have so much 
expense. She may go out to work herself, but she 
will not usually employ a housekeeper. She will do 
most of the housework herself perhaps with some
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help. Or she may remarry, in which case her 
husband will provide for her”.27
Some of the underlying assumptions in the above passage become 
immediately apparent. The first of course is that the man will have 
work. The second is that it will be ‘some woman’ who ‘looks 
after the house’, a turn of phrase which appears to sound like ‘any 
woman would do’. It also equates ‘wife’ with ‘housekeeper’ - 
here, the two terms appear to be synonymous with each other. It is 
additionally clear that as men do not Took after the house’, the 
woman does not ‘qualify’ for financial assistance for housework. 
It appears to be assumed that housework is what women ‘do’. 
Within the last sentence, it is further assumed that if the woman 
remarries she will be financially supported by her husband. The 
assumptions contained within this short passage impact upon a 
woman’s ability to self-define and express identity. She is only 
able to define her identity within the confines dictated by the 
judgement.
She can for example, choose whether to do all of the housework 
herself, or employ ‘some help’. She cannot choose to state that 
housework is not part of her identity. Despite the imposition of 
this obligation, fulfilling it is not enough to support the inference 
of common intention:
“If the husband likes to occupy his leisure by laying 
a new lawn in the garden or building a fitted
27 Watchel v Watchel [1973] Fam. 72, per Denning at page 78.
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wardrobe in the bedroom while the wife does the 
shopping, cooks the family dinner and bathes the 
children, I, for my part, find it quite impossible to 
impute to them as reasonable husband and wife any 
common intention that these domestic activities or 
any of them are to have any effect upon the existing 
proprietary rights in the family home”.28
In Burns v Burns29 the woman was not entitled to any share in the 
property, due to the judicial construction of ‘common intention’. 
Only if the courts can impute from the conduct of both parties 
before separation, a common intention that they were both to have 
a beneficial interest in the property, will such an interest will arise.
' She failed to establish a ‘common intention’ because her 
contribution was not a financial one. Although she remained at 
home to raise their two children until the breakdown of their
relationship seventeen years later, her ‘contribution’ was, in the
court’s view not relevant:
“Can the fact that the plaintiff performed domestic 
duties in the house and looked after the children be 
taken into account? I think it is necessary to keep 
in mind the nature of the right which is being 
asserted. The court has no jurisdiction to make
28 Pettitt v Pettitt, Supra, per Diplock LJ at page 826.
29 Burns v Burns [1984] 1 All ER 244.
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such order as it might think fair; the powers 
conferred by the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 in 
relation to the property of married persons do not 
apply to unmarried couples. ... The mere fact that 
parties live together and do the ordinary domestic 
tasks is, in my view, no indication at all that they 
thereby intended to alter the existing property rights 
of either of them”.30
This overly narrow view of what constitutes indirect contributions 
can of course lead to unfairness, whereas taking a wider view 
could be more in line with how the parties regard the home and its 
contents; that is ‘their assets’. This does not mean that the house 
will be taken away from what doctrinal traditionalists would 
regard as its true owner, because up until now, ‘true owner’ is 
defined in terms of property rights established by traditional 
property law. If the court declares the property rights/interests to 
be whatever the parties originally intended (regardless or 
howsoever those intentions were expressed) how are the strict 
rules of property law affronted?
If the parties always regarded the home as ‘their home’, then 
surely all the courts would be doing is to formally state those 
interests not, as cases such as Rosset would have us to believe, 
reassigning those assets. Why do other courts ignore what is 
surely an injustice, what Denning termed as the ‘deserted wife’?
30 Burns v Burns, supra, per Fox LJ at page 254.
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Is it that they do not recognise that Denning’s ‘deserted wife’ has 
suffered injustice? Indeed, it was stated in one case that:
“The wife does not get a share in the home simply 
because she cleans the walls or works in the garden 
or helps her husband with the painting and 
decorating. Those are the sort of things which a 
wife does for the benefit of the family without 
altering title to, or interests in, the property”.31
This point is emphasised by Moffat:
“...so long as a married or cohabiting couple adopt 
conventional roles within the traditional sexual 
division of labour, nothing they do is regarded as 
‘evidence’ of anything” (Moffat and Chesterman 
1988: 132).
The assumptions made regarding ‘men’s’ roles and ‘women’s’ 
conduct become easier to see. The judicial interpretation(s) of 
‘property law’ become determined by judicial commitment to the 
parties’ performance of ‘traditional’ gender roles; only certain 
‘performances’ become judicially equated with fulfilling the 
requirement o f ‘common intention’.
31 Button v Button [1968] 1 WLR 457, per Denning MR at page 462.
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In Gissing v Gissing32, the house was bought in the husband’s 
name and paid for by a mortgage which he alone repaid. The wife 
spent money on furniture, laying a lawn and paying for her own 
and the parties’ son’s clothes. Her ‘conduct’ was not considered 
enough to entitle her to an interest in the home.
Gissing v Gissing left the law in an uncertain state.33 Reid LJ 
could see no reason for the distinction between direct and indirect 
contributions and thought that in many cases it would be 
unworkable. Diplock LJ pointed out that, if the wife had made an 
initial contribution to the deposit or legal charges which indicated 
that she was to take some interest in the property, the court should 
also take account of her contribution to the mortgage instalments, 
even though these were indirect, because this would be consistent 
with a common intention that her payment of other household 
expenses would release the husband’s money to pay off the 
mortgage and would thus be her contribution to the purchase of the 
home.
If the wife did not make an initial contribution to the purchase 
price; no direct contribution to the repayment of the mortgage, 
then there could be no:
32 supra.
33 Browne-Wilkinson VC has stated extrajudicially that in his opinion, the law 
took a wrong turn in Gissing. In his opinion, these sorts o f  cases should be 
decided on the basis o f proprietary or promissory estoppel. Cited in Pettit 
1997:178.
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“adjustment to her contribution to other expenses of 
the household which it can be inferred was referable 
to the acquisition of the house”.34
She was, therefore, unable to succeed in her claim for an interest in 
it:
“merely because she continued to contribute out of 
her own earnings or private income to other 
expenses of the household”.35
While in theory the courts have a large amount of discretion in this 
area, this does not mean to say that they will apply justice. And it 
would appear that more recent decisions have turned away from 
the use of the constructive trust, especially the ‘new model’ kind 
used by Denning to the more strict resulting trust principles 
contained in Grant v E d w a rd s . 36 This is demonstrated by the 
later cases such as Lloyds Bank v Rosset,37
However, it is at the same time difficult to determine exactly what 
or rather whose conscience is being used. In later cases revolving 
around the use of constructive trusts, the courts have obviously 
abandoned Denning’s ‘new model trusts’, in favour of return to the 
strict doctrinal approach. Cases such as Rosset38 and Hammond v
34 Gissing v Gissing, supra, per Diplock LJ at page 793.
35 Gissing v Gissing, supra, per Diplock LJ at page 793.
36 supra.
37 [1990] 1 All ER 1111.
38 Supra.
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Mitchell?9 illustrate that what passes for the achievement of a fair 
and just result, is a rejection of the underlying philosophy of the 
constructive trust.
In Rosset, the husband bought a semi derelict house as a 
matrimonial home for both himself and his wife; the husband 
providing the purchase money. The wife made no financial 
contribution to the purchase price. She claimed that she held a 
beneficial interest in the home as a result of a common intention 
that the property should be jointly owned, a common intention on 
reliance of which the wife had acted to her detriment by carrying 
out restoration work on the property prior to the date of 
completion. The House of Lords held that the wife had no interest 
in the property. It was considered essential by the House of Lords 
that, in the absence of any express discussion establishing an 
agreement, a common intention was only likely to be inferred from 
a direct contribution to the purchase price. The wife’s restoration 
work was not sufficient to raise an inference of a common 
intention that the property should be jointly held.40
By examining some of the older cases involving suggestions of 
dishonesty, it is possible to see that the courts appeared more 
willing to allow the party to claim a beneficial interest in the 
property. However, this may have had more to do with the fact 
that the court was more concerned that an errant husband should
39 [1991] WLR 1127 (Fam Div). See also Bottomley, A., [1994] Feminist 
Legal Studies Vol.II no.l.
40 Rosset was not covered by Matrimonial law as the issue under consideration 
was whether Mrs Rosset had any proprietary claim prior to that o f the bank. 
Thus the case fell to be decided under the ordinary rules o f property law.
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not be allowed to benefit from dishonest representation, than it 
was with ensuring fair treatment for the wife.
In Eves v Eves41 for example, the two parties (Janet and Stuart) had 
lived together for four years during which time a house had been 
paid for by and conveyed into Stuart Eves’ sole name. Janet Eves 
had been explicitly led by Stuart Eves to believe that when they set 
up home together, the property would belong to them jointly. She 
had been told by him that the legal title in the home was vested in 
his sole name only because she was then under 21 and that he 
intended to put the home into their joint names.
What appeared to weigh heavily on the court here, was Stuart 
Eves’ dishonest conduct:
“In view of his conduct, it would, I think, be most 
inequitable for him to deny her any share in the 
house”.42
However, apart from the fact that the court did not want to let 
Stuart Eves ‘get away’ with dishonesty, there is also another 
aspect of this case which is of interest. The court paid attention to 
the work she had undertaken in and around the home.
A female claimant appears less likely to succeed if her actions and 
conduct substantially conform to the conventional expectations
41 Eves v Eves [1975] 1 WLR 1338.
42 Ibid, per Denning at page 1340.
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regarding ‘appropriate’ roles vis a vis femininity and masculinity. 
Janet Eves had redecorated the entire house, demolished a garden 
shed, wielded a 14 pound sledgehammer to break up an area of 
concrete at the front of the house. To the court, this was much 
more than a woman would normally be expected to do to the 
extent that it was described in detail:
“She did a great deal of work to the house and 
garden. She did much more than many wives 
would do. She stripped the wallpaper in the hall.
She painted woodwork in the lounge and kitchen.
She painted the kitchen cabinets. She painted the 
brickwork in the front of the house. She broke up 
concrete in the front garden. She carried the pieces 
to a skip. She, with him, demolished a shed and put 
up a new shed. She prepared the front garden for 
turfing”.43
Thus ‘ordinary’ household labour and child rearing, when 
performed by women, is evidence of nothing at all. It is only 
when they deviate in some way from this traditional view that their 
activity begins to acquire some probative and evidential force.
43 Ibid. per Denning at page 1342.
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What the courts have not paid as much attention to as they ought, 
is that most people view their relationship as a partnership.
Despite the fact that there are not many couples who earn exactly
the same as each other, and make exactly the same contributions to 
the running of the family and home, they would still regard the 
home as belonging to ‘them’, as ‘theirs’. The orthodox approach 
also ignores the imbalance of power in relationships which is often 
the case, between the parties:
“It is said that equality of power, which separation 
of property achieves, does not of itself lead to equal 
opportunity to exercise that power; it ignores the
fact that a married woman, especially if she has
young children, does not in practice have the same 
opportunity as her husband or as an unmarried 
woman to acquire property; it takes no account of 
the fact that marriage is a form of partnership to 
which both spouses contribute, each in a different 
way, and that the contribution of each is equally 
important to the family welfare and to society”.44
44 Law Commission (1971) Family Property Law, Working Paper No. 42, 
London: HMSO.
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One of the advantages of the constructive trust approach, is that it 
removes the requirement to find evidence of intention, or strictly 
speaking it should do. The absence of intention can lead to the 
dismissal of such a claim.
However, I think that there may be a further explanation for the 
current judicial disapproval of the constructive trust. This lies in 
the answer to the question of why financial contributions are given 
priority over other contributions? One argument often advanced in 
favour of attributing shares in the house on the basis of money 
contributions is that the alternative of reorganising non-financial 
contribution would amount in effect to the introduction of a 
‘family property’ concept so distrusted by law.
As has already been mentioned, there may be little difficulty in 
quantifying the parties’ share if the conveyance spells out the 
beneficial interests or one of them acquires an interest by virtue of 
a resulting trust.
In the former case, the court must give effect to the conveyance. If 
the circumstances in which the property was bought raise a 
resulting trust, the beneficial interests will be proportionate to the 
parties’ contributions. Problems arise, however, in the case of 
constructive trusts. As far as the courts see it, once the existence 
of a constructive trust has been established, the court’s task is to:
“do its best to discover from the conduct of the 
[parties] whether any inference can reasonably be 
drawn as to the probable common understanding
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about the amount of the share [to be taken by the 
claimant]”.45
In principle, the parties interests must reflect their common 
intention when the property was acquired; in practice as we have 
seen, an express agreement is rare and the court will have to infer 
their intention from their actions. All the ‘available evidence’ 
must be considered. As was demonstrated by Grant v Edwards, 
the ‘available evidence’ led the court to award each party a half 
share in the house. Usually the best guide will be the parties’ 
contributions, both direct and indirect. In Gissing Lord Diplock 
saw:
“nothing inherently improbable in [the spouses’] 
acting on the understanding that the wife should be 
entitled to a share which was not to be quantified 
immediately upon the acquisition of the home but 
should be left to be determined when the mortgage 
was repaid or the property disposed of, on the basis 
of what would be fair having regard to the total 
contributions, direct or indirect, which each spouse 
had made by that date.”46
45 Gissing v Gissing, supra per Diplock LJ at page 792.
46 Gissing v Gissing, supra, per Diplock LJ at page 789.
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In practice, it may very well be impossible to determine what 
proportions each party’s contribution bore to the whole.
Lord Denning’s earlier attempts to solve this problem were based 
on the premise that the courts had a general power to do what was 
just and equitable in the circumstances and this frequently led to 
an equal division between the parties, especially if they were 
married. I earlier highlighted Denning’s attempts to see the law 
develop in a certain direction, were severely checked in Gissing v 
Gissing, where it was held that the maxim ‘equality is equity’ had 
been applied too many times in these types of situation.
However, if both parties have made a substantial contribution but 
it is difficult to fix the exact proportions, the court may have no 
choice but to fall back on this principle.
As in the case of spouses, if both cohabitants have a legal or 
equitable interest in their home, each will have a right to occupy it. 
Unlike spouses however, neither of them has a right to occupy the 
other’s property.
A good illustration of how this works is the case of William and 
Glyn’s Bank v Boland.47 A matrimonial home was bought by 
contributions from both husband and wife but the property was 
registered only in the husband’s name. He then arranged a legal 
mortgage of the matrimonial home. The bank made no 
investigation of any possible interest in the property held by the
47 [1981] AC 487.
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wife, who remained ignorant of the mortgage until her husband 
ceased mortgage payments. The bank sought possession. It was 
held that the wife had an equitable interest under a resulting trust, 
and that this could resist a bank’s claim to possession by virtue of 
that resulting trust.
This limited degree of occupational protection flowing from the 
trust is of equal importance to both unmarried and married family 
members. It is, in fact, that in the case of married persons, it is 
regarded as more effective than existing or proposed statutory 
schemes for protecting spouses’ occupation of the matrimonial 
property.
So, the courts may impose a constructive trust if they consider it to 
be in the interests of justice to do so, or to prevent unjust 
enrichment. If they do, it will create a property interest for the 
occupier which will bind third parties. This can be seen operating 
in one of the older cases, Bannister v Bannister48 Here, a woman 
sold her brother-in-law two cottages on the understanding that she 
would be allowed to live in one of them rent free, for the rest of 
her life. The understanding between the parties was not recorded 
in any document and was merely an oral agreement.
The brother-in-law tried to obtain possession of the cottage, but 
the woman claimed that the oral agreement amounted to an 
informal declaration of trust by the brother-in-law that he would 
hold the property on trust for her lifetime. Now, normally, such a
48 [1948] 2 All ER 133.
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declaration of trust requires writing under the Law of Property Act 
1925, s.53, but because of the unconscionable conduct of the 
brother-in-law in seeking to rely upon the absence of writing, in 
these circumstances the court imposed a constructive trust to allow 
the woman to occupy it during her lifetime.
Similarly, in Ungurian v Lesnoff9 the defendant had left her native 
Poland, abandoned her home and her promising academic career 
there, in reliance on the parties’ common intention that the 
plaintiff would buy a house where she could live with her children. 
She also spent much time supervising repairs and alterations and 
doing some of the repair work herself. In these circumstances, 
Vinelott J was not prepared to infer a common intention that she 
should acquire an interest, when the arrangement had been that she 
would live with him in a house which he had provided. Thus, full 
effect would not be given to this intention by inferring an 
irrevocable licence to occupy the house. In the end, the plaintiff 
held the property on trust for her, in order that she could live there 
for the rest of her life.
However, it is not clear whether Mrs Lesnoff was found to have 
established detrimental reliance, on the basis of her work on the 
property alone, or whether it was the fact that she had given up her 
home and career in Poland.50 Vinelott J, stated:
49 [1990] Ch 206.
50 The case, however, is not strictly comparable with those discussed above, as 
the agreement was not that she should have an interest in the house, but that she 
should be allowed to live in it for the rest o f her life. She successfully claimed 
a constructive trust and became a tenant for life.
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“I think that in retrospect Mrs Lesnoff has probably 
come to exaggerate both the extent of the work she 
did, and in particular the skilled work. Mrs Lesnoff 
gave a graphic account of wielding a pickaxe. No 
doubt her solicitors had retailed to her the facts in 
Eves v Eves, which they drew to the attention of Mr 
Ungarian’s solicitors. ... I doubt whether Mrs 
Lesnoff used a tool as clumsy as a pickaxe at all, 
unless possibly she picked one up that had been left 
lying around by workmen and put it to some 
temporary, and possibly inappropriate use. ... I am 
not persuaded that, as she claimed, she mastered the 
art of plastering walls.”51
It could be argued that the judge was slightly sceptical of Mrs 
Lesnoff s claim to physical work on the house, and therefore, may 
be it was the fact that she had given up her career and flat which 
appealed to the judges. Why the judge was so cynical about a 
woman claiming to have undertaken hard physical labour, 
especially ‘skilled’ work, is clear from the judgement; again the 
unquestioned sexual stereotyping is the answer. The assumptions 
regarding specific roles within a familial relationship were 
certainly made in the older cases. See for example Gurasz v 
Gurasz, where it was stated that:
51 Ungarian v Lesnoff, Supra, per Vinelott J at page 223.
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“Some elements of family life are elemental in our 
society. One is that it is the husband’s duty to 
provide his wife with a roof over her head: and the 
children too. So long as the wife behaves herself, 
she is entitled to remain in the marital home.”52
This does not bode well for women who seek to rely on their 
physical labour to establish detrimental reliance.
Perhaps it should be the skills or characteristics possessed by the 
individual woman concerned be taken into account when deciding 
whether or not her conduct could reasonably have been expected 
of her, as opposed to a stereotyped and generalised view of what is 
‘reasonably expected’ of a woman?
Although Rosset is still regarded as the leading case in this area, I 
wish to examine some of the post Rosset decisions.
Whilst Rosset made it clear that a constructive trust cannot be 
imposed on the baasis of conduct which was not a direct money 
contribution, the Court of Appeal in Midland Bank v Cooke53, 
appeared to suggest that contributions such as child-care, could be 
taken into account, but only in relation to the nature of the 
common intention which will be applied. However, this would 
only be the case where the plaintiff could satisfy a threshold
52 [1970] P 11.
53 [1995] 4 All ER 562.
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requirement of some direct contribution to the purchase price. In 
other words, having made the (albeit small) direct contribution to 
the purchase price, (the Rosset requirement), the court then 
considered it a duty to take account of all the circumstances 
surrounding the parties’ relationship:
the duty of the judge is to undertake a survey of 
the whole course of dealing between the parties 
relevant to their ownership and occupation of the 
property and their sharing its burdens and 
advantages”.54
Even so, considerations of appropriate gender roles are still 
evident. The fact tat she had contributed to household bills, 
looked after the children, consented to a second mortgage of the 
house to guarantee her husband’s business debts and maintained 
the property, led Waite LJ to grant her a half share in the property 
because they fulfilled the appropriate gender roles:
“One could hardly have a clearer example of a 
couple who had agreed to share everything equally: 
the profits of his business while it prospered, and 
the risks of indebtedness suffered through its 
failure; the upbringing of their children; the rewards 
of her won career as a teacher; and most relevantly, 
a home into which he put his savings and to which
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she was to give over the years the benefit of the 
maintenance and improvement contribution”.55
Despite the ‘relevant’ importance given by Waite to the savings 
and maintenance issue, his approval of appropriate gender roles in 
the above passage is clear. Waite then went on to give further 
approval to gender roles:
“When added to all this there is added the fact (still 
an important one) that this was a couple who had 
chosen to introduce into their relationship the 
additional commitments which marriage involves, 
the conclusion becomes inescapable that the 
presumed intention was to share the beneficial 
interest in the property in equal shares”.56
Midland Bank v Cooke contrasts nicely with an Australian case. In 
W v G57 the NSW Supreme Court held that a contribution of $500 
towards the deposit of a house was de minimus and therefore 
incapable of establishing an interest by way of a constructive trust. 
In other words, the plaintiff was held not to be entitled to any 
interest in the property of her partner by way of a constructive 
trust, despite the fact that she had contributed to their joint living 
expenses, contributed financially and physically to the 
improvement of the property, and looked after their children. 
Indeed, although the NSW Supreme Court held that a lesbian
54 Per Waite LJ at page 574.
55 Per Waite LJ at page 580.
56 Per Waite LJ at page 580.
57 (1996) 20 Fam LR 49 (NSW Supreme Court).
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partner had acted to her detriment where she had agreed to have a 
child by way of artificial insemination on the basis of an assurance 
that her partner would assist in the upbringing of the child, the 
court did not, however, find that having a child per se was a 
detriment. Whereas English law uses the concept of the 
constructive trust, Australian law uses the concept of 
‘unconcionability’. Notwithstanding this, the case still failed to 
provide adequate recognition of domestic contributions to family 
life.
There is no clear guidance as to how these judicial tests vis a vis 
detrimental reliance, should (or could) be applied to male 
cohabitees. Would a man’s financial contributions to mortgage 
instalments, improvements or extensions, amount to detrimental 
reliance in the same way they would as if they were made by a 
woman? Direct contributions to the purchase price/mortgage 
would present no problem.
However, the effect of a man’s physical labour on the property is 
more uncertain. If the work done by Janet Eves had been done by 
Stuart Eves, would it have amounted to detrimental reliance?
If the judges do make stereotyped assumptions about so called 
‘women’s work’, then presumably the same assumptions would be 
made in relation to so called ‘men’s work’. On this basis, the 
answer would be no; such work could, presumably, be reasonably 
expected of a man acting out of love and a desire to improve the 
place in which he lives, in the same way that painting, wall 
papering and designing can be similarly expected of a woman. In
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Button v Button58 for example, stereotypical views regarding 
‘appropriate’ behaviour for a husband were portrayed as thus:
“The husband does not get a share in the house 
simply because he puts up a shelf or touches up a 
window sill or even paints and decorates a room. ...
He should not be entitled to a share in the house 
simply by doing the ‘do-it-yourself jobs’ which 
husbands often do. He may however, be entitled 
when the work is of a kind which normally a 
contractor is employed to do.”59
If this is so, is there any limit to the amount of physical labour it 
is reasonable to expect of a man, and if so, what is it? Would it 
make any difference if the man was, say an office worker who 
never did any such manual labour?
Men who do not invest physical labour in the property, but who do 
more than is ‘traditionally expected’ of them in other ways, for 
example, by taking on the chief responsibility for looking after the 
children and for doing the housework, would not seem to fare very 
well either.
“It might be argued that the division of labour 
evident in cases from the 1970’s has no bearing in
58 Supra.
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the 1990’s. Yet this would be to misread how the 
law has reconstructed the man/work relation and 
underestimate how culturally powerful this idea of 
breadwinner masculinity remains.” (Collier 1995:
195).
Taking on a ‘feminine’ role of child-rearing takes the man out of 
his ‘traditionally’ defined role of ‘breadwinner’.
It is now clear that what is now required is much more exacting 
proof of ‘detriment’ or ‘sacrifice’. The ruling of the House of 
Lords in Rosset (still regarded as the leading case), underlines the 
intense preoccupation with money payments which dominates 
much of the law of trusts:
“The test of acquisition of beneficial interests by a 
spouse or partner (probably female) relies on a 
contractual (market place, male) model of human 
relations which is in practice...inappropriate to the 
circumstances.” (Green 1995: 143/144).
In other words, the pre-occupation with money appears to 
transcend all other considerations. There is little, if no acceptance 
that relationships are more than just a financial contractual 
arrangement between two individuals. The extreme limitations
59 Button v Button, supra.
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imposed by Rosset become more apparent when we look at the 
many forms of contributory behaviour which are now effectively 
excluded from the ambit of the constructive trust. Bridge LJ 
conceded that even substantial or arduous renovation works on 
property, such as in Eves v Eves, fell far short of the kind of 
conduct required. Even less likely to succeed in the context of 
constructive trusts, will be the many years of domestic endeavour 
on the part of the woman who is the wife, mother and homemaker.
Even a pattern of prolonged contribution by the claimant to the 
shared general expenses of a common household raises no 
constructive trust in respect of the family home in the absence of 
course, of an ‘express representation’ by the legal owner that the 
contributor was to have a beneficial interest. The effect of these 
recent cases, is to severely limit the ability of the woman to 
express an identity of her own making.
In England and Wales, many of the reform proposals over the past 
twenty years have been made by the Law Commission.60
60 These have been; Law Commission, Working Paper No. 42, Family Property 
Law (1971); Law Commission, First Report on Family Property: A New 
Approach, Law Com. No.52 (1973); Law Commission, Second Report on 
Family Property: Family Provision on Death, Law Com. No. 61 (1974); Law 
Commission, Third Report on Family Property: The Matrimonial Home (Co- 
ownership and Occupation Rights) and Household Goods, Law Com. No. 86 
(1978); Law Commission, Property Law: The implications o f  Williams and 
Glyn’s Bank v Boland, Law Com. No. 115 (1982); Law Commission, Working 
Paper No.90, Transfer o f  Money Between Spouses - the Married Women’s 
Property Act 1964 (1985); Law Commission, Matrimonial Property: Second 
Consultation Paper (1986); Law Commission, Property Law: 3rd Report on 
Land Registration, Law Com. No. 158 (1987); Law Commission, Family Law, 
Matrimonial Property, Law Com. N o.175 (1988); Law Commission, Transfer 
o f  Land: Land Registration, First Report o f  a Joint Working Group on the 
Implementation o f  the Law Commission’s Third and Fourth Reports on Land 
Registration, Law Com. No. 235 (1995).
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Throughout this time, there have been two main themes running 
through the Commission’s work. The first was the persistent 
observation that the present rules for determining the ownership of 
property during marriage were arbitrary, uncertain and unfair.
The second was that the ownership of property whilst a 
relationship or marriage continued, is was important that any 
considerations of marital property should exist during that 
relationship; that it was not right to consider marital property only 
in relation to what happens when a marriage ends. They pointed 
to the fact that many couples rarely stop to consider questions of 
property ownership at the onset of a relationship, but they 
considered that if these couples were to consider this, the majority 
of them would expect that much of their property acquired during 
the marriage, would be co-owned. Bottomley, for example, 
argues that:
“The evidence suggested by so many of the cases is 
that whilst there may be mutual (?) dreaming about 
what the couple will do together, there is rarely 
concrete discussion about the practicalities of 
economic relations, especially should the couple 
separate.” (Bottomley 1993: 61).
The most recent attempt to address this issue and the many 
deficiencies in this area, began in 1995 when the Law Commission 
was asked to examine the property rights of ‘homesharers’. Their
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consultation paper is expected to be published in late 1999. 
Although it is not known at this tine what recomendations will be 
made by the Law Commission, it would appear reasonable to 
suggest that their remit will be broader than previously. The Law 
Commission is to examine the legal position of ‘homesharers’ not 
of cohabitants. ‘Homesharer’ has the potential to encompass a 
broader class of persons than cohabitant, and would appear to be 
clearly wider in application than those who share living 
accomodation and an intimate relationship.
Conclusion to chapter three
During the course of this chapter, I have attempted to illustrate 
that the divisive nature of law is not necessarily something which 
is hidden and kept secret. The judicial approach has been a dual 
process of the selective interpretation of the ‘facts’, which are then 
‘applied’ selectively to the ‘law’. However, because ‘family law’ 
is such a nebulous, undefinable area of law, there are no ‘family 
law’ rules as such to apply. What is ‘applied’ is other ‘areas’ of 
law - primarily, property law. The constant striving to keep 
separate, make categories, set apart and so forth, ensures firstly, 
that ‘male’ identity is kept separate from ‘female’ identity, thereby 
controlling identity.
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Secondly, this ‘strategy’ excludes on the basis of rigidly defined 
epistemologically distinct areas of law. This, however, may be in 
the process of being undermined. For example, Bottomley points 
out that Hammond was heard in the Family Division before a 
‘family’ judge under s.30 of The Law of Property Act 1925 
(Bottomley 1994). This section allows the court to ‘make any 
order as it thinks fit’ in favour of ‘anyone with an interest’. 
Bottomley argues that if the ‘trend’ for using s.30 in the Family 
Division continues:
“it will be highly likely that women would be more 
advantaged; my supposition is that Family Division 
judges are more likely to be more flexible in the 
interpretation of the facts and the jurisprudence.” 
(Bottomley 1994: 89).
The examination of some of the leading case law in property 
dispute situations, has I hope ‘uncovered’ a process of exclusion, 
separation and categorisation; a process presented as a desirable 
and necessary divide over ‘distinct’ areas of legal practice. The 
relationship between law, identity and ownership, is a relationship 
‘complicated’ (by love, trust and so forth), it is a relationship too 
complex for judicial thinking to apparently allow for. The 
artificial and thin divisions created by law in respect to its own
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operational workings, and the continuation of the artificial divide 
between ‘property’ law and ‘family’ law, is not due to a necessity 
to prevent different fields of legal study overlapping another, (a 
common cry amongst some lawyers), but is part of a larger pattern 
of exclusion and ostracision. A process necessary for the 
construction and control of ‘identity’.
The ‘injustice’ that often results from the pattern of exclusion 
highlighted above, is arguably the most ‘blatant’ open 
acknowledgement of law’s divisive operational nature. Yet 
despite this, there is an apparent pervasive inability to re-evaluate 
categories and concepts, even where there is a judicial admission 
that this leads to ‘injustice’ and/or unfairness. It would appear that 
the approach of the various Law Commissions over the years, has 
concentrated too much on the ‘substantial’ issues of reforming 
‘property’ law or reforming ‘family’ law. This approach is, I think 
exemplified by an article which appeared in The Conveyancer61. 
A workshop had been organised by the Chancery Bar Association 
to discuss the reform of the law relating to home sharing. This 
informal workshop agreed that:
“Reform should not be limited to relationships akin
to marital ones; a wide range of other relationships
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may involve house sharing, for example relations of 
the owner of the house. ... it was generally agreed 
that any reform proposals should be at least 
potentially applicable to people in other 
relationships. ... It was considered to be unfair 
because insufficient attention is paid to what might 
be termed domestic labour contributed to the 
household; such contributions being highly 
unlikely, in the light of ... Rosset, to be sufficient 
for ... the woman, to acquire a beneficial interest in 
the home.” (Thompson 1996: 155).
Whilst in a limited sense I may have applauded the apparent 
awareness that the law in this area may be ‘unfair’, it is not the fact 
that law pays insufficient attention to domestic labour per se 
which gives rise to the unfairness. It is the gendered, stereotypical 
constructions and assumptions regarding the ‘appropriate’ roles for 
women and men which is the unfairness. Reform framed in 
accordance with the above agenda, still fails to recognise this.
The ‘blatant’ admission that these exclusionary methods may 
result in unfairness are ‘justified’ by reference to judicial 
epistemological concerns regarding the ‘proper’ boundaries of
61 Thompson, M.P. [1996] Home Sharing - Reforming the Law. Conv. 154.
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property law. This is not to say however, that such divisive and 
exclusionary methods are abandoned when (ostensibly at least), 
property law is not the main focus. In the epistemological area of 
‘family law’, these methods are still at work. They, are however, 
more ‘subtle’. These exclusionary methods rely on repetitious re­
iteration of the symbolic and iconistic. In the following chapter, I 
explore the importance of the symbolic and iconistic in identity 




Imagery, Iconography and the Deployment of Familial 
Symbolism1 in Family Law Texts2
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I argued that the ‘injustice’ which often 
results from exclusion from law, was perhaps one of the most 
‘blatant’ examples of law’s divisive operational nature. In the 
present chapter, I question what happens when this 
acknowledgement is missing?
I argued that the exclusionary strategies used are more ‘subtle’. 
However, whilst the strategies themselves may be more subtle, the 
effects on ‘the subject’ are not. In order to explore the operation 
and effect of these strategies, I concentrate in this chapter, upon
1 The etymology o f the verb to ‘symbolise’ comes from 16th Century England. 
It was first used in physics to refer to substances which when combined, would 
cause a transmutation o f elements (Pitkin 1972).
2 See generally, Jackson, B. (1985); Semiotics and Legal Theory. Goodrich, P. 
(1991); Icons o f  Legal Authority. Goodrich, P. (1990); Languages o f  Law, 
From Logics o f  Memory to Nomadic Masks. Weidenfield and Nicolson. 
Cotterell, R. (1991); The Sociology o f  Law, Butterworths, 2nd Edn., Salter, M; 
Symbols, Legitimation and Dynamics o f  Legal Culture. Kevelson, R (1988) The 
Law as a System o f Signs. Plenum Press. Kevelson, R. (1989) Law and 
Semiotics Vols 1-3. Plenum Press.
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the importance of the symbolic and iconic aspects of law’s 
exclusionary operational nature and continued reinforcement of its 
own ‘legitimacy’. I argue that law’s dependence upon legitimacy 
is achieved mainly through the re-enforcement of ‘lines of 
succession’ in the context of ‘the family’. This is achieved not 
just through written rhetoric, but also through what I have termed 
‘visual’ rhetoric; i.e., law’s symbols and icons. Law’s visual 
symbols and icons has been the subject of critical examination in 
other contexts, for example, the symbolic nature of the court 
room.3 However, the operation of power through more 
‘accessible’ or ‘common’ visual symbols has not been addressed 
to a similar extent.
Constant bombardment of a particular visual representation of the 
family operate upon the subject to re-inforce the dominant 
ideology of an inherently heterosexual and gendered family. For 
example, the ‘nuclear’ family, is often portrayed visually. This 
visual portrayal tends to be in a manner consistent with its written 
image. Part of the ‘problem’ of trying to uncover dominant 
ideological constructions, has been the ‘invisibility’ of alternative 
discourses. Even within the ‘academy’ itself, the problem of 
invisibility continues. At the level of undergraduate studies, while
3 See for example, Jackson, B. (1985) Semiotics and legal Theory. Goodrich, P. 
(1991) Icons o f  Legal Authority. Kelveson, R. (1989) Law and Semiotics Vols
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the students may be encouraged to think critically about law, the 
main ‘tools’ used for this are, of course, text books4. These 
immediately present the student and lecturer with images of the 
family which are prescriptive in nature and operation. The visual 
images I have chosen are found on the front covers of ‘commonly 
used’ family law text books in order to further explore whether 
‘power’ operates by the symbolic repetition of citation, and how 
that which is symbolic becomes invested with power.
The purpose of law is to effect particular behaviours in individuals 
- to compel individuals to do, or not to do, a certain thing, by 
acting as a form of social control:
“The purpose of all legal enactments, judicial 
pronouncements, contracts, and other legal acts is to 
influence men’s (sic) behaviour and direct them in 
certain ways. The legal language must be viewed 
primarily as a means to this end. It is an instrument 
of social control and social intercourse.” 
(Olivecrona 1962: 177).
1- 3.
4 In recent times perhaps even more so, given the stretching o f all resources.
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In order to achieve this, law obviously uses language to 
communicate and perpetuate its ideology. A semiotic analysis of 
written rhetoric can go a long way in attempting to uncover and 
explain the meaning of legal language. However, ‘language’ is 
obviously not restricted to the written word - the use of language 
can explain how the mind or individual comes to be structured in a 
particular way and inserted in a social order (Saussure 1966:36). 
Language is also concerned with signs, symbols, icons - in other 
words, legal language uses visual pictures to communicate its 
ideology. Derrida, for example, argues that ‘text’ in the 
semiological sense of extended discourses, i.e., all practices of 
interpretation, are not limited to language. In other words, 
‘meaning’ is not inherent in signs, nor in what they refer to, but 
results from the relationship(s) between the observer and the visual 
image He draws out the radical ‘post structuralist’ implications of 
this point - that structures of meaning (without which nothing 
exists for us) include and implicate any observers of them. To 
observe is to interact; the observer constitutes herself as a subject 
in relation to the visual image. In this respect, the ‘scientific’ 
detachment of structuralists or of any other rationalist position is 
to Derrida, untenable. At the same time, the subject is also the 
observed; the visual image is reflected back at the subject as an 
imperative. In this respect then, legal vision has a duality of 
purpose.
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Each subject of law interacts with the symbols presented. The 
vision presented to the subject produces ‘experience’ through 
interaction with the meanings associated with signs and symbols. 
In other words, as legal subjects, we experience the effects of 
law’s interaction, and the meaning given to the symbol. Law’s 
‘vision’, however, is an imperative, it masks the ‘life’ experience 
of the legal subject.
‘Law’s languages therefore, are not merely restricted to written 
rhetoric. Given these considerations, how does legal vision affect 
the subject’s free will in identity determination (if at all)? This 
chapter will, therefore, seek to explore the use (or perhaps abuse), 
of the communication and perpetuation of ideology through the 
symbolism of certain familial icons.
Whilst there has been preponderance of work on the importance of 
symbolism and icons within legal culture, this has been restricted 
to studies of the symbolism and iconography of written rhetoric.5 
As yet, there appears to be little or no work on the importance of 
symbolism and iconography of visual rhetoric within legal culture. 
This is especially so within the context of the family and family 
law. One exception to this is Anne Bottomley who has explored
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the impact of iconography on land law books. Bottomley 
examines the many different landscapes which can be mapped by 
the inclusion/exclusion of ‘land law’ topics. She focuses on real 
property texts and argues that the image on the cover of the text is 
relatively unimportant in constructing our perception of the 
boundaries to real property -  it is ‘simply packaging to the text 
(Bottomley 1996:116). However, she goes onto argue that:
‘intriguing patterns to emerge and do lend 
themselves to a reading of the covers themselves as 
a kind of text of law. Real property books are 
characterised by a focus on landscape. Indeed 
landscape in the sense in which it is most often 
evocatively used in the country -  rural landscape.
Other images could have been chosen; they are 
available. Instead the dominant ideology has 
utilised not only rural landscape but also the major 
English artists who have been themselves melded 
into a tradition of ‘Englishness’. ... The uses of 
such imagery might not be consciously invoking 
narratives associated with traditional identity but is 
surely reproducing them”. (Bottomley 1996:116).
5 However, there has been considerable amount o f work outside o f legal 
research, especially in art criticism. See for example Saint-Martin, F. (1990)
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Bordo has argued that it is through media images that the subject 
learns how to behave and what is expected of the subject (Bordo 
1993:76).
What is it about symbolism and icons generally, that makes them 
worthy of attention?:
“Objects are human constructs and not self existing 
entities with intrinsic natures - meanings do not 
reside within objects ... but rather emerge out of the 
process of interpretation by which definitions are 
created and used.” (Plummer 1975: 11).
In other words, the icon does not have an independent meaning; it 
is always symbolic of something else. It is meant to be 
representative of that which is ‘real’ and to take the place of the 
content. Stripped of any cultural, social or legal interpretations, 
symbols and icons have no inherent meaning. They become 
important only when the subjective subject superimposes meaning, 
according to whatever tradition we wish to promote. It has been 
argued that these self imposed meanings and interpretations are
Semiotics o f  Visual Language. Indiana University Press.
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being constantly re-interpreted when social-legal values change.6 
In other words, we need new versions and interpretations to allow 
for our current prejudice. As Smart points out ‘It’s vital to 
remember that the meanings of representations is not immutable 
or unitary, although there may be dominant forms of 
interpretation’ (Smart 1989: 136). Therefore, symbols are
interpretative constructs whose process of assembly is a theme 
worthy of study in its own right.
In the context of ‘the family’, this can be interpreted in two ways; 
firstly, familial symbols can be interpreted as being representative 
of the ‘real’ family; a family which is stated to exist in both 
reality and actuality. Secondly, to signify exactly the opposite; to 
symbolise that which is not ‘real’. In this second context, the 
‘familial’ icon is used to symbolically represent and promote a 
familial ideology.
This dual purpose serves its function well. It can be used as both 
as a model or prototype for an idealised conception of future 
families; and as a reflection of previous families. When used in 
these ways, the familial symbol therefore continuously reinforces 
its own symbolic legitimacy.
6 See generally, Pierce, C.S. 1931-35. Collected papers. 8 vols. Eds. P. Weiss, 
C. Hartstone, and A. Burks. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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Pictorial images directly impose a concept on the viewer’s mind 
graphic and vivid images, in ways that the written word cannot. 
Pictorial images do have a more immediate and emotive effect 
than text. For example, starvation in the third world, can be read 
about in terms of written rhetoric, but it is most likely that public 
opinion will only be moved to action once these images appear in 
pictorial form, on television. The transfer and communication of 
an ideology is achieved through the perception of an image on a 
single page. This phenomenon is particularly prevalent in the 
imagery and iconography used to adorn various undergraduate law 
text books. For the picture on a text book (more than the often 
complex and difficult to remember text in side), reduces the 
concept of the family to the imagery which is being represented. 
The image lends itself to family law in particular, for the 
reproduction of an image on a text book is analogous to ‘the 
family’ itself; it relies upon reproduction, succession, passing 
down, exclusivity and so forth.
In exploring these issues, I shall be concentrating upon four 
undergraduate family law text books; Bromley's Family Law?;
7 Bromley, P.M. and Lowe, N.V., (1992) Bromley’s Family Law. Eighth Edn.
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Law and the F a m ily and The Family, Law and Society (third and 
fourth editions9).
The first of these, Bromley’s Family Law, presents us with an 
image on the front cover which is of four figures who are depicted 
in outline only. The four figures are two adults and two children. 
As all the figures are shown in relief, only by looking at the 
outline of the figures does it become possible to determine that 
what is represented is a family. By the stylised nature of the 
height and shape of these adult outlines, it can be assumed that one 
is male and one is female. By using imagery in this particular 
way, the book serves to promote one example of familial 
arrangement, (i.e., that of two parents of opposite sexes with two 
children), as ‘the’ family. In other words, the imagery becomes 
ideological in the sense of conflating a particular conception of the 
family with the idea of ‘the’ family per se, thereby disguising its 
own relatively contingent status. The symbol of a nuclear family 
becomes the symbol for all families, due to a process of constant 
re-inforcement and lack of critique. Other issues are raised by the 
appearance of the outlined figures. For example, the shorter of the 
two adult figures (presumably the female), is represented by long 
hair, the other (presumably the male), by short hair. Therefore, not
8 Dewar, J (1992) Law and the Family 2nd Edn.
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only does the book promote a particular familial arrangement, but 
it also prescribes how the individuals within that arrangement 
should be constructed, by both elaborating and then reinforcing the 
symbiotic nature of gender and sexuality within that familial 
relationship.
The symbols on the front cover of Bromley’s Family Law are 
therefore restricted to a particularly narrow understanding of what 
a family is. Perhaps more importantly, it acts as a very wide 
exclusionary understanding of what a family is not. This notion of 
of what a family is, (as depicted by the cover), is re-produced and 
continued by the written rhetoric contained within the covers.
How then, is this depiction carried out and on what basis? How, is 
the cultural construction routinely carried out? What are its 
assumptions and value judgements?
Is the front cover of Bromley’s Family Law stating that the length 
of hair is representative of perceived notions of femininity and 
masculinity? Presumably, it is. For in this context, the symbolism 
on the book cover (amongst other things), states that to be male is 
to have short hair, and to be female is to have long hair. But this is
9 Hoggett, B and Pearl, D., (1991) The Family, Law and Society. Cases and 
Materials, 3rd and 4th Edns.
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quite plainly non sensical. We could just as easily state that the 
female figure here is Caroline Cossey.10 The point to be made 
here is that in law, Cossey is still regarded as a man, but she 
‘conforms’ to portrayal of femininity as depicted by the book’s 
front cover. Here, the images of ‘femininity’ and ‘masculinity’ are 
therefore revealed to be crude stereotypes - a complete fiction. 
Bromley’s Family Law therefore uses legal and cultural 
constructions of gender to depict yet another socio-legal 
construction.
Does what is on the front cover of a law text book really matter? 
Presumably, it does, as otherwise, all books (whether text books or 
not), would have plain covers thereby saving on printing costs, 
royalties and so forth.11 It also has no bearing to ask who chose 
the cover, for it does not matter whether the choice was left to the 
author or the publisher, the resulting book cover has the same 
impact on the subject. The front cover of Bromley’s Family Law, 
was obviously chosen for a particular purpose, i.e., the picture is 
presented as though it most accurately sums up a particular 
conceptual image of the family. The image on the front cover 
offers itself up as being representative of the ‘essence’ of the
10 Caroline Cossey is a post operative male to female transsexual.
11 Although no empirical research has been undertaken, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the undergraduate text books used on the continent, do not tend to 
have their covers adorned by signs, symbols, pictures and so forth.
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family; to present something as representative of an ‘essence’ is 
firstly to assume that there is such a thing as an ‘essential family’.
Secondly, if such an assumption is correct, the ‘essence’ is 
identifiable as the particular ‘thing’ it is, and without which, it 
would not be identified as that ‘thing’.12 In this context, any given 
particular familial arrangement can be said to have certain 
common characteristics with any other given familial arrangement 
(such as love, companionship, cohabitation and so forth), but it is 
important to stress that the socially constructed heterosexual 
nuclear family does not have a monopoly on the essence of the 
family. Yet the use of visual rhetoric on the book cover states this 
to be the case.
What effect and influence might this have? The rhetorically 
powerful and influential nature of this pictorial representation 
should not be underestimated. The first thing the reader sees every 
time the book is picked up is the visual rhetoric and iconography 
which invents a context for the act of reading the content. This in 
turn is reinforced by the title itself Bromley’s Family Law which 
is stamped authoritatively on top of the cover across the pictorial 
images. It becomes apparent then, that the field of vision on
12 Perhaps in this context, the publishers and/or author o f  this particular book 
could legitimately be described as committed proponents o f  essentialism. I.e.,
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Bromley’s Family Law, is limited to one of reflection, 
proselytising and structuring. Thus the wording on the front cover 
reinforces and legitimates the pictorial representation and of 
course, vice versa.
Bottomley argues that the cover of the property law text book, is a 
‘map’ to the rest of the book13:
“The cover becomes the frontier between two 
territories; a window into the text and a window 
from the text onto the world.” (Bottomley 1993: 3).
The ‘window’ is there to be looked through. It also frames a 
selected ‘slice’ of ‘reality’ in a particular way and structures the 
frame of visibility. These ‘windows’ allow any perception of the 
law to be gazed at, but as we have seen with Bromley’s Family 
Law, the (window of) opportunity is invariably not taken. The 
image(s) used are ‘safe’ and easily recognisable:
“[T]hey draw on an accepted aesthetics; and in this 
sense could be seen as rather safe and boring, they 
do not confront any of the problems of, for instance,
that a definition describes or reveals the essence o f  a thing and/or o f  the perfect 
ideal form o f which it is an imperfect copy.
13 Feminist Perspectives on Property Law: Entering as a Stranger a Familial 
Landscape. Unpublished paper. Bottomley, A. (1993) presented to the W.G.
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non-flgurative contemporary art but rather 
reproductive images we can all recognise and 
understand. They therefore do not utilise images or 
techniques which could signal that there are not 
only contemporary issues here, but issues which 
may be unsettling, difficult to recognise in the 
landscape.” (Bottomley 1993: 7).
When this approach is applied to the cover of Bromley’s Family 
Law, it becomes clear that not only does the cover act as a window 
on the text and vice versa, it presents a ‘safe’ and ‘cosy’ image of 
the family. There is nothing to suggest that there is or can be more 
to ‘a family’ than mother, father, children. Equally, there is 
nothing to suggest that there is, or can be more to ‘family law’ 
than that law which is designed to ‘deal’ with this particular 
pictorial image. Bromley’s Family Law, in other words, does 
nothing to ‘rock the (family) boat’. There is nothing to suggest 
that a family headed, for example by a lesbian couple, would be an 
equally valid familial alternative to the image of a family that this 
particular text represents.
Hart Legal Workshop. 7th July 1993, for the institute o f  Advanced Legal 
Studies.
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The operation of this system of prejudices can be self perpetuating. 
Given the ‘imperative’ demands made by the image, it is an 
intended outcome that the subject of law (in this instance, the law 
student), will subconsciously ingest and then re-produce a 
particular conception of the family, in very much the same way as 
law is re-productive of its own image. In this context the, re­
production follows conception.
This prejudiced conception engenders imagery which in turn 
supports the cultural prejudice. Is this an example of the fact that 
if the same thing is repeated enough times in enough ways, it 
becomes accepted as the ‘norm’? The answer to this question is 
yes as repetition produces the ‘norm’. In this context, a symbol or 
icon can originate as the symbol of the ‘reality’, but continues to 
be the symbol or the icon after the ‘reality’ has disappeared - it 
becomes a symbol of a fiction. During this process, it is 
‘forgotten’ that the symbol derives its legitimacy from legal and 
socially gendered constructs, and that these constructs are directly 
reliant on the postulate the ‘family’ is essentialist. What is also 
‘forgotten’ is the presence of those established as ‘outside’ to the 
familial symbol - the most obvious of examples are families 
headed by one parent, lesbian families and so forth. What is 
‘remembered’ is recalled through the associations contained within 
these representations of the image. In this context, what is
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forgotten is therefore repressed. This repression must occur if the 
interpretative process of construction of the family is to take 
place: it occurs on a routine, ‘taken for granted’ basis. Therefore, 
the familial symbol attempts to ‘control’ what is remembered and 
what is forgotten. The power exercised by the symbol or icon 
masks those images which Taw’ does not want to see. In other 
words, ‘law’ is analogous to a mirror - only the ‘desired’ image is 
reflected back at the observer:
“The art of law ... is to be understood precisely as 
an art, as the construction of a mirror image, a 
portrait or icon that will serve both to represent and 
reflect. It represents in a perfect form the face of 
power, it portrays the absent cause of law, the other 
time of authority, while equally reflecting back to 
the subject of law the image if its own otherness, 
the mask or persona of legal subjectivity.” 
(Goodrich 1989: 110).
There are, of course, different methodologies at play when 
choosing the cover of a text book. The cover can be specially 
designed and commissioned for the book {Bromley’s Family Law 
being one such example); alternatively, they can be drawn from
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existing pictorial images. A common practice appears to be to 
utilise paintings.
The second of the four books under consideration is Dewar’s Law 
and the Family}* What happens then, if we apply these theories to 
other ‘family law’ text books? In Dewar’s book, we have a 
reproduction of Diego Valasquez’s Las Meninas.15 The picture 
depicts several people, one of whom is a child (the subject of the 
title). The people depicted are a mixture of servants and family. 
The Patrons and the painter himself are visible to us the viewer, 
but only by their reflections in a mirror which hangs on a back 
wall of the painting.
The chosen painting as one selective, contemporary interpretation 
of ‘a’ family. This interpretative painting, is in turn, used as the 
front cover of a text book to represent ‘a’ family. In other words, 
we have a reproduction of an interpretation, used as a symbol to 
firstly reflect the context of the book, and secondly, as a symbol 
for ‘a’ family generally. Again, why was this particular picture 
used? What effects (and affects) does it achieve? What strategy 
of ideology is it a part of? By depicting an ‘extended’ family, the 
painting clearly allows for the definitional boundaries of ‘family’
14 Supra, above.
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to be drawn wider than Bromley’s Family Law (which depicts a 
nuclear family).
According to Foucault, the domination of visual knowledge in the 
Classical Age, rested on the assumption that the ‘observer’ existed, 
and was able to observe visual knowledge from an ‘outside’ 
perspective. In this respect, Las Meninas, was to Foucault, an 
exemplification of this assumption (Foucault 1970).16 Thus, at the 
time of painting, Las Meninas took the place of written discourse; 
the visual was everything.
Again, the pictorial representation on Dewar’s book act as a 
reflection of the text contained within it.17 For example, in the 
index of Bromley’s Family Law there are no listings or references 
to homosexuals or lesbians; whereas in Dewar’s book, there 
are three listings for homosexuals.18
15 Meaning ‘Little Princess’. Completed in 1656, the painting is conventionally 
thought o f  as baroque, rather than classical art.
16 Foucault, M., The Order o f  Things: An Archaeology o f  the Human Sciences 
(New York, 1970). Translated from Les Mots et les choses (1966).
17 One review o f Law and the Family stated that it was a ‘refreshing approach 
to the subject, a stimulating and invigorating read and a good introduction to 
law and the family today. Not many o f its problems would have been known 
by Valasquez whose Meninas graces the cover - what I wonder were the 
publishers or the author intending to convey by reproducing this classic? Not 
surely that time stand still!’. Freeman, M. (1994) SPTL, Spring.
18 The listings are: ‘cohabitation; custody o f  children and marriages void. See 
page 537’. Incidentally, ‘lesbians’ do not appear in the index.
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The question could be raised however, that ‘this is a book on 
family law, not sexuality or gender, why should there be any 
references to lesbian, homosexual or heterosexual?’ In response, I 
would suggest that the act of asking the question illustrates that 
‘family law’ is exclusionary. To not address issues of sexuality in 
family law text books would be to argue that sexuality is irrelevant 
to the family. If only in crude biological terms, families do not 
exist without sexuality. So clearly therefore, sexuality has a 
significant role to play in the family. But as I have illustrated, 
only (hetero) sexuality is deemed to be relevant.
The last of the family text books I wish to briefly consider is the 
third and fourth editions of Hoggett and Pearl’s The Family, Law 
and Society.'9 On the third edition, the cover is a photograph 
depicting Egyptian carvings of four figures (two adults and two 
children). The image which is presented to the viewer leaves no 
doubt about the sex of the two adults; they are male and female, as 
are the two children. Akin to Bromley's Family Law book, the 
picture is representative of the ‘traditional heterosexual nuclear 
family’, yet the book professes to cover a wider range of ‘family 
law’ subjects than others.20 In other words, the book professes to
19 The Family, Law and Society. Cases and Materials. 3rd end. Hoggett, B & 
Pearl, D. (1991).
20 On the back cover it is stated: “...with the first edition they produced a source 
book o f ground breaking scope and depth. With the second edition they have
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cover a wide range of issues, and in comparison to other similar 
books, it probably does. However, its outward appearance still 
remains as ‘conservative’ as Bromley’s Family Law; it still 
projects the same heterosexist agenda.
Thus if we accept the symbolism and iconography of what is 
presented on the front cover, as reflecting the content of the book, 
then perhaps the book is not as ‘ground breaking’ as it would have 
us believe. For again, we can argue that the symbol and the icon 
‘encapsulate’ the ‘essence’ of that which is being symbolised, in 
this case, ‘a’ family and the text contained within the book. Yet 
this striving to express a static ‘essence’ requires a process of 
symbolism which can never be free of the gender politics and 
assumptions out of which it emerges, and which its own practices 
further support and sustain.
For the fourth edition the picture chosen depicts a family21 this 
time consisting of seven individuals.22 What does this cover ask us 
to implicitly accept?
stuck to this task with the inclusion o f an even more varied range o f  interesting 
and instructive extracts”.
21 All o f  them white.
22 The picture is a reproduction o f a painting by Harry More Gordon, titled 
Interior with Dalmatian and Family, dated 1994.
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The family in this painting are pictured in ‘domestic’ setting - a 
lounge, there are two adults (presumably, the parents) and five 
children.23 The mother is seated, and dressed in what are 
apparently casual clothes. She is also wearing a ring on the third 
finger of her left hand - it is possible to surmise therefore, that she 
is married to the father. The father, is standing behind the mother, 
and although he too, is apparently dressed casually, they appear 
more formal than those of the mother as he is wearing a jacket and 
tie. The five children (two boys and three girls)24, are variously 
seated and standing. They are either side and slightly set back 
from the parents. All the females in the group have long hair 
whilst all the males have short hair. This, is a family law which 
law would approve of. The ‘conventionality’ of the family 
depicted is obvious to view. The depiction and representation of 
heterosexuality is felt strongly, even within this heterosexual 
conventionality there are other ‘rules’ complied with; even down 
to the length of hair, not only of the parents but the children as 
well.
In the preface to the fourth edition, the authors mention that they 
have welcomed two new authors ‘who are members of a new 
generation of law teachers and can take the book on towards the
23 From their surroundings, it would seem reasonable to suggest the family are 
‘middle income’.
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next century’. They go on to state that ‘As always there is no 
shortage of new developments to think about. It is hard to 
remember what life was like before the Children Act 1989; but 
many of the old debates have been replaced with others’.25 The 
written rhetoric clearly acknowledges ‘new developments’ and 
‘new debates’, yet this awareness is not reflected on the front 
cover. The written rhetoric on the back cover states that:
“Particular emphasis is given to policy issues 
arising out of state intervention in family life and 
support for families in crisis or at risk, opening the 
book up to students on sociology, social work, 
social policy and history courses as well as anyone 
interested in family law or family policy.”
The book itself then, clearly promotes itself as appealing to an 
audience wider than ‘just’ law students. The written rhetoric 
suggests the book is aiming to be inclusive rather than exclusive in 
its reach. However, I would argue that the ‘inclusiveness’ implied 
in the written rhetoric is not reflected in the visual rhetoric. 
Again, the first rhetoric encountered by the student is the visual 
image presented to them on the front cover. In most
241 presume.
25 At page v.
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undergraduate courses, it is after the introductory lecture at the 
start of the course that the student will buy the text book.
At this stage they have not done any substantive work on the topic. 
They go to the book shop, take the book of the shelf, turn to look 
at the front cover and it is there that they are presented with their 
first substantive rhetoric on ‘family Taw’. Would it not be 
reasonable for them to assume (even on a sub conscious level), 
that this is a ‘legitimate’ representation of ‘the’ family?
Conclusion to chapter four
It has not been the purpose of this chapter to suggest that one 
particular form of visual rhetoric should be privileged over 
another. Rather, my intention has been to illustrate that legal 
culture privileges particular familial forms via visual rhetoric. In 
the light of this, I would argue that symbols appearing on text 
books should be the subject of continuing challenge and scrutiny. 
Firstly, because symbols constitute visual rhetoric, and rhetoric of 
any kind should be so treated. Secondly, because of the impact 
they have on the observer, - they construct and shape the 
observer’s perception of familial arrangements. This 
‘constructing’ and ‘shaping’, is also a repetitious process, i.e., the 
repetitious use of the symbol re-enforces its own legitimacy.
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Legal culture thus promotes a particular familial arrangement 
through the repetition of the symbol. It is this repetition which is 
used to justify a series of legal symbols which are embedded in a 
‘closed and sterile symbolic field’ of endless repetition (McCahery 
1993: 417). In concentrating upon text book covers, I have 
attempted to demonstrate that because visual rhetoric creates 
idealised effects, it has the potential to ‘obscure’ or ‘cloud’ vision. 
If it is important to be aware of that which attempts to construct 
or obstruct perception; to uncover hidden ideology wherever it 
may raise its (ugly) head, symbolic visual rhetoric should not be 
excluded from scrutiny.
Further, if such constructs are not recognised as being ‘mere’ 
constructs, they then become treated as absolutes; and there is 
nothing absolute in symbolism and iconography. The above 
discussion, has, I hope, illustrated this. There are many possible 
images and symbols from which to chose a text book cover, but 
the ‘impact’ of that choice, is as important for visual rhetoric as it 
is for written rhetoric. What is chosen therefore, has the potential 
to become visual rhetoric which is as equally important as the 
written rhetoric contained within the covers. Visual rhetoric, more 
often than not, goes unchallenged and further shields law’s cultural 
prejudices from critical examination and challenge, leaving the 
operation of ‘power’ and ‘truth’ within discourse to continue
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uncritiqued and unquestioned. What implications then, do these 
arguments have with respect to ‘identity’?
Visual rhetoric provides a symbolic imperative; a ‘template’ which 
makes certain demands on any subject, not just a legal subject. It 
instructs the observer as to how families should be constituted 
(even to the extent of proscribing hair length). Visual rhetoric 
demands that families be structured along prescriptive notions of 
identity; the individuals within that family being clearly defined 
and understood in gendered and sexualised terms. Familial groups 
which do not see themselves reflected in the visual rhetoric are 
placed lower down the legal hierarchy, sometimes to the point of 
complete exclusion. Being continually presented with a (legally 
approved) image of the family, may persuade some legal subjects 
that ‘law’ is not to be engaged with (unless absolutely necessary).
The next chapter will concentrate on those legal subjects who 
engage with law more closely than an observing subject. 
Partaking in a legal process such as applications for residency 
brings the legal subject arguably closer to the constraints of 
constructed identity. The legal ‘subjects’ under consideration are 
lesbian mothers in child residence and responsibility disputes. 
What are the ‘terms’ upon which a lesbian mother is ‘allowed’ to 
engage with law? To what extent (if at all), is she ‘recognised’ as
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a self-defined legal subject? Is she even ‘visible’? Does law, when 




The Formation of Identity Through Judgement
“The legal regulation of lesbianism has been and 
continues to be very different from the law’s 
treatment of male homosexuality. ... Yet when 
female sexuality is seen as threatening the idea of 
essential womanhood in law (motherhood) then the 
law’s treatment of lesbian mothers shows that it 
would be inaccurate to say that the law treats 
lesbianism with legal impunity.” (Collier 1995: 
102).
Introduction
“In custody disputes between heterosexual parents, 
it is generally the mother who is awarded care and 
control of her children. When the mother is 
lesbian, however, custody is commonly denied. 
Whereas the likelihood of a lesbian mother 
retaining custody may be slightly higher in the 
1990’s than it was in the 1970’s, it remains the case
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that many lesbian mothers who go to court are 
unsuccessful in their quest to keep their children.
For this reason, many women do not even try.”
(Tasker and Golombok 1997: 2).
In fact, between 1990 and 1997, there have only been two reported 
cases involving disputes between a lesbian mother and father over 
residence of children (Hame and R.O.W. 1997). However, 
mothers’ appear to be increasingly aware that the traditional 
judicial preference for maternal custody is less prevalent in recent 
years. Once a father brings a custody dispute to trial, his chances 
of winning are roughly equal that of his former wife. Women are 
at a disadvantage in custody litigation because their post-divorce 
employment may be seen as conflicting with their maternal 
obligations, because they have less to offer their children 
economically, or because their behaviour may be more carefully 
scrutinised for evidence of immorality (Lewin 1993:164). In 
addition to this, going to court is expensive, and women are more 
likely to agree to a compromise, or even to give up custody, if they 
cannot afford a long court battle - a likelihood that is increased 
given that women’s ‘earning capacity’ is less than that of men.
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Lesbian mothers are particularly vulnerable to such litigation. 
Judges tend to view them as unsuitable custodial parents solely 
because of their sexual orientation, even in the absence of any 
‘evidence’ to the contrary. Lesbian mothers, aware of their poor 
chances in court, will endeavour to avoid it if at all possible.
Because ‘motherhood’ and lesbianism are legal oxymorons, legal 
discourse is forced to give up any essentialist assumptions 
regarding motherhood. There can no longer be a presumption that 
there is something ‘essential’ about motherhood that destines a 
woman for custody of her children. As illustrated below, the 
woman’s ‘suitability’ for ‘motherhood’, becomes a series of 
questions regarding abilities, choices, lifestyle, resources and so 
forth. The mother must ‘prove’ her suitability as a parent. Within 
this context, is it possible to expose the ways in which a lesbian 
mother must explicitly and implicitly defend her identity as a 
woman, lesbian and mother?
In this chapter, I will focus upon some of the case law surrounding 
lesbian custody cases.1 I will explore some of the ways in which 
legal ideological discourse ‘hides’ its dominance behind a veil of 
neutrality, either disregarding and minimising the relevance or
1 See also, Columbo, Spencer and Rutter; ‘Children in Lesbian and Single 
Parent Households, Psychosexual and Psychiatric Appraisal’. Journal fo r  Child
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importance of other discourses as and when convenient. It is 
through this exploration, that I hope to expose the constraints 
placed upon identity and the implicit assumptions being made 
regarding ‘appropriate’ parental roles .
I will be addressing several major questions within this chapter. 
Firstly, are law’s ‘promises’ of fairness, objectivity, absence of 
personal morality and so forth, borne out in practice, by the case 
law in this area? Secondly, within this context, what implications 
does this have for the legal construction of the lesbian mother’s 
identity? To what extent, can the legal subject (in this particular 
instance the lesbian mother), exercise ‘free will* in the 
determination of her sexual and gender identity?
Law’s ‘Promise’
“Law constitutes a plurality of principles, 
knowledges, and events, yet it claims a unity 
through the common usage of the term ‘law’
[which] operates as a claim to power in that it
embodies a claim to a superior and unified field of
Psychology and Psychiatry (1983). page 124. And Green and Mandell in 
Hotvedt, Gray and Smith; Lesbian Mothers and their Children. (1986).
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knowledge which concedes little to other competing 
discourses which by comparison fail to promote 
such a unified appearance.” (Smart 1995:4).
In the first chapter, I discussed the ‘nature’ of Law’s promise in 
general terms, where law seeks to impose its control and authority 
through its ‘claim to truth’. However, a close examination of the 
case law in this area starkly reveals a breakdown of commitment 
to its own ideals. It appears to me that there are several ‘promises’ 
that law makes within this context.
The first is that legal discourse will not allow law to be ‘ahead’ of 
popular social attitudes, i.e., that law must reflect current social 
attitudes. The second, which, although in one sense contradicts 
the first, also supplements it, is that law will also present itself as 
‘progressive’, i.e., it must not try to ‘hold back the clock’; that law 
is an active, not a passive by-product of social change - it leads, 
rather than follows social convention. Thirdly, that the issues 
under consideration must be decided on the basis of existing case 
law and that in doing so, the judge must not let (his) own personal 
attitudes and beliefs influence the outcome of the case.
‘Superimposed’ upon this imperative is the ‘overriding’ principle 
that the court will decide upon the issues solely by reference to
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‘the best interests of the child.’2 However, as will be seen, 
although courts are often at pains to point out that they are free 
from any pre-conceived moral values or bias, they use language 
and judgements which show strong preference for particular ideas 
and concepts, thereby reinforcing the heterosexual imperative and 
its hegemony.
‘Reflecting social attitudes’
Law will state on many occasions that it must decide the issues 
with strict adherence to social attitudes; that law is a reflection of 
social progress and development. However, there are times when 
this judicial ‘rule of thumb’ is conveniently ignored or bypassed. 
Case law concerned with lesbian parenting, seems to be 
particularly susceptible to this ‘double standard’. In some of the 
cases, the judges appear to acknowledge that society’s normative 
values and morality differ from their own, but if this difference is 
‘inconvenient’, then that difference is constructed as legally 
irrelevant, allowing the judge to impose his own morality. In this 
respect, the use of ‘moral’ language is dynamic rather than
2 S. 1(1) o f  the Children Act 1989 states that in any contested case concerning a 
child’s upbringing, the welfare o f the child is the paramount consideration.
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descriptive; it seeks to influence others rather than inform them. 
The following example illustrates the point:
“Despite the vast change over the past 30 years or 
so in the attitudes of our society ... to homosexual 
relationships, I regard it as axiomatic that the ideal 
environment for the upbringing of a child is the 
home ... of her mother and father. When the 
marriage between father and mother is at an end, 
that ideal cannot be obtained ... the court’s task is to 
chose the alternative which comes closet to that 
ideal.”3
In this example, although there is a concession that social attitudes 
have changed, this obviously conflicts with the judge’s own 
viewpoint and attitude towards homosexual relationships. Social 
attitudes are therefore conveniently ignored and substituted by the 
judge’s own personal opinion:
“Lesbian mothers applying to live with, or to have 
regular contact with, their children are difficult for 
many family judges to come to terms with. A
3 C v C (a minor)(custody: appeal) [1991] 1 FLR 223., Per Glidewell LJ at page 
228.
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possible reason for this is that there is a perceived 
dissonance between ‘mother’ and all that the word 
implies, and ‘lesbian’ which carries a different set 
of resonance’s. Faced with this problem of 
dissonance, courts resort to the external 
environment and general social attitudes. ... so 
although the mother may be seen by the court as 
better qualified for child care than the father by 
reason of past experience or a ‘natural bond’, her 
femininity, which is affirmed by such a perception, 
is opened to question by sexual preferences.” 
(O’Donovan 1993:84).
In W v W*, the mother won her case for custody of her two 
daughters (twins) aged 11 at the time of the hearing. The basis of 
the father’s case had been the mother’s ‘attachment to the 
Women’s Liberation Movement, and her lesbian activities’. The 
rhetorical use of ‘activities’ immediately constitutes the lesbian 
mother as ‘the other’. Her ‘activities’ are then imbued with 
negativity, legitimising subsequent legal scrutiny. It’s inclusion 
here, is akin to the usage of ‘criminal activities’. Heterosexuality
4 [1976] Unreported. Court o f  Appeal 3, 4 November. Cited in Edwards, S 
1996:69.
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is impliedley established as the ‘legal norm’; there is therefore no 
necessity to talk in terms of ‘heterosexual activities’.
In awarding custody to the mother, the Court of Appeal were 
careful to state:
“The case turned on practical day to day 
grounds...and I hope no one will regard this 
judgement as containing any pronouncement for or 
against homosexual activities.”5 
In other words, custody was only awarded to the mother because 
the father was unable to provide a suitable home. The Court of 
Appeal also made clear that if the father could have made suitable 
accommodation proposals for the two girls, then he would have 
been granted care and control.
Ormrod went onto say that whilst they were considering the case 
“with as open minds as it is possible to have on this type of issue” 
the mother ought to agree that, “it is quite obvious that their lives 
are highly abnormal”, and that it is:
“Simple common sense to say that the children 
ought to have a more normal life in a more normal
family, amongst less vehemently minded people. It 
would be difficult to dispute that proposition.”6
The appeal to ‘common sense’, releases Ormrod’s rhetoric from 
the inconvenience of having to provide a ‘legal’ justification. To 
use the word ‘normal’ twice in one sentence re-inforces the 
‘accepted wisdom of common sense’. The underlying ideology 
presents itself as ‘practised wisdom and common sense’ - it 
conveniently releases the judge from critical self-examination. 
Ormrod’s rhetoric pathologises the lesbian mother as lacking in 
common sense, abnormal and vehemently minded, whilst at the 
same time re-inforcing law’s legitimacy and ensuring that the 
possibility of dissent is minimised.
Perhaps one of the most blatant example of law ‘hiding’ behind 
‘social attitudes’, is the case of M  v M? The mother had been 
granted access to her child but on the condition that the child not 
come into contact with the mother’s partner. The condition had 
been imposed because the trial judge, Hollings, J, viewed the 
mother’s partner as “dangerous”, and had suggested that the 
mother’s partner had seduced the mother and was the “dominant” 
partner.
5 W v W (1976) unreported Per Ormrod LJ. Cited in Edwards, S 1996:69.
6 Per Ormrod LJ.
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Hollings J., considered that the children would be better off if they 
were to ‘grow up’ with the knowledge of their mother’s lesbianism 
that if “they were overwhelmed by its discovery later”. He was 
also concerned that the mother and her partner behaved 
‘cautiously’ before the children, but he was satisfied that neither of 
them were the ‘active militant’ types. From this subjective and 
stereotypical perception of the women’s life-style, he was able to 
conclude that “there was therefore, no real risk of them behaving 
because of their lesbian and feminist views in a way harmful to the 
children”, (emphasis added). Using the word ‘and’ implies that in 
the trial judge’s opinion, it is possible to be a lesbian but not a 
feminist (and vice versa). The implication being, that heterosexual 
women may be subject to similar exceptional legal scrutiny if they 
present themselves, or are perceived to be, feminists.
Cumming-Bruce and Stamp thoroughly approved of the trial 
judge’s sentiments, but denied the father’s application. The denial 
of the father’s request was presented as a ‘pragmatic’ solution; the 
child was going to discover his mother’s lesbianism anyway, so 
there was no point in trying to hide it from the child by keeping 
the mother’s partner away:
7 Unreported, 12 July 1977, Court o f  Appeal; Stamp and Cumming-Bruce LJ.
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“For myself I would share the father’s anxieties but 
it does not follow that I accept his solution because 
the fact of the matter is that it is important for both 
these children to develop a close and affectionate 
relationship with their mother, and if the mother 
continues to hold these perhaps excessively simple 
views about the position of homosexuals in a 
fundamentally heterosexual society, if  she wants to 
push her views down the children’s throats she is 
going to have ample opportunity to do it.”8
Cumming-Bruce and Stamp were clearly ‘resigned’ to a situation 
perceived and presented as far from ideal. The mother was 
presented as not acknowledging and not conceding to, societal 
‘norms’. Cumming-Bruce and Stamp positioned themselves as 
‘knowing subjects’, in stark contrast to the mother whose views 
were described as ‘excessively simple’. As a ‘knowing subject’, 
the judge ‘knows’ what current societal normative values are; this 
‘knowledge’ is then relied upon to produce the judgement, 
obscuring that what is presented as ‘society’s views’, are in fact, 
his own. Thus:
8 Per Cumming-Bruce LJ.
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“Whatever personal views one might have about 
homosexual activities, because society is orientated 
and organised on the basis of heterosexual family 
relationships in spite of greater tendencies to 
toleration; biologically the future of the human race 
is linked with heterosexual relationships between a 
male and a female, and society at present accepts 
that children are much more likely to develop with 
personalities that are not dictated or disturbed if 
they grow up in a household in which there is a 
male parent figure and a female parent figure.”
There are several implicit assumptions within this passage worthy 
of attention. Firstly, there appears to be a contradiction here, 
between the references to ‘greater tendencies to toleration’ towards 
‘homosexual activities’, and, the statement that ‘children are much 
more likely to develop with personalities that are not dictated or 
disturbed if they grow up in a household in which there is a male 
parent figure and a female figure’9. These statements are also 
offered as statements of fact, and by presenting them as such, the 
judge again presents himself as a knowing subject.
9 Is it just co-incidence that ‘male parent figure’ is mentioned first and ‘female 
parent figure’ last?
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Secondly, there is a conflation between ‘heterosexual family 
relationships’ and the continuance of the human race. It is unclear 
in which context the word ‘relationships’ means, but 
‘biologically’, the future of the human race depends only upon 
‘relationships’ between egg and sperm.
The passage continues:
“Therefore if the mother and (her partner) reject the 
view commonly held in society which may be 
regarded as one of the basic precepts of social life, 
their influence is likely to be extremely dangerous 
to the children because the children could become 
imbued with some very silly ideas which could 
have an adverse effect on their standards and 
behaviour when they try to form their personalities 
in adolescence.”
Again, female and male parent figures are held up as the ‘basic 
precepts of social life’, which the lesbian mother with her ‘silly 
views’ has ‘rejected’. This of course makes her ‘extremely 
dangerous’. As a ‘knowing subject’ the judge represents ‘truth’ 
and effectively endows himself with the power to not just to deny
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or grant custody in any particular set of circumstances, but also 
with the power to define identity, to define meaning.
This can be compared to Re D (An Infant)JO which concerned a 
homosexual father refusing adoption consent. In this case, there 
was an almost complete rejection of social attitudes. In this case, 
the court quite clearly regarded itself as the guardian of children’s 
‘rights’, which were clearly presented as the ‘right’ to be brought 
up in a ‘normal’ household. In other words, the rejection of social 
attitudes was ‘justified’ by ’hiding behind’ the ‘welfare principle’ - 
conveniently disguising the judicial prejudice, which as a result, 
does not need to be justified:
“Whatever new attitudes Parliament, or public 
tolerance, may have chosen to take as regards the 
behaviour of consenting adults over the age of 21 
inter se, these should not entitle the court to relax, 
in any degree, the vigilance and severity with which 
they should regard the risk of children, at critical 
ages, being exposed or introduced to ways of life 
which, as this case illustrates, may lead to severance 
from normal society, to psychological stresses and
10 Re D  (An Infant)(Adoption: Parents consent) [1977] AC 602.
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unhappiness and possibly even to physical 
experiences which may scar them for life.”11
Whilst this passage reveals an acknowledgement that the attitudes 
of ‘Parliament or public’ to the consensual behaviour of adults 
over the age of 21 are important, the relevance of this to children is 
only implicitly given. It is implicit within this passage that the 
homosexual father has ‘severed’ his ‘way of life’ by not living in a 
‘normal’ society which may lead him to ‘psychological stresses 
and unhappiness’. The ‘judicious’12 choice of words allows the 
judge to exercise ‘the court’s’ (i.e., his) ‘severe vigilance’ over the 
father and constitute him as ‘the other’.
‘Judges’ Personal Beliefs’
“The impression often appears to be created that a 
judge’s own views and value judgements are of 
minimal importance when taken alongside 
assessment of evidence and reliability of 
witnesses.” (Bradley 1987: 186).
11 Per Wilberforce LJ at page 629.
121 hesitate to use that word in praise.
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Judges are often at pains to point out that all they ‘do’, is simply to 
examine a set of facts and apply the law to those facts; their 
personal morality has therefore no part to play in this process:
“One thing is however clear: in making a decision 
on welfare the judge should not be influenced by 
subjective considerations...he must try to ensure 
that his personal beliefs do not affect his judicial 
function in deciding where the child’s welfare 
lies.”13
As laudable as this may sound, it does have a hollow ring to it. In 
a manner similar to reflecting societies attitudes, a judge’s 
personal beliefs and morality play a significant role in judicial 
pronouncements:
“Nevertheless...he cannot abdicate responsibility 
merely because the issue is a sensitive one on which 
differing views are held. What standards then 
should he apply if he is not to apply his own 
subjective views? In my judgement, he should start 
on the basis that the moral standards which are
13 C v C (a minor)(custody: appeal) [1991] FCR 24, Per Balcomme LJ at page 
231.
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generally accepted in the society in which the child 
lives are more likely than not to promote his or her 
welfare.”14
It seems to me that law does not follow its own rules, or rather it 
only follows them when it convenient in order to maintain the 
heterosexual status quo. As I will explore below, many of the 
judges go specifically out of their way to state that they are not in 
the business of making (or taking), moral or philosophical 
decisions and then proceed to do precisely that. There are openly 
moral statements about their views on lesbianism, which suggest 
that, rather than considering the best interests of the child, they are 
more concerned with controlling the moral behaviour of society. 
Some of the judges admit to being ill-informed, but never the less 
still proceed to decide the case on their own prejudices.
For instance, in Re P (A Minor) (Custody) ^ , the issue was whether 
the child should stay with her mother or be committed into the 
care of the Local Authority. The mother kept her daughter on a 
staying access visit, after the daughter complained of apparent 
abuse by her father. The father did not challenge the mother’s 
claim that he should not have custody, but he insisted that the
14 C  v C, Per Balcomme LJ at page 230.
15 Re P  (a minor)(custody) [1983] 4 FLR 401.
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mother was ‘unfit’ for custody because of her cohabitation with 
her female partner. The Court of Appeal, (giving its judgement 
through the then President, Sir John Arnold), rejected the father’s 
claim that the ‘better alternative’ was for the child to go into local 
authority care. It appears, that this case strongly suggests that a 
lesbian mother is a preferred option than local authority care and 
that a lesbian mother who was in other ways unexceptional, could 
have custody. This appeared to be on the basis that the Court of 
Appeal was impressed by the mother’s ‘discretion’, the only 
‘exceptional’ thing about the mother was her sexual orientation, 
referred to as her ‘sexual proclivities’. It was stated that:
“The only question I have to ask myself is whether 
the proclivities of the mother and the lady with 
whom she lives are such as to make it undesirable 
in V’s interests that she should be brought up in that 
home.”16
This has clear implications for women who for various reasons, 
are unable to conform to the court’s construction of discreet. 
Women who ‘flaunt their homosexuality’17, may not find the court 
as sympathetic to their claim. The Court of Appeal went onto state
16 Per Watkins LJ at page 406.
17 Per Arnold P., at page 403.
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that before a child could be committed to care, it must be 
‘impracticable’ or ‘undesirable’ that the child should be placed 
with an individual. Since it was not impracticable that the child 
should be with its mother, it had to be shown that it was 
undesirable. The trial judge had stated that since he had no 
evidence of the effect on children of being brought up in 
homosexual households, he must use his ‘common sense’ (sic). 
The father’s case was based upon ‘corruption’ (to the child), and 
‘reputation’. ‘Corruption’ was defined by the court as:
“that by force of example, or by erosion of that 
instinctive rejection of devious conduct, which 
upon the father’s analysis inevitably resides in the 
normal mind, in one way or another the child is 
likely to come to harm.”18
The mother was described by the trial judge as a ‘sensitive, 
articulate, and understanding woman’:
“not one of those homosexuals who flaunt their 
homosexuality as many do nowadays not only in 
the face of those who are interested to know but
18 Per Watkins LJ at page 406.
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also in the face of those to whom it is of no concern 
whatsoever.”19
Despite her ‘devious conduct’ the mother was, according the court, 
discreet. In this respect, the court felt that there was little or no 
danger that the child would be corrupted. Therefore corruption was 
dismissed as a reason to deny the mother custody. There is an 
implication here that if the mother had not been discreet, she 
would be corruptive. Whether the mother retained custody or not, 
was dependent therefore upon her fulfilling the criteria of discreet. 
Obviously, much depends on what is understood by ‘discreet’. 
Placing restrictions on the mother’s behaviour would I suggest, 
limit her self-determination of identity.
‘Reputation’ was defined as ‘social embarrassment’, and related to 
the ‘expressions of ridicule and scom by some sections of the 
community and at a lesbian household, leading to teasing and 
embarrassment of the child’.20 Although the Court of Appeal 
rejected the father’s argument vis-a-vis corruption, they were 
persuaded by the argument surrounding reputation:
19 Per Arnold P., at page 403.
20 Per Arnold P at page 404.
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“One does not have to be a psychiatrist to 
appreciate that a lesbian household would be quite 
likely to be the subject of embarrassing conduct and 
comment, particularly among the child’s friends. It 
may be, and I am prepared to assume, that it is a 
disadvantage of so a substantial a character, that it 
can be fairly classed as a feature of undesirability so 
as to let in ... the power of the court to make an 
order.”21
Here, the appeal to negative social attitudes is clearly illustrated. 
In this instance, placing reliance upon negative social attitudes, 
excuses the court from having to fully justify their decision. The 
clear implication in this passage is that having a lesbian mother is 
a ‘disadvantage of so a substantial a character’ that the decision 
has, in effect, already been made - all that is required by the court 
is endorsement. Arnold readily admits that this is his assumption, 
he uses the first person singular 7 \  His personal assumption is 
presented as factual evidence so compelling ‘so as to let in ... the 
power of the court’. ‘His’ personal assumptions become law. 
Additionally, given that the social attitudes referred to were not
21 Per Arnold P at page 404.
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substantiated in the judgement22, a process of ‘elimination’ would 
suggest that it is not social attitudes which are being used to justify 
the judge’s own attitude.
Since the ‘undesirability’ of the alternative had also to be weighed, 
it was considered that the ‘warm mother’s care’ was preferable to 
the care of a Local Authority, and that the mother should retain 
custody. It is interesting to note the phraseology ‘warm mother’s 
care’, again emotive of prescribed gender roles.
Although Watkins LJ concurred with Arnold P., he was clearly 
very uneasy about allowing the child to live with her mother which 
caused him ‘considerable unease’ and he concluded that ‘for the 
future the progress of this child in this home must be regularly, 
carefully and discreetly watched by one of those trained to do 
so’23. He was also clearly in favour of regular reviews of the 
custody arrangements and the possibility of adding conditions:
22 This point is made strongly be Tasker and Golombok “The decision to deny a 
lesbian mother custody o f her children has often been made in the absence o f  
expert evidence. When experts have been called, the witness produced on 
behalf o f the father has generally proposed, on the basis o f  psychoanalytic 
theory, that if the children remain with their mother, they are likely to 
experience psychological difficulties. In contrast, the expert produced on 
behalf o f  the mother has usually argued, on the basis o f empirical research, 
that this is unlikely to be so. in the face o f  these opposing opinions, the judge 
commonly opts for the family environment that most closely approaches the 
traditional nuclear family” (Tasker and Golombok 1997:10).
23 Per Watkins LJ at page 406.
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“This is neither the time nor the place to moralise or 
philosophise about sexual deviance and its 
consequences on those who practice it, but the 
possible effect on a young child living in proximity 
to that practice is of crucial importance to that child 
and to the public interest. I accept that it is not right 
to say that a child should, in no circumstances, live 
with a mother who is carrying on a lesbian 
relationship with a woman who is also living with 
her, but I venture to suggest that it can only be 
countenanced by the court when it is driven to the 
conclusion that there is in the interests of the child, 
no other acceptable form of custody.”24
In this passage, Watkins appears to be stating that law has nothing 
to do with moral or philosophical considerations. However, the 
categorisation of the mother’s sexuality as ‘deviant’, allows the 
court to establish her as ‘the other’ or ‘opposite’ to their own 
position. I also find Watkins’ appeal to ‘the public interest’ 
interesting. This emotive language places law and the public 
interest in the same boat, re-inforcing the lesbian mother’s 
isolation and ‘illegitimacy’. This semantic linking of ‘law’ and
24 Per Watkins LJ at page 405.
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‘public interest’, places severe limitations on the mother’s ability 
to self determine sexual and gender identity.
Although the ‘corruption’ argument in Re P (A Minor)(Custody), 
was rejected by the Court of Appeal, does not, I suggest, mean 
that the lesbian mother is not regarded as corruptive. Rather that 
she is regarded as prima facie corruptive unless she can 
demonstrate that she discreet. The fact that the Court of Appeal 
approved of the ‘reputation’ argument clearly demonstrates a 
major concern: that ‘exposure’ to lesbian parenting will lead them 
into ‘sexually deviant ways’, and will not therefore, be in the ‘best 
interests of the child’.
‘The best interests of the child’.
When deciding whether to make an order, or what type of order to 
make, the ‘child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount 
consideration’.25 In order to help them achieve this, the courts 
have the power to order welfare reports prepared by a local 
authority officer; a further illustration of the importing of overt 
state scrutiny into the parties’ living arrangements, lifestyle and 
their relationships (Douglas and Lowe 1992:46). The use of such
25 S. 1 Children Act 1989.
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reports can be severely criticised on the grounds that they reinforce 
the view that lesbianism is a ‘sickness’:
“It is interesting to note that the most frequently 
called expert was thepsychiatrist. This demonstrates 
yet another frequently held myth about 
homosexuals - that homosexuality is some kind of 
mental disease ... the usefulness of the expert 
evidence presented in some cases is doubtful. Two 
completely opposing views from experts of 
comparable experience are often presented and the 
widely conflicting views presented in evidence 
seem to reflect the current state of feeling within the 
community, and allow the judge to choose and rely 
upon a view close to his own view of the matter.”26
According to Cooper and Herman27, there is a:
“Deep-rooted conservative Christianity [which] 
underlies many of the views expressed by 
conservatives. Right-wing Christians ... maintain
26 Chief Judge Elizabeth Evatt o f the Family Court o f  Australia. A Review o f  
Judgements: (Relevance o f  and Weight attached to a P aren t’s Homosexuality). 
Unpublished paper, 1980.
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that the heterosexual unit is ‘God -ordained’; any 
other arrangement is both evil, and dangerous...their 
opposition to lesbian and gay families is rooted in 
this tradition of the need to fortify the Christian 
home and nation against its perceived enemies - 
within and without. In the case of homosexuality 
however, such a view is usually publicly tempered 
by a reliance on the ‘best interests of the child’ 
principle, a standard drawn from a somewhat 
different discursive field.” (Cooper and Herman 
1991:32).
The seemingly ever present judicial claim of objectivity, appears 
to be exemplified particularly well in care and control cases. The 
appeal to ‘common sense’ also appears to be particularly 
ingrained. In deciding upon care and control of children, the 
‘appeal’ of the ‘best interests of the child’ maxim, is, at first 
glance, free of any consideration outside of that maxim. Although 
I would argue that decisions regarding care and control are capable 
of being resolved by reference to ‘best interests’, it is the judicial 
construction and interpreted meaning of this phrase that I wish to 
question. Smart argues that the requiring of a male presence
27 Cooper, D., and Herman, D., Getting The Family R ight’; Legislating 
Heterosexuality in Britain, 1986-1991. Canadian Journal o f  Family Law,
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during child rearing is an attempt to impose a patriarchal family 
model, and the ‘welfare’ of the child is inextricably linked with 
this (Smart 1989: 96). This line of argument would appear to be 
broadly in line with Eekelaar’s suggestion that stressing biological 
parenthood over social parenthood is a form of social engineering 
(Eekelaar 1992).
It appears then, that the courts seem more concerned with the 
mother being a lesbian, than they are with the woman’s parenting 
abilities and considering what the child’s paramount interests are. 
This particular judicial concern reflects Foucault’s own arguments 
that in the modem age, the individual was defined by rights; 
whereas in the post-modem age, the individual is defined not by 
rights, but by a process of ‘normalisation’. In other words, the 
mother’s identity is no longer defined by what rights she 
possesses ‘over’ her child, but by legal discourse which defines 
her in the abstract.
The courts raise the ‘issue’ of the mother’s lesbianism, and at the 
same time demand that the mother herself, not highlight it. In 
other words, the lesbian is rendered forcibly invisible.
vol. 10. 1991.
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In all of these cases, the courts are at pains to stress that the 
overriding issue is ‘the welfare principle’. Section 1 of the 
Children Act 1989 provides that:
“(1) When a court determines any question with 
respect to-
(a) the upbringing of a child; or
(b) the administration of a child’s property or 
the application of any income arising from it, the 
child’s welfare shall be the court’s paramount 
consideration.”
As Smart points out (Smart 1989), although the court’s have 
readily accepted this as an overriding principle in child care law, 
they have reconceptualised the issue into one of childrens’ rights, 
to the extent that contact is the inalienable right of the child:
“Once defined as a right the law can deploy its 
traditional powers to defend this right (even to the 
extent of obliging a child to exercise her rights 
against her will). This transformation of power 
conflicts into the language of rights enables law to 
exercise power.” (Smart 1989: 20).
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S.l. of the 1989 Children Act contains a checklist of factors 
which should be considered when making decisions regarding the 
upbringing of the child.28 The legal criteria does not sanction or 
require judicial prejudice, yet it does not prevent it either. As 
Dewar points out, there is no indication in the checklist of the 
relative weight of each factor, which means that:
“[T]he rule of thumb ... th a t... heterosexual parents 
are more suitable than lesbian or homosexual ones 
could persist under the checklist, but now with 
statutory sanction.” (Dewar 1992:365)
It has been pointed out that parental behaviour is only relevant 
where it has a direct bearing on the child’s welfare.29 This view is 
reflected in the checklist. However, even prior to the checklist, in 
cases involving lesbian mothers, it has been held that being 
brought up in a lesbian household does not promote the child’s
28 In coming to a decision as to the child’s residence, the court ‘shall have 
regard to:
“(a) the ascertainable wishes and feelings o f  the child concerned (considered in 
the light o f her age and understandings;
(b) her physical, emotional and educational needs;
(c) the likely effect on her o f any change in circumstances;
(d) her age, sex, background and any characteristics which the court considers 
relevant;
(e) any harm which she has suffered or is at risk o f  suffering;
(f) how capable each o f her parents, and any other person in relation to whom  
the court considers the question to be relevant, is o f  meeting her needs; the 
range o f  powers available to the court under this in the proceedings in 
question”.
29 See for example Re H  (A Minor)[ 1991] Fam Law 422.
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welfare due to ‘social embarrassment’. In S v S, for example, 
despite two psychiatrists stating that there was no danger of the 
children being lead into ‘deviant’ sexual ways; and the children’s 
express desire to remain with their mother, the judge emphasised 
the possible social embarrassment which the children might suffer.
If this ‘rule of thumb’ did exist prior to the Children Act, can we 
now be reassured that the introduction of the new checklist will 
mean the magical disappearance of the above named ‘rule of 
thumb’? Will it mean that a parent's sexual orientation will cease 
to be considered relevant (by anybody) in residence and contact 
cases?
In C v C (A Minor)(Custody: Appeal)^0, the issue was again 
whether the child should reside with her father and his new wife, 
or the mother and her new (female) partner. At first instance, 
custody was awarded to the mother on the basis that:
“The lesbian relationship was not a matter to be put
in the balancing exercise.”31
30 [1991] 1 FLR 223. See also “What is a ‘N orm al’ F am ily?” . Susan B. 
Boyd. MLR vol.55 page 269.
31 Per Malcolm Ward J at page .
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However, on appeal, it was made quite clear that the trial judge 
had been ‘wrong’ not to consider the mother’s lesbianism as 
legally relevant “In my judgement this was an error on his part”32, 
as it was considered:
“Axiomatic that the ideal environment for the 
upbringing of a child is the home of loving, caring 
and sensible parents, her father and mother. When 
the marriage between father and mother is at an 
end, that ideal cannot be obtained ... [the court’s] 
task is to chose the alternative which comes closest 
to that ideal.”33
Glidewell was of the firm opinion that the trial judge had been 
‘plainly wrong’ in concluding that lesbianism was not a factor that 
should be considered when weighing up the options as to the 
child’s best interests. By stating that it is ‘axiomatic’ that a 
heterosexual family is the ‘ideal’, Glidewell makes a ‘claim to 
truth’; there is no need for further justification; the matter is ‘self- 
evident’ or ‘obvious’. Thus, the ‘best interests of the child’ are 
best provided for within a heterosexual family. There is no
32 Per Balcomme LJ at page 232.
33 Per Glidewell LJ at page 228.
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necessity for further justification because everybody is deemed to 
endowed with the same ‘common sense’ as the judge.
A rehearing was ordered and in the interim, custody was awarded 
to the father, with the mother having reasonable access. At the 
rehearing, the Family Division awarded custody to the mother on 
the basis that the mother’s lesbianism was only one of the factors 
to be taken into account.34:
“The fact that the mother has a lesbian relationship 
with Mrs A does not of itself render her unfit to 
have the care and control of her child. It is 
however, an important factor to be taken into 
account in deciding which of the alternative homes 
which the parents can offer the child is most likely 
to advance her welfare.”35
By stating that lesbianism was one of the factors to be taken into 
account, there seems to be an attempt on the judge’s part to 
present his justification in liberal terms. Indeed, at first glance, 
this judgement would appear to be more ‘generous’ to lesbian 
mothers than those examined above. Nevertheless, even though it
34 C v C (Custody o f  Children) No.2 [1992] FCR 206.
35 Per Balcombe LJ at page 231.
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was only ‘one’ of the factors to be taken into account, it was still 
regarded as an ‘important’ factor; the judgement ‘gives with one 
hand and takes back with the other’. There is still a demonstrable 
reliance upon heterosexual, normative values; the mother’s sexual 
orientation was to be regarded as an ‘important factor’; the 
justification for which, was not forthcoming.
In B v B (Minors)(Custody, Care and Control),36 the Family 
Division of the High Court was asked to decide whether the child 
should reside with the father or the mother. According to the 
Judge (Callam J);
“This case raises two specific issues. The first is 
what is best for the welfare of [the children]; and 
secondly, the specific issue as to the desirability of 
bringing up a child in a lesbian household. It is the 
second issue which has given rise to a considerable 
amount of time being spent to investigate that 
aspect of the case.”37
The mother left the father to live with another woman. The court 
welfare officer had recommended that the youngest child (aged
36 [1991] 1 FLR402.
37 Per Callum J, at page 403.
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two), should live with the father for three reasons: concern about 
the effect of the mother’s lesbianism on the child; concern that if 
the father lost care and control he would make a fresh application 
when the boy was older; and as the child’s two older siblings were 
living with the father, the siblings should remain together.
The opinion of the court welfare officer conflicted with an 
‘expert’ witness.38 The court welfare officer had argued that the 
mother had given insufficient thought to the future development of 
the child and the effect of bringing him up under a lesbian 
relationship. However, the expert witness argued that the mother 
seemed to be well informed and to have thought deeply about the 
issue. He was of the opinion that it was because the mother did 
not share the views expressed in the welfare officer’s report.
The judge rejected the court welfare officer’s report on the first 
count, relying on an expert witness who had stated that little 
weight should be given to the effects of the mother’s lesbianism; 
the court should have regard to the quality of parenting in all other 
respects, and the quality of the parenting of the mother was 
excellent’.39 It was held that:
38 Professor Russell-Davies.
39 [1991] 1 FLR410.
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“In determining whether as a matter of principle a 
child should be brought up in a lesbian household, 
there were two factors to be considered: the effect 
upon the sexual identity of the child and the effect 
of stigmatisation. Fear of psychosexual 
development being distorted or that the child would 
be subjected unduly to taunts or ostracism were not 
supported by research. The sexual identity of the 
child in this case, particularly in view of his boyish 
appearance and behaviour and the fact that his 
father would continue to play a role in his life 
whoever had control was, therefore, not a matter for 
concern and the stigmatisation aspect, though 
undoubtedly a worrying factor, had to take its place 
in the balancing exercise in deciding what was in 
the best interests of the children. The situation 
would have been very different in terms of risk to 
the children had the mother and the other woman in 
the case been militant lesbians trying to convert 
others to their way of life, where there may well be 
risks that counterbalance other aspects of welfare 
and are detrimental to the long term interests of
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children either in relation to their sexual identity or 
corruption, and lesbians in private.”40
There are many assumptions contained this passage which are 
deserving of attention. The first and most immediate perhaps, is 
the assumption that the court has authority to decide whether a 
child should be brought up in a lesbian household. It is doubtful 
whether the same assumption vis-a-vis authority would be made 
purely on the grounds of heterosexuality.
The judge then focuses upon what he perceives are the two most 
salient issues: the child’s sexual identity and ‘stigmatisation’. He 
appears to not be overtly concerned with the child’s sexual identity 
- he appears to be mollified by the child’s ‘boyish appearance and 
behaviour’ and by the fact that the father would continue to ‘play a 
role’ in the child’s life. It may be surmised therefore, that to 
ensure a child’s ‘normal’ sexual identity development requires the 
‘correct’ physical appearance, and, not surprisingly perhaps, a 
father presence. The constraints placed upon the woman’s ability 
to express self-defined identity are perhaps more clearly 
demonstrated in the second half of this passage. The ‘fear’ of 
‘stigmatisation’ appears to weigh heavily with the judge. It is to 
him a ‘worrying factor’, which never the less, ‘had to take its place
40 [1991] 1 FLR at page 410.
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in the balancing exercise’. It would appear that the stigmatisation 
concern would have been significantly more ‘worrying’ had the 
mother and ‘the other’ woman been ‘militant lesbians’ as opposed 
to being ‘lesbians in private’.41 Given these ‘parameters’ (which 
he has defined), the judge clearly considers that the ‘risks’ to the 
child’s sexual identity or his possible corruption, to be so great, 
that they may ‘counterbalance other aspects of welfare’ and be 
‘detrimental to [his] long term interests’. Such a position allows 
the judge to continue to exclude certain identities from legal 
recognition. This exclusion applies not just to lesbian identities 
per se, but certain ‘types’ of lesbian identity.
Concerns such as those expressed above surrounding a child’s 
‘future development’, enables a court to constitute the mother’s 
sexual identity as ‘the other’. Similar concerns to those mentioned 
above were apparent in Eves on v Eveson42 This was an appeal 
brought by the mother against an order awarding interim custody 
of her six year old boy to the father. At first instance, it was clear 
that custody had been awarded to the father because of the ‘risks’ 
the boy would be exposed to by living in a lesbian household. The
41 It might be argued that by being so condemnatory o f  ‘militant lesbians’ who 
try to ‘convert others to their way o f  life’, the judge him self is being a ‘militant 
heterosexual’ in trying to convert others to his way o f  life.
42 Unreported, 27 November, 1980, Court o f  Appeal, Civil Division; Arnold P. 
and Dame Elizabeth Lane. Cited in Edwards, S 1996:70.
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trial judge felt that ‘The way of life would not be right or natural’, 
and that if the child lived with his mother:
“he would learn more and more and it would fill 
him with dismay and would be very worrying and 
upsetting for him.”43
The trial judge’s comments quite clearly found approval with the 
Court of Appeal. Although Dame Elizabeth Lane attempted to 
present a ‘liberal’ analysis of the situation:
“There is no rule or principle that a lesbian mother 
or homosexual father cannot be granted custody of 
a child. Indeed, I myself sitting at first instance, 
have committed the custody of children to such 
parents more than once.”44
Despite this seemingly judicial liberalism, there was no reason 
given (apart from the mother’s lesbianism) why the mother was 
denied custody. It would appear that the court was primarily 
concerned with how the mother’s lesbianism would affect the 
future development of the child, and concern was expressed about
43 Cited in Edwards, S 1996:70.
44 Cited in Edwards, S 1996:70.
214
the child’s ‘undesirable’ interest in an ‘unnatural relationship’. 
As in other cases, there were appeals to what is selectively defined 
as ‘natural’ sexual behaviour:
“My inclination is to decide the case not on the 
personalities but rather that the child is getting on 
well where it is and not to expose it to the risks of 
putting it with the mother.”
There was no reference or further explanation in the judgement as 
to what these risks were, and it appears that it was the mother’s 
lesbianism per se which constituted the ‘risks’ referred to be the 
judge. The mother’s sexual identity is constructed in such a way 
as to place her in a situation where her lesbianism is regarded as a 
legally relevant consideration. The only response she is left with 
is to then proceed to demonstrate why her lesbianism should be 
dismissed as an irrelevant consideration.
A similar line of argument was taken in G v D45, The appeal was 
again brought by the father against a mother having custody of her 
two daughters. The mother retained custody. The father had been 
awarded custody at first instance, even though the children had 
been living with their mother all their lives, including the three
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years since she had been separated from her husband. The father’s 
view that he should have custody of the children on his re­
marriage, was based on the grounds that he could provide a more 
‘stable’ and ‘normal’ home for the children. His view was 
supported by the welfare report. The judge at first instance had 
said that:
“the long term interests of the children would be 
better served by being brought up in an ordinary 
household with a father and mother (or mother- 
substitute) rather than in a household which 
consisted of two women living together in the way 
that the mother and (Ms C) were.”46
Again, there is an unquestioned use of ideological notions of 
‘family’. A home consisting of father and mother is constituted as 
‘ordinary’, it is part of the process of normalisation which reduces 
the lesbian mother to the category of ‘other’. Even though there 
are no express uses of normative values re-inforcing 
heterosexuality, the implied normative values are still present, 
‘hidden’ behind the veil of the best interests of the child.
45 (1983) unreported, Court o f Appeal. 16th February 1983.
46 Cited in Edwards, S 1996:70.
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The privileging of heterosexuality through normative values 
continued in the Court of Appeal, where the language used was 
more overt:
“The children do not want to live with their father 
and their stepmother. That being so, the Court has 
to give very careful consideration indeed to whether 
it is wise, particularly in such an abnormal situation 
as this, to force the children into a way of life that 
they did not like.”
Ormrod LJ went onto state:
“The mere fact of this homosexual way of life on 
the part of the mother is not, in itself, a reason for 
refusing to give her the control of her children, 
although of course it is a factor that one has to take 
into account and think about very hard. Experience 
shows, just as in this case took place, that 
homosexual relationships do tend to be even more 
unstable than heterosexual relationships are, in 
these days, and the result is that there is a good deal 
of moving to and fro ... but there is no evidence 
whatever that the children have suffered at all as a
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result. Mr. and Mrs. G had two other children very 
much older, also girls (their custody was not in 
question) and I think there is not much evidence 
that they have suffered or been caused to suffer 
stress by the mother’s association with other 
women.”
Within this passage, the language appears more ‘liberal’, than that 
used in previous cases. The mother’s sexuality is now represented 
as a ‘mere’ fact. However, it is ‘of course’ a factor to be 
considered. The emphasis is placed upon ‘stability’ , and in this 
regard the judge manages to equate ‘experience’ (exactly whose 
experience, was never quantified), of homosexual relationships 
into ‘knowledge’ about the instability of such relationships.
The use of language which appears more liberal, still hides 
underlying assumptions regarding ‘ordinary’ sexual relationships. 
In Re H  (A Minor)47 The couple wanted to adopt the baby of a 
friend who already had children and did not want any more. The 
local authority had opposed the couple’s application on the 
grounds that one of the women had a history of mental illness
47 Re H  (A M inor)(s.37 direction) [1993] 2 FLR 541. As far as the author is 
aware, this case is, the only reported case concerning a joint residence 
application by lesbian couple.
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and the other, a criminal record. At the residence hearing, the 
judge stated that the fact that:
“they are lesbians does not, according to the 
evidence that I have heard, make it any less likely 
that the placement will succeed than if  they were 
an ordinary heterosexual couple.”48
The focus placed on a mother’s lesbianism has been found in 
many cases.49 The dual ‘risks’ of the children being Ted into 
deviant sexual ways’ and the ‘children suffering social harm if the 
relationship became known’50, appears to be one of the underlying 
‘commonalties’. Based on this premise, the mother’s lesbianism 
becomes of ‘prime importance. It was what the whole case was 
about’.51 The emphasis placed upon a mother’s sexual identity is 
almost ironic considering that such an identity is given so little 
legal affirmation. The concern surrounding ‘militant’ lesbians 
(discussed above) raises other questions relevant to identity. The 
express judicial disapproval towards ‘militant’ lesbians places
48 [1993] 2 FLR 545.
49 See also Re W (A Minor)(Adoption: homosexual adopter) [1997] 3 All ER 
620.
50 S  v S (Custody o f  Children) [1978] 1 FLR 143.
51 Holder v Holder 12 December 1985 Court o f  Appeal, Civil Division.
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limits on self defined identity. Such disapproval has extended to 
women who have joined the women’s movement, for example.52
Throughout these cases, there is, I would argue, a strong 
underlying assumption that sexual orientation is a ‘relevant factor’ 
to be taken into consideration in custody disputes.53 Why should 
this be so? Are the courts operating on the basis of preconceived 
notions of ‘ideal parents’ defined in terms of being heterosexual 
and married? Where do these pre-judged notions come from and 
why are they still clung to by the vast majority of judges in 
custody and access disputes?
The judges base these decisions on deeply entrenched cultural 
prejudice(s) as to the suitability of parents on categories of legal 
relevance. As we have seen, once the lesbian mother is constituted 
as ‘the other’ it is ‘obviously’ legally relevant to be lesbian, but 
not to be heterosexual. Further, this legal relevance of being 
lesbian is further subdivided, for example, into those lesbians who
52 Re M  (Minors) (1992).
53 Research undertaken by Tasker and Golombok demonstrates that a parents 
sexual orientation has little or nothing to do with their child’s, and that children 
are not at ‘risk’ or will not suffer ‘harm’ by being raised in a lesbian household. 
See Tasker and Golombok, “Children Raised by Lesbian Mothers; The 
Empirical Evidence”. Fam Law  [1991] 184, and Growing Up in a Lesbian 
Family - Effects on Child Development (1997).
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are categorised as ‘good’ lesbians by being ‘private’ and ‘bad’ 
lesbians who are categorised as ‘militant’.54
Conclusion to chapter five
“Notwithstanding the changing nature of the social 
family, the homosexual family exists as an 
anathema to be sanctioned only as a last resort and 
in preference to a care order.” (Edwards 1996: 72).
The judicial consideration given to lesbianism in custody cases 
pivots upon the perceived legal relevance of lesbianism, in other 
words, the women are regarded as lesbians first, and mothers 
second. Having a lesbian mother, it would appear, is not deemed 
to be in the child’s best interests. What is clear, is that decisions 
regarding a child’s residence and so forth necessitate a judgement 
about the nature and quality of parenting - is this woman ‘good 
enough’ to be a parent? Being a lesbian mother immediately 
places a question mark over her ability to parent. But the criteria 
used are often not explicit. Even in ‘heterosexual’ cases, it is 
acknowledged that it is difficult, if not impossible to arrive at a 
consensus as to what makes a ‘good’ parent. When a lesbian 
mother finds herself in a courtroom, she is not only placed in the
54 B v B (Minors)(Custody, Care and Control), supra.
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position of having to convince the judge that she is ‘as good’ as a 
heterosexual mother, but also that she possess the necessary 
‘mothering qualities’. Whilst in a great many respects mother 
hood is socially constructed, the English legal system largely 
presents ‘motherhood’ as being essentialist, naturalistic qualities, 
(selflessness; placing her child’s interests above her own, and so 
forth), the lesbian mother appears in the court room without these 
‘qualities’; her lesbianism makes her ‘deviant’55, ‘abnormal’56 and 
‘devious’57. As such, she is viewed as morally flawed and thus an 
unfit parent.
It becomes apparently clear to me that law’s promises are not 
adhered to. The ‘common sense’ appeal to ‘what is natural’ or to 
what is ‘normal’ is an appeal to emotive essentialism. It allows for 
the continued dominance of a narrow, essentialist led discourse. I 
would suggest therefore that the promises of ‘neutrality’, 
‘objectivity’, ‘fairness’ and so forth are somewhat compromised. 
In other words, the law can deliver neutrality, objectivity and 
fairness, but only if the heterosexual imperative is complied with, 
not to parents who are ‘the other’ to heterosexuality. The above 
case have illustrated that the judges are at pains to point out that 
their own personal value systems are of minimal importance in
55 S v S (Custody o f Children) [1978] 1FLR 143.
56 G v  D  Unreported, Court o f Appeal. 16th February 1983 ??.
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deciding parental responsibility issues. It can be seen from the 
above discussion that the dominant heterosexual approach has 
constituted lesbian mothers as subverting the basis on which 
society and civilisation are built and depend upon. This approach 
enables law to privilege and promote a certain morality:
“Law is not viewed by conservatives as a neutral, 
value free mode of regulation. On the contrary, 
conservatives recognise that law plays a role in 
shaping social relations; as dominant ideology 
fragments and ‘new’ practices and ideas come to 
the fore, law must, therefore, be seized and used as 
a weapon of restraint.” (Cooper and Herman 1991:
145)
The constant stressing of the preferability of a ‘heterosexual’ 
upbringing, subjects the lesbian mother to a process of 
construction she has little, if no, control over. As a lesbian 
mother, her nonconformity to heterosexuality threatens the 
dominant ideology’s view of sex as ‘innate’; ‘given’ and ‘natural’. 
This ideological discourse implies a circular argument; family pre­
dates society, it is the basis of life itself and the primary socialising 
agent. Family means mother, father and children. Children of
57 Re P (a minor)(custody) [1983] 4 FLR 401.
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homosexual parents will be harmed, their best interests impaired 
by socially malfunctioning parents. The harm they experience lies 
primarily in their gender socialisation; the presence of one parent, 
or two same sex parents, causes a child’s ‘precarious’ gender 
identity to become confused. Children will not grow up to 
understand the ‘appropriate’ roles women and men are meant to 
inhabit and perform. This leads to the disintegration of the family 
unit upon which ‘civilisation’ itself is based.
A ‘common sense’ approach denies the possibility of dissenting 
discourse; it assumes that everyone ‘must’ be of the same mind, 
the same opinion. The expression of her sexual identity is tightly 
controlled. The judicial comments in these cases appear to say 
more about ‘controlling’ the mother’s behaviour, expression, and 
ultimately, identity than they do about what is in the ‘best interests 
of the child’. The lesbian mother is constructed as ‘unnatural’ or 
‘not normal’, thus denying her the ‘opportunity’ (or should it be 
‘right’?), to exercise free will in the determination of her own 
identity. The legal discourse establishes a ‘truth’ about what 
mothers’ should and should not be:
‘Thus the legal position of a mother in relation to 
her children does not turn on the assertion of 
formal and unqualified rights, as the father’s rights
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once did at common law, but on prevailing views 
concerning the mother’s role in child-rearing, and 
on considerations of the individual mother’s 
‘moral’ character and fitness.” (Brophy and Smart 
1991).58
The opportunity for a different discourse is consequently denied. 
Although a Foucauldian approach would point out that the mother 
experiences the effects of ‘power’, this approach does not address 
the issue that she is neither part of the discourse, nor is she able to 
deny the de facto ‘power’ of the court to take her children away 
from her. As a subject, she is denied the opportunity to have her 
parenting abilities determined in the absence of her sexuality. She 
is denied (self-determined) existence. The superficial ‘gentleness’ 
of the judgements outlined here disguises the underlying violence 
of what is actually happening. In other words, the lesbian mother 
is forced to concede a lack of legitimacy in her sexual identity in 
order to demonstrate to the court that she poses no ‘risk’ to her 
child.
In this respect, Law’s ideology of lesbian mothers, allows for the 
continued dominance of law’s version of lesbian identity and the 
subordination of the experientially defined identify of the woman
58 Quoted in Dewar, 1992:100
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herself. The connection between discursive ideology and its 
material effects becomes easier to see:
“A dominant power may legitimate itself by 
promoting beliefs and values congenial to it; 
naturalising and universalising such beliefs so as to 
render them self-evident and apparently inevitable; 
denigrating ideas which might challenge it; 
excluding rival forms of thought, perhaps by some 
unspoken but systematic logic; and obscuring social 
reality in ways convenient to itself”
In this respect, a Foucauldian analysis would suggest that it is the 
discourse which produces the ‘perceived reality’. This results in a 
narrow, fixed and immutable meaning of ‘motherhood’, allowing 
only its own discourse to predominate. The lesbian mother’s 
status as ‘parent’ appears to be severely curtailed and restricted. It 
would seem then, that the promise of ‘fairness’, ‘objectivity’ and 
so forth are not adhered to in the cases discussed above. To me, 
the cases reveal much about law’s ‘claim to truth’. In some 
instances, the judges appear to be at pains to stress that they ‘move 
with the times’; in others, there appears to be judicial pride in 
ignoring ‘changing social attitudes’. These conflicting, plural and 
often contradictory approaches are ‘hidden’ behind a claim of the
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unity and truth of law - its claim to a unified field of ‘knowledge’ 
(Smart 1989).
I also find the issue of performance interesting. I would suggest 
that a majority of the litigants who appear in a court of law 
(whatever the matter under consideration), will have received 
advice from their lawyer(s) in regard to their apparel. Whilst in a 
formal sense at least, litigant are free to chose whatever apparel 
they wish, in practice, the more a litigant mimics or adapts to the 
performance of the constructed identity, the greater the legal 
approval. This is reminiscent of Butler’s arguments surrounding 
performance. Giving the ‘right’ performance in court does not 
necessarily equate with giving a performance which corresponds 
with one’s own self image. I would suggest that the issue of self 
defined identity is linked with the issue of performance. In other 
words, I have argued that the individual should be able to self 
define identity, in the same way, I would argue that the individual 
should be able to chose their own performance. The issue of 
adaptation to legally constructed identities is one which I suspect 
is not merely limited to disputed contact or residency orders.
I have argued that the discourse of law can have serious effects on 
the woman’s ability to ‘self-define’ her identity. If the effect(s) of 
discourse and power felt by the women involved in the above
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cases, was to disempower them, what further ramifications might 
arise? Is it possible to ‘map’ the extent of law’s ‘influence’ in 
determining identity? What is the extent of law’s control - might 
this control extend to a situation akin to that of ‘ownership’? Do 
concepts of ‘ownership’ within ‘the family’ have ‘links’ into the 
possible ‘ownership’ of identity itself? To what extent is identity, 




Is Identity ‘Owned’ by Law?
Introduction
This chapter is concerned with lesbian identities in law and the 
lesbian mother in particular.1 My analysis examines the ‘gaps’ 
between the constructions, expressions and representations of self- 
defined identity, and those that are imposed upon the subject by 
law. These matters will be considered by way of a series of legal 
judgements concerned with parental responsibility for the child of 
the family and the child’s residence2. These cases suggest that the 
law’s concept of lesbian identity cannot be easily reconciled with 
the diversity of women’s experiences and sexual identities. Are 
lesbian mothers forced to inhabit a ‘legal body’ not of their own 
making and construction?.
1 The term ‘lesbian mother’ obviously has essentialist connotations, and whilst I 
am reluctant to place reliance on essentialism, this chapter concentrates upon 
la w ’s essentialist constructions o f identity. Indeed, this point illustrates the 
limitations placed upon us by language; there must surely be a suitable 
alternative terminology available which encompasses the extremely wide 
ranging and diverse group o f women whose sexuality and sexual existence, not 
being heterosexual, is questioned and controlled by legal culture.
2 Since the introduction o f the Children Act 1989, the terms ‘custody’ and 
‘access’ have been replaced by ‘residence’ and ‘parental contact’ respectively, 
Children Act 1989, s.8.
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In this context, my understanding of ‘legal body’, is as a cultural 
and legal construct. It is composed of numerous aspects of 
identity, for example, gender, nationality, ethnicity, which 
together, combine to (re)produce an overall sense of self. This 
‘body’ can be viewed as an outward expression of identity - an 
expression of a particular way of being ‘one’s self. This body can 
also be viewed as an inner source of self identity. Within the 
context of these issues, the term ‘body’ is capable of being 
interpreted as generating and containing a multiplicity of 
meanings. In this particular context, my use of ‘legal body’ refers 
to the individual person as she appears to the court and to law - a 
person who is ‘fully constituted’ to bring matters of legal dispute 
before the authority of the court and the legal process. In other 
words, a person who is deemed capable of enjoying legal rights 
and duties, and responsibilities.
Through an analysis of the ‘gaps’ between how an individual 
perceives and constructs herself, and how that individual is 
constructed and then represented in law, I will draw attention to 
the continuing difficulty that women, as legal subjects, have in 
authenticating their identity and exercising control over it. In 
particular, I will consider the ways in which law impoverishes our 
understanding of identity by way of an extremely limited range of 
imposed alternatives. I will illustrate the many ways in which self
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identity is excluded from law, by law, together with some of the 
processes that facilitate this exclusion. In other words, to what 
extent is a subject’s attempts to ‘self-define’ her identity, 
undermined and resisted by law?
Female identity as ‘property’: the principle of marital unity
A preliminary matter that needs to be addressed in this context is 
the relation between the identity of the subject in law and the 
‘control’ and ‘ownership’ of that identity. This is of particular 
concern for women as the law has traditionally treated the woman 
as the property of the man. The clearest example of this is to be 
found in the principle of ‘marital unity’:
“the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, 
the very being or legal existence of the woman is 
suspended during the marriage, or at least is 
incorporated and consolidated into that of her 
husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, 
she performs everything.” (Blackstone, (1769), 441- 
2)
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While ‘marital unity’ addresses the issue of ownership and control 
of female identity in marriage, the principle of ‘ownership’ and 
‘control’ described is not limited to the woman as ‘wife’, but also 
to woman as ‘daughter’ and woman as ‘mother’. In the context of 
marriage, having no independent legal existence produced various 
effects. It meant it was legally impossible for a husband to commit 
rape against his wife (Hale 1736:629). Being ‘one person’ in law, 
marital rape was taken to be an act of rape by the husband upon 
himself - a legal impossibility3. Further, if a wife was sexually 
assaulted or raped by a man other than her husband, only the 
husband had legal redress in the form of tortious action for 
interference with property rights (a trespass). Sexual violence was 
treated as a property crime. In Family Law Matters, O’Donovan 
argues that Hales’ pronouncement was constructed in the absence 
of written sources of law and judicial authority, but were 
extremely influential, largely due to what O’Donovan terms as the 
‘legal mentality’, and the reverence accorded to his text by 
subsequent judges (O’Donovan 1993:2). As O’Donovan points 
out, exceptions to the marital rape principle were gradually stated, 
but that the central proposition remained:
3 The erasure o f women’s identity within the context o f  ‘the marital rape 
exemption’, only came to a formal end in the case o f  R v R [1991] 4 All ER 
481, and by the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s. 142. 
Incidentally, the exemption was overturned by the Scottish courts two years 
earlier in S v H.M. Advocate 1989 S.L.T. 469.
232
“Indeed it was confirmed, the male marital right 
was upheld, but legal derogation was permitted.
The woman’s submission of her case to law -  not 
her will -  revoked her consent. She still lacked 
autonomy over her body and only the courts could 
withdraw what she was held to have conferred upon 
her husband” (O’Donovan 1993: 3).
As a woman’s gender and sexuality constituted property, she had 
little or no effective control, possession or ownership of her sexual 
and gender identity. Thus historically, the ‘legal body’ of a 
woman was considered as ‘property’. All of these examples draw 
attention to the legal tradition which denied women the possibility 
of an autonomous self presence in the law and formally subjected 
them to the control of men. Women still experience considerable 
difficulties in their attempts to control the way they are represented 
in the law.
Invisible Identities?
“Lesbians have been subject to erasure from the 
record, of that there can be no doubt.” (Wilton 
1995: 3).
I would suggest that lesbian identities and experiences4 probably 
pre-date history, much of that history remains undocumented, 
concealed or invisible (Donoghue, 1993; Faderman 1985). In a 
legal context, those identities and experiences can be said to have a 
relatively short history, having been rendered invisible by, and 
displaced from, legal culture (Robson 1992). However, I would 
suggest that in many respects, lesbian identity is more visible 
towards at end of the twentieth century than it was at the 
beginning. This appears to reflect a social and legal re-appraisal 
of lesbian identity. For example, the media, in one way or another 
have acknowledged lesbian existence, largely on the basis of what 
is termed ‘lesbian chic’ or ‘lipstick’ lesbian. These have included 
Cindy Crawford and K.d. Lang on the front cover of Vanity Fair,; 
and ‘Beth Jordache’ a character from the Channel Four programme 
Brookside are well known examples. Howver, despite some 
increase in acknowledgement, I would suggest that this 
recognition is still relatively limited. One example is where the 
limit of changes is to be found is in the context of lesbian 
motherhood.
4 I use this phrase to include the widest possible variety o f  female same sex 
relationships.
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Constructing the body of the lesbian mother
Press coverage given to lesbian mothers has provided the 
following headlines:
‘Should Lesbians Have Children?’.5
‘Court says that lesbian can be ‘father” .6
‘Gay Culture Will Never Beat Nature’.7
These newspaper headlines illustrate the continuation of negative 
social constructions of lesbian mothers which are generated by 
attaching a particular significance to their sexuality. This is in 
contrast to heterosexual women (qua heterosexual) are not 
required to defend or justify their heterosexuality in child contact 
or residence cases. For heterosexual women, their heterosexuality 
per se, is not of judicial concern.
When it falls to law to determine and assess ‘parental suitability’ 
or the child’s residence, those mothers who express a sexuality 
other than heterosexuality, again find that their sexuality assumes 
an importance not deemed relevant to heterosexual mothers. It is 
to these matters that I now want to turn.
5 The D aily Express, 22nd June 1994.
6 The Daily M ail, 30th June 1994.
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The lesbian mother in law
The first case I want to consider is Re C (1994)8. This decision 
was the first to grant a lesbian couple a joint residency order for 
their 22 month old boy under the auspices of the Children Act 
1989. Despite this Re C did not find its way into the law reports, 
(the hearing was held ‘in camera’, and only a short statement was 
authorised by the judge). As such, its status as a precedent is 
problematic further adding to the invisibility of lesbian 
motherhood to academic and practitioners alike. However, the 
media response to the case provides some insight into some of the 
problems that arise in the context of establishing lesbian 
motherhood in law.
Whilst the actual decision was welcomed by many, there were 
some who were not so quite enthusiastic. Harry Greenway, a 
Conservative M.P. commented ‘It’s very unfair on he child. He 
should have a father as well as a mother. There should be an 
appeal without delay’.9 The (late) Sir Nicholas Fairbaim, former 
Conservative Solicitor General for Scotland observed ‘It’s 
ridiculous. We don’t put children in the hands of the insane. Why 
should we put them in the hands of the perverted? Surely the child
7 The D aily Mail, 23rd January 1995.
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should have a normal upbringing not an abnormal one’.10 These 
statements about the case are of interest in various ways. They set 
up the distinction between lesbian and heterosexual by resort to a 
series of polar opposites: the perverted and the normal; ‘gay’ 
versus ‘straight’; ‘good’ versus ‘bad’. The establishment of ‘gay’ 
as a polar opposite of ‘heterosexual’ is particularly important in 
the context of the term ‘lesbian mother’. In this context ‘lesbian 
mother’ is an oxymoron. For the lesbian to be a ‘mother’ she has 
to ‘mimic’ the heterosexual construction of ‘woman’. As 
‘motherhood’ is understood in terms of heterocentric normativity, 
the sexuality of motherhood is rendered invisible. Lesbian 
mothers upset the relation between sexuality and gender, rendering 
motherhood sexualised and thereby problematic.
More generally within the context of that amorphous body called 
‘Family Law’, it is the heterosexualist imperative in law that 
reiterates and imposes the ‘norms’ that construct the idea of 
‘parent’. There still appears to be a judicial preference for 
heterosexual two parent families in contested custody cases 
involving lesbian mothers (Boyd 1992:269). In most jurisdictions, 
it is the mother who is most likely to be granted custody of the 
children, and therefore it is the lesbian mother who is placed under
8 Unreported High Court (Manchester) decision. (1994). See also The 
Guardian July 2nd 1994 and The Pink Paper July 1994.
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greatest scrutiny. As Edwards notes ‘Lesbianism has been 
considered as axiomatically antithetical to the interests of the child 
and incongruous with the construction of motherhood’ (Edwards, 
1996: 69).
What appears to be a common thread throughout residence and 
responsibility cases, is the almost exclusive reliance on the 
heterocentric imperative. Accordingly, families are (in a legal 
sense), essentially heterosexual, and a woman’s sexual identity is 
heterosexual. This, as O’Donovan points out, is because of the 
perceived ‘dissonance’ between ‘mother’ and all that the word 
implies, and ‘lesbian’ which carries a different set of resonance’s 
(O’Donovan 1993:84). It is for this reason that a lesbian mother’s 
application for residence or responsibility in respect of a child is 
difficult for family law judges to come to terms with:
“Faced with this problem of dissonance, courts 
resort to the external environment and general 
social attitudes ... So although the mother may be 
seen by the court as better qualified for child care 
than the father by reason of past experience or a 
‘natural bond’, her femininity, which is affirmed by
9 The D aily Mirror, 30th June 1994.
10 The Daily Express, 30th June 1994.
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such a perception, is opened to question by sexual 
preferences”. (O’Donovan, 1993:84).
As a mother, a woman is further constructed according to the 
distinction ‘married’ or ‘unmarried’, which in turn is made to 
signify respectively, ‘good mother’, ‘bad mother’. Here, we have 
categories of mother which are defined not in terms of the 
relationship between the child and the mother, but by reference to 
the marital status of the mother, a role that has traditionally been a 
subordinated to that of ‘husband/father’. Because many lesbian 
mothers are legally unmarried,11 or are in the process of divorce, 
they are placed into the category of a ‘bad’ mother due to law’s 
construction of unmarried mothers as ‘bad’, and married mothers 
as ‘good’ (Wallbank 1997). As such a lesbian’s sexual identity 
threatens to disrupt the heterocentric logic of identity.
At the same time, the more a lesbian conforms to the pre-existing 
legal attributes conventionally associated with the construction of 
‘woman’, the more likely she is to be successful in any parental 
responsibility case. The pressure to conform, can take several 
guises. For example, prior to the case reaching the court room, 
this pressure can take the form of the woman’s solicitor’s advising
11 In legal terms, the lesbian mother cannot adhere to the prescribed formal 
rules for the legal recognition o f her partnership (if  she has one). And whilst 
two ‘parents’ are generally considered to be ‘better’ than one, this refers only to 
a man and a woman. Consequently, it is not only in connection with the formal 
rules that the lesbian partnership is not recognised.
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her to wear a skirt, or to apply make-up. If and when the case ends 
up in court, the identity of the particular woman is further 
constructed and restrained by enquiries into the mother’s lifestyle, 
with invasive questioning regarding shows of physical affection in 
front of the child(ren); concern about the ‘minutiae of who was in 
which bedroom, and whether or not the women slept in the same 
bed’ (Crane 1982: 103). Questions such as ‘Will you have sex in 
front of the children?’ or ‘Do you make a noise when you have 
sex?12 are not uncommon.
The ‘catch 22’ situation for the lesbian mother is that for as long as 
she ‘refuses’ to adopt the hetero-identity law has constructed for 
her, she faces an uphill battle in trying to convince the court that 
she is a ‘suitable’ parent. However, if she adopts the hetero­
identity constructed for her, she necessarily, must deny her self 
identified sexual identity, but does appear to stand a greater chance 
of success in gaining an order for residence or parental 
responsibility. Her lesbian sexuality becomes ‘relevant’ in 
contrast to a heterosexual mother whose sexuality would have no 
such similar ‘relevance’. Such lines of legal enquiry help to 
illustrate law’s focus upon the expression of sexual identity. This 
focus is not only directed towards lifestyle identity, but also at the 
‘appearance’ of lesbian identities presented before law.
12 The Guardian 5th December 1990.
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In this context, the ‘appearance’ of the lesbian is all important to 
legal culture. Law appears more concerned with ‘controlling’ the 
so called ‘butch’ lesbian, than it is with the so called ‘feminine’ 
lesbian (Creed, 1995:86). The latter, presents a ‘lesser’ threat to 
the dominant male ideology than the former - due to a greater 
‘sameness’ - the ‘feminine lesbian’ body physically presents 
herself as visibly little different from her heterosexual counterpart. 
The ‘butch’ lesbian body presents herself with a greater degree of 
difference. However, although physical sameness is one factor, 
more important perhaps, is ‘lifestyle’ which is understood by 
reference to the public/private distinction found within legal 
discourse.
The ‘public’/‘private’ distinction can also be read as a distinction 
between that which is ‘good’ and that which is ‘bad’. In the 
reported case of B v Bu the judge drew a distinction between 
‘lesbians who were private persons who did not believe in 
advertising their lesbianism...and militant lesbians who tried to 
convert others to their way of life’. Here the private lesbian was 
praised (the good lesbian), while the militant (public) lesbian was 
regarded with suspicion (the bad lesbian). In contrast to the 
lesbian, existence of heterosexual orientation presents no such 
dichotomy. A distinction between ‘private’ heterosexuals and 
‘public/militant’ heterosexuals makes no sense. By means of these 
distinctions, the lesbian identity is constituted as both other to 
heterosexuality and other to itself. Both work to render lesbian 
identities largely invisible. In turn that which is visible, is forced
13 (1991) supra, chapter five.
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to ‘conform’ to the ‘accepted’ expectations of female gender 
identity expression; the ‘feminine’ female. The expression of 
sexual identity has to ‘conform’ with the expression of gender 
identity. In other words, legal culture expects and requires 
simultaneous conformity to its own constructs of sexual and 
gender identity. Thus, where an individual’s expression of sexual 
identity does not conform, that sexual identity is perceived by 
legal culture as ‘deviant’. The constructed legal body is the only 
body that legal culture is able to recognise and respond to - given 
the prejudicial criteria for visibility. ‘Lesbian bodies’, are 
constructed as ‘outsider’.
We can make a link with this, and the previous point on 
appearances. There, the ‘feminine’ was ‘good, invisible and 
private’ as opposed to the ‘butch’ which was ‘bad, militant and 
public’. The former appears to be more ‘accepted’ than the latter. 
However, the problem is slightly more subtle than this. As Creed 
notes, ‘to function properly as ideological litmus paper, the lesbian 
body must be instantly recognisable’ (Creed 1995: 23) As such, 
appearance may always be relevant to law, but relevance does not 
equate to re-reading or re-evaluating appearance. The 
‘appearance’ of a lesbian body to the court, is something to be 
exposed. When the lesbian body is constituted as the ‘other’, 
exposure is always a possibility. In this context ‘control’ over 
identity lies with the court, not the individual.
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The decision in Re C, appears to be at odds with previous cases 
where lesbianism was considered legally relevant to questions 
relating to a child’s residence, or parental responsibility. At first 
glance, it might appear that the lack consideration given to sexual 
orientation, is similar in nature to applications by heterosexual 
women. In Re C, the women’s sexual identity was not considered 
legally relevant to the court at that time, in this particular instance. 
However, although sexual identity might have been considered 
relevant, it wasn’t considered problematic.
From reading the press release at the time, the impression gained 
is that the mother’s sexual identity was not considered problematic 
because no legal representation was made regarding the issue of an 
‘absent father’. (The Official Solicitor who represents the child’s 
interests was in favour of the application.) In one respect, it can be 
argued that this case is a step forward, for sexual identity was not 
considered legally problematic. However, the outcome of this case 
does not mean that the obsession, in legal culture, with non­
heterosexual identity has magically disappeared. The omission of 
discourse on the relevance of lesbianism to parenting in this case 
can be seen as a positive omission, however, there remains that 
which was not stated. The case did not expressly state that sexual 
orientation is irrelevant and unproblematic to parenting. If there 
had been such representation to the court from a putative father as 
to the relevance of lesbianism to parenting, the court would most 
likely have considered it. Thus it is (unfortunately), still open for 
future cases to consider a lesbian identity as a legally relevant 
consideration, illustrating law’s determination to continue
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constructing identity and imposing that construction upon its 
subjects.
This particular point, is one that should, in the first instance, be 
analysed in terms of equality. In terms of assessing parental 
suitability, sexual orientation is at present, only considered 
relevant where that sexual orientation is not heterosexual. In this 
context, it is possible to view this case from another angle. If we 
assume that the court is preoccupied with lesbianism, then why not 
emphasise this in order to illustrate to the court the advantages for 
a child in being brought up in a lesbian household? In other 
words, this approach would acknowledge the court’s de facto 
interest in the mother’s lesbianism, and would use this to 
emphasise the positive aspects of lesbian parenting as opposed to 
heterosexual parenting.
Whilst this idea holds some attraction, I remain unconvinced that 
emphasising lesbian identity to the court would necessarily 
produce ‘better results’. Because the majority of such custody 
cases revolve around a dispute between a lesbian mother and her 
estranged male heterosexual partner, there is a potentially 
significant danger that lesbian sexuality would be placed in a 
competitive arena with heterosexuality. In such a context, it 
would necessitate portraying lesbian sexuality as ‘better’ than 
heterosexuality - a sexual identity ‘competition’. This, in my
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opinion, would be an unnecessary focus. What is important is not 
necessarily which sexual identity is ‘better’ than another, but the 
quality of parenting.
At this juncture, a distinction needs to be made between ‘sex’ and 
‘gender’. Obviously the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ will have 
different meanings for different people and discourse surrounding 
these topics are hardly scarce, but there does appear to be a 
relatively common understanding. In other words, that there is a 
division in the distinction between sex and gender. It is a widely 
held view that the terms ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ do not have the same 
meaning. And what purpose does making this distinction have? 
The distinction appears to serve the argument that whatever fixed 
characteristics sex (as a biological phenomenon)14 may, or may not 
have, as a cultural construct gender can take as many different 
forms as there are possible variations on cultured ways of life. 
Thus, gender is neither the causal result of sex nor as seemingly 
fixed as sex. If we accept the argument that sex denotes physical 
characteristics, hormones, chromosomes and so forth, then gender 
still remains something else other than sex. Gender is usually said 
to be expressed by those personality traits and behaviour patterns 
associated with the cultural constructs of ‘masculinity’ and
14 Butler argues that ‘Sex is an ideal construct which is forcibly materialised 
through time. It is not a simple fact or static condition o f  a body, but a process
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‘femininity’. Therefore, a biological sexed ‘man’ can be 
‘effeminate’, and a biologically sexed ‘woman’, can be identified 
as ‘masculine’.
Furthermore, even if the sexes appear to be unproblematically 
binary (which cannot be assumed15), then there is no reason to 
assume that gender must necessarily be unproblematically binary. 
The presumption of a binary gender system implicitly retains the 
ideological belief in gender ‘mimicking’, or being defined by sex. 
When the constructed status of gender is theorised and lived, as 
being totally independent of sex, gender is again recognised as a 
free floating artifice.16 The paucity and narrowness of the ‘binary’ 
approach to sex and gender, leaves us little room for manoeuvre 
outside of the pre-determined compound. If we wish to explore 
the extent to which the individual can have genuine self 
determination with respect to sexuality and gender, thinking in 
terms of universal, narrow, binary opposites, does not allow for 
much diversity, and again leads to essentialism.
whereby regulatory norms materialise “sex” and achieve this materialisation 
through forcible reiteration o f those norms’ (Butler, 1993:1).
15 See for example The Independent, October 9 1994, which highlights the 
growing number o f individuals who wish to create and become part o f the third 
gender - neither male nor female.
16 See Sharpe in Legal Queeries (1998:26), and Whittle Legal Queeries 
(1998:42)
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From a position outside the heterosexual norm, the lesbian lives a 
paradox. While the lesbian sense of self may be more of a 
‘product’ of the lesbian herself than that of her heterosexual 
counterpart, the more she identifies with a lesbian body, the 
greater the gap will be between her self defined identity and the 
identity which law constructs for her. Furthermore, the less likely 
she is to receive formal recognition of that lesbian body and the 
greater the regulation and control.
Viewed in this way, ‘control’ and ‘ownership’ of the sexual body 
and the expression of identity is therefore linked to self 
determination and autonomy. This helps to illustrate the falsity of 
law’s claim to simply uncover and reflect the ‘truth’. In effect, its 
discourse only allows for one truth; one legal body; one legal 
identity. The discursive rhetorical repetition needed to sustain this 
concealed ‘creativity’ relies upon the exclusion of other, different 
identities and senses of self.
Conclusion to chapter six.
During the course of this chapter, I have tried to highlight the 
existence of the gaps between constructed legal identity and self­
defined identity, and hopefully gone some way towards mapping 
them.
247
Lesbian identity in motherhood presents us with an interesting site 
of legal construction because they cross the boundaries of legal 
identity. In terms of ‘control’ or ‘ownership’ of identity, the 
experience of the lesbian mother can uncover law’s pervasivness 
in not just the construction of identity, but also the control over 
the expression of identity. The lesbian mother may have control 
over her appearance, and she may have the appearance of control, 
but she faces a severe uphill struggle to gain legal representation 
and recognition of her lesbian body unless she complies with a 
pre-determined construction of identity.
If any thing is capable of being ‘owned’, and subject to self- 
determination, then in theory, sexual and gender identity is capable 
of such ownership. However, as I have explored, ownership and 
control are not necessarily synonymous. Whilst an individual can 
be said to possess and to have the power to express and withhold 
expression of her identity, she may only do so in the narrow and 
extremely limited manner prescribed by law. There is no 
corresponding ownership, control, power and so forth regarding 
the construction and imposition of that identity. To say that 
identity belongs to an individual is, I would argue, misleading. 
The possession and expression of identity, is not ‘owned’, as with 
Other forms of property. Rather it belongs and is owned by law, 
which as the builder and constructor of identity, conceals its own
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creativity. The construction of identities and the gaps that 
separate them is an on-going process, the ‘social making of 
meaning’ whereby ‘lesbian’ is constructed as something which 
comes into being by processes of description, recognition, 
disavowal, internalisation, extemalisation and embodiment 
(Wilton 1995: 83). In so doing, law projects a false belief in the 
self determination of the creation of individual sexual and gender 
identity, projects its own categories and stereotypes and then treats 
these as independent, as already ‘there’. It thus conceals the 
enforced maintenance of the gaps between imposed identity and 
self defined identity.
It might be argued that greater visibility for lesbians and lesbian 
motherhood is a ‘good thing’17. However, greater visibility does 
not necessarily mean greater subjective control over identity. 
Whilst the boundaries of lesbian identities may have widened or 
moved, (which remains to be seen), this has not necessarily been 
the result of a re-evaluation of the strategies employed in 
constructing those identities. On this basis, I would argue that this 
partly explains why the ‘new’ lesbian identity is largely as 
stereotypically limited as the current legal construct of ‘wife’, or 
‘mother’, ‘husband’, ‘father’ and so forth.
17 By a ‘good thing’, I mean that lesbians are at least becoming part o f  the 
discourse, having been previously ignored in comparison to, say, gay men.
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The idea that sexuality or sexual identity is a social construct is 
nothing new, but as with any construct, what must be remembered 
is that the construct cannot exist independently as a ‘thing in 
itself. Without its constructors it has no ‘independent’ existence 
(Caplan 1987; Frosh 1994). Without law as the constructor, the 
boundaries of identity cease to have importance or relevance.
If law is to continue to exercise control over the formation and 
expression of identity, it must enforce and preserve the exclusive 
parameters of identity. The gaps separating imposed identity and 
self-defined identity, essential to the maintenance of its own 
control, must be maintained and enforced by a process of 
exclusion, definition, and ownership.
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Conclusion
“The legal subject upheld in liberal theory is a rational, 
choosing person, capable of decision, an autonomous 
individual. This individual is without particularities of identity 
such as gender. Such a figure of neutrality is a deliberate legal 
creation to overcome differences - whether of culture, origin, 
race, gender or other particularities. Thus imaginary figure 
legitimates law’s generality and, sometimes law’s violence.”
(O’Donovan 1997: 47).
This thesis has focused upon the formation of identity in law. I have 
examined the legal and social construction of female gender and sexual 
identity with particular reference to lesbian sexual identity. I have argued 
that discourses regarding identity involve examining debates about, what 
in law, it means to be ‘woman’, ‘mother’ and ‘lesbian’. I went on to 
identify that such discourses take place not only within the context of 
hetero-centric values, assumptions and norms, but also within the 
operational nature of ‘distinct’ epistemological fields within law. The 
analysis aids understanding that identity is created by legal discourse, not 
the individual. I focused upon the ways in which female identity is 
represented within the contexts of ‘the family’, child custody disputes,
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property disputes, visual rhetoric, marriage and biological determinism. I 
argued that lesbian identity in particular, continues to be regarded and 
rendered ‘the other’ and ‘the invisible’, in relation to their position in the 
network of heterosexual legal and social power relations.
During the course of my thesis I wanted to explore the law’s selective 
refusal to recognise identity in some cases and the promotion of identity in 
others. Within that context, I wanted to examine some of the discourses 
that allow for the constitution of identity, and the imposition of that 
identity on the ‘subject’ of law. I have sought to demonstrate the 
importance of reading and re-reading legal discourse along with social 
discourse which map out what it means to be a ‘family’, ‘mother’, ‘parent’ 
in a contemporary Western society. It has been my concern to try and 
dis-mantle the idea of a unified and stable notion of ‘family’; ‘family law’ 
and ‘identity’.
During chapter one, I explored some of the methodological approaches 
available to me in trying to explore these issues. I drew upon some of 
Foucault’s work in order to explore some of the limitations within the 
meanings associated with, and constructed by, the language(s) that law 
uses. I did however, stop short of a complete adoption of Foucault’s ideas 
regarding the ‘non-existence’ of ‘the subject’, preferring instead to regard 
the subject as ‘something which exists’ within law, but whose 
experientially defined subjectivity is ignored or negated. Within this
252
context, I went on to identify how the lesbian mother is discursively 
produced and located in a hierarchical system in relation to other legal 
subjects e.g., the heterosexual mother.
In chapter two, I examined some of these issues further by exploring the 
manner in which ‘family’ has been defined, categorised and imposed by 
dominant ideological discourse. I argued that this dominance is often 
‘hidden’ within ‘layers’ of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘truth’, from critical 
examination. I argued that the analysis of legal ‘rights’; the ‘blood tie’ 
and symbolism demonstrated that these concepts continue to play a central 
defining role in socio-legal familial construction. The ‘truth’ about 
families (sic), is that they are biologically constructed and determined; 
they are ‘natural’. The appeal of ‘the natural’ to legal discourse, allows 
for the operation of power inherent within these layers of ‘established 
truth’ to be largely disguised. I explored the ways in which judicial 
attitudes and pronouncements rely on what is ‘natural’ in order to present 
and determine the ‘facts’ as ‘truth’. ‘Difference’ injudicial considerations 
is constructed as being based on fact, not cultural meanings:
“No matter how you may dispute and argue, you cannot alter the 
fact that women are quite different from men. The principal 
task in the life of women is to bear and raise children:...He is 
physically the stronger and she the weaker. He is 
temperamentally the more aggressive and she the more
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submissive. It is he who takes the initiative and she who 
responds. These diversities of function and temperament lead 
to differences of outlook which cannot be ignored.” (Denning 
1980:194).
I argued that this ‘desire’ to keep separate, make categories and so forth, 
was (and still is), utilised not only to ensure that ‘male’ identity is kept 
separate from ‘female’ identity, but was also exclusive in other ways; 
‘heterosexuality’ from ‘homosexuality’, or ‘mother’ from ‘lesbian’. Once 
categories are established, they can then be placed in a hierarchy of 
privilege - what is ‘natural’ is legally privileged above that which is not. 
The construction of the ‘natural’ enables law to dictate those identities 
which are ‘natural’ and therefore legally recognisable, and those identities 
which are ‘unnatural’ and therefore legally unrecognisable.
In chapter three, I examined some of the case law in ‘marital’ property 
dispute cases in an attempt to uncover a similar pattern of separation and 
hierarchy. I argued that ‘identity’ is further constrained by the many 
divides between ‘distinct’ areas of legal study and practice. I argued that 
the continuation of the artificial divide between ‘property’ law and 
‘family’ law, is not due to a necessity to prevent one ‘discipline’ 
overlapping another, but is part of a larger pattern of exclusion and 
ostricision (Bottomley 1993). I explored some of the ways in which the
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relationships between law and proprietal ownership had many implications 
for the ‘subject’ of law in the ‘ownership’ of ‘identity’.
I argued that the ‘injustice’ which often results from this pattern of 
exclusion is perhaps, one of the most ‘blatant’ examples of law’s open 
acknowledgement of it’s divisive operational nature. I explored some of 
the ways in which despite this acknowledgement, there is an unwillingness 
to re-evaluate categories and concepts. I asked myself what would happen 
when even this rather unhelpful acknowledgement of such divisive and 
exclusionary methods was absent?
I attempted to answer this question in chapter four by suggesting that the 
exclusionary strategies used, become a little more ‘subtle’. I argued that 
whilst the strategies may be more subtle, the effects on ‘the subject’ are 
not. I concentrated upon the importance of the symbolic and iconic 
aspects of law’s exclusive operational nature and how this continued to 
reinforce its own ‘legitimacy’. I argued that within the context of the 
‘family’, law’s dependence upon legitimacy is achieved mainly through 
the re-enforcement of ‘lines of succession’. I argued that this is not only 
achieved through written discourse, but also through ‘visual’ rhetoric; i.e., 
law’s symbols and icons. Although the symbolic nature of law’s visual 
symbols and icons has been the subject of critical examination in other
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contextsi, I wanted to explore the operation of power through more 
‘accessible’ or ‘common’ visual symbols. I suggested that a constant 
bombardment of a particular visual representation of the family operates 
on the subject to re-inforce a dominant ideology of a heterosexual and 
gendered family, presented as ‘inherently natural’. Part of the ‘problem’ 
of trying to uncover dominant ideological constructions, has been the 
‘invisibility’ of alternative discourses, both written and visual.
I argued that at the level of undergraduate studies, whilst the students may 
be encouraged to think critically about law, the main ‘tools’ used for this 
are of course, text books. I suggested that these immediately present the 
student and lecturer with images of the family which are prescriptive in 
nature and operation. I argued that ‘power’ operates by a symbolic 
repetition of citation, and that it is the symbolic which becomes invested 
with power. In order to illustrate this point I chose to examine the front 
covers of ‘commonly used’ family law text books.
In chapter five I argued that the lesbian mother provides a ‘site’ on which 
we can uncover the wielding of power within law which renders her 
unable to inhabit an identity of her own making. I wanted to explore the 
operation of ‘power’ and ‘truth’ upon the legal subject. I explored the 
restrictive terms upon which a lesbian mother is ‘allowed’ to be recognised
l See chapter four.
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as a legal subject in her own right. I argued that not only does this operate 
to the detriment of the particular lesbian mother concerned, but also to the 
detriment of law itself. In other words, diversity and difference should be 
considered expressions of strength, not weakness and deviance. It is 
unrelenting sameness and homogeneity that provide for law’s stagnation. 
In this respect, sameness and difference are placed in a hierarchy of 
privilege in relation to their opposites. For example, the legal category of 
‘woman’ is placed on a hierarchical scale in relation to its binary 
oppositional category, that of ‘male’. In other words, law concerns itself 
with the creation of categories, hierarchy and privilege - and ‘power’ is an 
integral part of that process. Thus, it is not necessarily the identification 
of difference per se, that is of prime interest to me, but rather the 
operation and nature of that difference, and the meaning and importance 
law ascribes to that difference.
In chapter six, I questioned whether the power/knowledge dichotomy 
could be viewed inherently linked with the issue of control, ownership and 
possession of identity. I also asked whether law claims exclusive access 
to the ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ about the construction and expression of 
identity.
If power/knowledge do operate within the construction of sexual and 
gender identity, then one of the consequences, might be the control over
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legal identity. ‘Power* is part and parcel of our everyday lives - we live it 
rather than have it:
“Foucault ... constitutes a radical break with all previous 
conceptions of power. ... To begin with, power is not a 
possession, won by one class that strives to retain it against its 
acquisition by another. Power is not the prerogative of the 
‘bourgeoisie’; the ‘working class’ has no historical mission in 
acquiring it. Power, as such, does not exist, but in challenging 
existing notions of how societies operate, one is forced, in the 
first instance, to employ the same word. Power is an effect of 
the operation of social relationships, between groups and 
between individuals. It is not unitary: it has no essence.” 
(Sheridan, 1980: 218).
Within the context of legal discourse, I examined how power operates 
upon the legal subject’s ability to self-determine sexual and gender 
identity. I argued that the legal subject does not ‘have’ a self-defined 
sexual gender identity, rather, they ‘experience’ or ‘live’ the identity 
constructed for them. In order to try and illustrate this point, I 
concentrated upon the concepts of ‘ownership’ within ‘the family’ and 
explored the extent to which sexuality and gender are viewed by law as 
‘property’. I wanted to ask whether law views ‘identity’ as the ‘property’ 
of law, or to what extent, is there ‘property’ in identity?
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I attempted to explore these issues by concentrating primarily upon the 
operation of law on lesbian mothers. I asked whether sexual identity and 
its attendant expressions, is perceived by law as something to be controlled 
and categorised. Were there ‘gaps’ between the constructions, 
expressions and representations of a lesbian mother’s self-identity, and 
those that are imposed upon her by law? I argued that if such ‘gaps’ did 
exist, they may allow us to ‘map’ the apparent continuing difficulty that 
women (especially lesbians), as legal subjects, have in authenticating their 
identity and exercising control over it.
Within this context, I questioned whether it is possible to resist impositions 
of power? Is it possible to move towards a ‘new’ jurisprudential 
approach to ‘the family’ and ‘intimacy’. Why does ‘law’ appear incapable 
of viewing the ‘family’ without its constructed crutches of gender, 
sexuality, femininity, masculinity and so forth? To use a politically 
fashionable phrase, ‘do we need to think the unthinkable?’. To my mind, 
‘thinking the unthinkable is not necessarily re-thinking the actual familial 
structures themselves, nor necessarily the strategies and methodologies 
used to create and sanction those structures - I do not deny their 
importance. Whilst I would strongly support the argument that re-thinking 
meaning, language, definitions and so forth is important, I would argue 
that ‘re-thinking’ offers little hope for even moderate change surrounding 
legal notions of identity, and could only claim limited success. Similarly,
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recognising or establishing ‘points of resistance’ can only go so far in 
resisting the intrusions of power.
Since I appear to have spent the majority of my thesis attempting to point 
to what I see as some of law’s shortcomings, its failings and so forth, do I 
have any suggestions which might improve matters? If ‘identity’ and the 
ability to self- define are so important, are there any ways in which I can 
see law changing or adapting in order to allow for ‘identity’ to be ‘self- 
determined’? Is law even a desirable ‘vehicle’ for reform? There is a 
danger that ‘however we theorise our claims, they will become 
transmogrified into legal categories which mask the nature of women’s 
socially-based oppression’ (Howe 1991: 165). It has been suggested that 
there is a need to engage with law and that feminists must engage with law 
because law is an important and unavoidable site of political struggle:
“It is not simply open to feminists to eschew law on grounds of 
its gendered content. The struggle must take place both within 
law and outside it, both through it and beyond it. Legal change 
is neither the starting point nor the end result of the feminist 
project but, as an inevitable part of that project, it must be 
addressed.” (Conaghan 1996:408).
Smart agrees with this approach. She argues that law must continue to 
engaged with, notwithstanding that law both facilitates and obstructs
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change resulting in ‘legal disappointments’ (Smart 1989). O’Donovan 
sees the issue as being one of ‘context’ - we should try and perceive 
female identity subjectivity within the woman’s own context. In other 
words, it may be useful strategically to call attention to, and to validate 
those qualities which traditionally denoted “woman” ’ (O’Donovan 
1997:52). She calls upon the work of Gilligan who argues that the placing 
of the subject in her context, offers a ‘woman’s justice’. For Gilligan, 
women tend to reason in a ‘different voice’ - they are less likely than men 
to privilege abstract rights over concrete relationships and are more 
attentive to values of care, connection, and context. In other words, 
values traditionally associated worth women be valued and that legal 
strategies focus on altering societal structures not just assimilating women 
within them (Gilligan 1982). For O’Donovan, it is the rhetorical 
methodology of locating law’s subject is, in itself, and ambivalently, both 
subversive of, and expressive of, subjectivites:
“In other words, we are self-consciously aware of past sexual 
constitutions and their places in current identities. 
Simultaneously we dissent from and resist these constitutions 
and identities.” (O’Donovan 1997: 63).
Whether I like it or not, I am a legal subject and law will continue to 
operate upon me. Similarly, law operates upon all legal subjects. Whether 
law’s operations are felt directly or indirectly, it will continue to influence
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and shape identity. In this respect, I would argue that law cannot be 
‘reformed’ to allow for autonomy over legal identity. ‘Family law’ is, I 
would argue, so fundamentally ‘flawed’ that no amount of ‘Family Law 
Reform Acts could remedy the defects alone. In Addition, it would not be 
possible to pass a reforming statute (or series of statutes) to allow for self 
determined identity to be recognised in family law without any concurrent 
effects being felt in other areas of law (for example property law). Indeed, 
it would seem improbable that family law could be reformed without other 
areas of law (such as inheritance; immigration; tax; social security; 
housing; criminal law etc.), necessitating similar treatment. Nor could 
such ‘legislative’ reform be restricted to statute. Smart suggests that ‘law 
is not simply synonymous with either legislation or the body of the 
judiciary’, and that the ‘operation of law is increasingly administered or 
influenced by quasi- or non-legal personnel such as probation officers, 
social workers’ (Smart 1994: 152).
Apart from complete social, political, religious and legal ‘revolution’, 
which I would argue, is unlikely, what I hope is achievable is a recognition 
that there is no ‘mileage’ in pursuing the ‘truth’ about identity. There is no 
‘truth’ to identity, just experience. However, if there is a stereotypical and 
legally acceptable version of ‘identity’, those that do not ‘conform’ do not 
stand as equals before the law. The diversity of ‘identity’ ‘experiences’, is 
a diversity foreign to law - its language is reductionist polarised as it is by 
an either/or framework which does not easily embrace complexity or
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nuance. It is not just ‘family law’ which is fundamentally flawed but, I 
would argue, law itself. Notwithstanding this however, it is I believe, 
possible and important, to continually endeavour to explore and recognise 
that which is silenced and rendered ‘the other’. Grosz, for example 
suggests that in relation to feminism, it is necessary to recognise ‘the 
situation and alignments of power within and against which it [feminism] 
operates’ (Grosz 1990: 59). I find O’Donovan’s analysis (above), 
persuasive. There is, she argues, no ‘utopia’ that can be achieved without 
a ‘moment of definition’. For if the ‘utopian moment is a moment of 
definition, and therefore prescriptive for others, then the very rigidities we 
are endeavouring to escape may be reimplied’ (O’Donovan 1997: 63). It is 
this which leads O’Donovan to conclude that Taw is undergoing an 
identity crisis’.
It is therefore, not just Taw reform’ which may prove ‘inadequate’, and it 
is not just the ‘meaning’ attached to notions of ‘natural’, ‘family’, 
‘marriage’, ‘woman’, ‘property’, ‘lesbian’, which must be continually re­
addressed. It is as O’Donovan argues, also important to be aware that the 
methodology of ‘sexing the subject’ is a ‘witnessing and documenting of 
the effects of history and practice’. This is why it is important to 
challenge not just the notions of ‘family home’ within the context of 
property law for example, but also to challenge the notion of a distinct 
epistemological field of property law. These ‘challenges’ have to be made 
not just ‘within’ law, but also ‘outside’ of law and legal practice. If there
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is the possibility of autonomy over identity self-definition, these 
‘challenge’ exist whenever and wherever, we engage with law. I perceive 
it as necessary therefore that there be continued critique of power relations 
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